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INVESTMENT GAMES
JAMES FALLOWS TIERNEY†
ABSTRACT
Popular zero-commission stock trading apps like Robinhood
innovate in user-experience design, featuring “gamification”
practices—flashy graphics, leaderboards, and the like—that make it
attractive, easy, and fun to trade stocks. Regulators are increasingly
scrutinizing gamification and other digital engagement practices, with
efforts underway at the SEC to adopt rules in broker-dealer and
investment-advisor regulation. This attention reflects considerable
skepticism about gamification in securities markets. At best, these
practices encourage motivation and engagement, and democratize
access to financial markets. But at worst, these practices encourage
people to trade habitually and unreflectively, and more than they might
want. This can lead to undesirable market-wide effects, like distorting
the process by which markets allocate investment capital to firms and
projects that will grow the real economy, as well as socially wasteful
(and individually harmful) excessive trading. And given that
interventions in retail investor choice have significant implications for
market quality and wealth inequality, regulatory responses here are a
high stakes matter for society broadly.
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Calls to regulate gamification highlight a tension at the core of
securities markets. Securities law has largely ceded the field of market
structure to the interests of sophisticated financial intermediaries in
producing liquidity and price discovery. By permitting gamification
practices that encourage active trading for the primary benefit of
financial intermediaries, securities law subordinates its investor
protection function to encourage wasteful investment in achieving eversmaller improvements in liquidity and price discovery. Regulatory
intervention would be socially desirable, I argue, not just given what we
know about retail trader behavior and its effects on personal finance
and markets—but because it is an opportunity for securities law to
recalibrate away from an all-out arms race in arbitrage.
This Article takes up the problem of gamification and related digital
engagement practices. It considers how gamification is the nearly
inevitable consequence of the rise of retail investors who trade without
superior information about a stock’s fundamental value, competition
on brokerage commissions, and a fragmented market structure. Yet
calls for regulatory interventions often elide important distinctions
between how securities law should treat active traders who prefer risk,
and those with preferences distorted by gamification. This Article
explains how we got here; examines the social-welfare case for
regulating gamification and related digital engagement practices; offers
a typology of techniques that securities regulators can adopt in
response; and assesses these interventions against existing securities law
doctrine and policy. This Article also considers how the securities laws’
tenuous relationship with innovative stock-market technology shapes
how retail investors engage with financial markets.
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INTRODUCTION
2021 might’ve been “the year of the retail investor.”1 Retail
investors piled into meme stocks like GameStop and other risky assets
1. See VAL SRINIVAS & JILL GREGORIE, THE RISE OF NEWLY EMPOWERED RETAIL
INVESTORS: HOW THEY’RE CHANGING CUSTOMER EXPECTATIONS AND INVESTING DYNAMICS
1 (2021), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us-
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like crypto and options, launching asset prices like rockets “to the
moon.”2 Popular stock brokerage apps like Robinhood not only made
active trading cheap, easy, and fun; they encouraged it.3 Legal scholars
have observed the reemergence of retail investors as a force in stock
markets, at odds with long-term trends.4
This airy story, resonant with overtones of the democratization of
finance, obscures two somber truths about today’s stock market. First,
many retail investors don’t heed the advice of traditional finance:
invest patiently in a diversified, risk-adjusted portfolio. Many try to
beat the market by trading stocks. Yet decades of research reveals that
active “trading is hazardous to your wealth.”5 The second somber
reality is that brokers have strong incentives to encourage customers
to engage in self-directed trades that are either excessive or in
the-rise-of-newly-empowered-retail-investors-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CEF-6WT6]. “Retail
investors” are individuals across all walks of life, perhaps including you or your friends or family,
who save and invest directly in retirement and nonretirement accounts to achieve financial goals
like education or retirement. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 12 (2010) (describing investment
by people saving for education and retirement). “Retail” distinguishes nonprofessional investors
from those sufficiently wealthy or sophisticated to meet requirements for accessing private and
institutional capital markets. See Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Couns., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Speech at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics: The
Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch1024
07bgc.htm [https://perma.cc/WR2A-9AEV] (contrasting retail investment with institutional investment).
2. See Katherine Doherty & Brandon Kochkodin, AMC Became the People’s Stock by Not
Being a GameStop Remake, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 4, 2021, 7:14 AM), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-04/amc-to-the-moon-how-meme-stock-embraced-reddit-b
oom-unlike-gamestop-gme [https://perma.cc/UFJ4-3LCS]; Avi Salzman, Watch Out, Coinbase:
Robinhood Just Revealed Big Crypto Growth, BARRON’S (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.barr
ons.com/articles/watch-out-coinbase-robinhood-just-revealed-big-crypto-growth-51614293289
[https://perma.cc/STC3-JUCH]; Madison Darbyshire, Eric Platt & Miles Kruppa, Robinhood
IPO: Why Believers Failed To Deliver the ‘Moonshot,’ FIN. TIMES (July 30, 2021), https://ww
w.ft.com/content/81e9871b-5d12-480b-87a8-454b69e11958 [https://perma.cc/RKW4-ZTB7]. For
discussion of this article’s limited focus on equity trading rather than options and crypto, see infra
note 39.
3. See Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci & Christina M. Sautter, Corporate Governance
Gaming: The Collective Power of Retail Investors, 22 NEV. L.J. 51, 52–53, 62 (2021).
4. See id. at 52–53; Jill E. Fisch, GameStop and the Reemergence of the Retail Investor, 102
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2022) (manuscript at 2–3) [hereinafter Fisch, GameStop]; infra
Part I.C.1.
5. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 773 (2000)
[hereinafter Barber & Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Health] (finding that active traders
underperformed in a study from 1991 to 1996); see also infra notes 264–266 and accompanying
text (explaining that retail investors rarely, if ever, beat average market portfolio returns).
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securities that are unsuitable for them.6 Between market innovations
like zero-commission trading, fractional share investing, and game-like
user-interface design, it is cheaper and easier than ever before for
ordinary people to trade securities and financial products.
Yet regulators now worry trading is too easy. What to do about it
is a concern for broker-dealer regulation, a subfield of securities law.7
Much of the worry has focused on Robinhood, an investing app.8 In the
market for zero-commission brokerage, mobile app developers have
innovated in user-interface design to compete with incumbent
brokers.9 Robinhood, for instance, used to shower digital confetti down
a smartphone screen upon successful execution of a trade.10 Other
innovations have included intuitive and appealing design, as well as
digital engagement practices that encourage interaction with the app
and that shape the information users consider in investing. Examples
include leaderboards of volatile or popular stocks, push notifications
prompting users to trade, and lottery-like rewards.11
These practices are called “gamification” in investing apps.12 The
concept reflects an increasingly familiar feature of our online world:
app design that channels and shapes our behavior—presenting
6. See infra Parts I, II.B.1.
7. Brokers are those “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)–(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)–(5). On
the regulation of broker-dealers, see, for example, Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities
Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1067–68 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou, Annie Massa & Anders Melin, How Robinhood
Made Trading Easy—and Maybe Even Too Hard To Resist, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2021, 3:01
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2021-robinhood-stock-trading-design [https://perma.c
c/6Z2N-8ZSD]; Hannah Levintova, Robinhood Promises Free Trades. Did Alex Kearns Pay with
His Life?, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2021/04/
robinhood-gamestop-free-trades-alex-kearns [https://perma.cc/E3JC-7G5Q]; Michael Wursthorn
& Euirim Choi, Does Robinhood Make It Too Easy To Trade? From Free Stocks to Confetti,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2020, 2:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/confetti-free-stocks-doesrobinhoods-design-make-trading-too-easy-11597915801 [https://perma.cc/V2ZP-6Y6P]. This Article
is not a brief against Robinhood but uses it as an example because it is a publicly traded brokerdealer with large market share that has been subjected to media and regulatory scrutiny.
9. See Jennifer J. Schulp, The Trading Game, REGUL. REV. (May 3, 2021), https://
www.theregreview.org/2021/05/03/schulp-trading-game [https://perma.cc/933Q-8YHL]; Nicole
Casperson, Robinhood Drops the Confetti, but Advisers Aren’t Convinced, INV. NEWS (Apr. 6,
2021), https://www.investmentnews.com/robinhood-drops-the-confetti-but-advisers-arent-convin
ced-204828 [https://perma.cc/GP7G-9L98] (noting Robinhood’s competition with the “dullerthan-dishwater experience of most financial platforms”).
10. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
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information in ways that alter attractiveness of options; or engaging,
motivating, and rewarding us to encourage us to make transactions we
otherwise would not.
Gamified investing can encourage trading that is excessive or
maladaptive. It can draw our attention to stocks or opportunities to
transact in other assets when we would not otherwise choose them.
And behind-the-scenes technological features can potentially learn
what kinds of prompts get us to trade, so we can be offered individual
prompts that encourage us to trade even more.13 When effective, it
elicits a higher volume of noisy retail order flow in securities that
generate brokerage profits and cross-subsidize further trading.14
Empirical research has shown how design can shape trading behavior
in ways that are profitable for the broker—but may not be in retail
traders’ interests.15 It also has downstream negative consequences on
market quality like higher volatility and lower-quality price discovery.16
Gamification, moreover, disrupts markets’ traditional capital
allocation function, as it tends to conflate “trading” with “investment”
13. Gamification is used colloquially in market commentary in ways that largely, if not fully,
overlap with “digital engagement practices” as a category of regulatory concern. The SEC has
issued a request for information on digital engagement practices. See Request for Information
and Comments on Broker-Dealer and Investment Adviser Digital Engagement Practices,
Related Tools and Methods, and Regulatory Considerations and Potential Approaches;
Information and Comments on Investment Adviser Use of Technology To Develop and Provide
Investment Advice, Exchange Act Release 92766, 86 Fed. Reg. 49,067, 49,068 (Sept. 1, 2021)
[hereinafter DEP RFI]. “Digital engagement practices” or “DEPs” are a broader concept than
gamification, ranging from electronic communications to roboadvice, and from securities
screening tools to retirement contribution planners. The concept also includes second-order
practices like data analytics, personalized recommendation algorithms, and A/B testing that allow
monitoring, testing, and fine-tuning the efficacy of these design practices. Full treatment of DEPs
would require a book. The concept covers any kind of sales or advisory practice that brokers,
dealers, registered investment advisers, and their associated people use through electronic means,
directly or indirectly. What’s more, regulatory concerns associated with “excessive trading”oriented gamification differ from those associated with using digital engagement to encourage
responsible financial behavior (such as roboadvice) or financial literacy. Cf. Part II.C.1
(describing how the market likely would not produce the kind of thoughtful DEPs necessary for
gamified investing to actually encourage beneficial financial behavior). This Article focuses on
broker-dealer rather than investment-adviser implications of DEPs. See infra note 64 and
accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Kyle Langvardt & James Fallows Tierney, On “Confetti Regulation”: The
Wrong Way To Regulate Gamified Investing, 131 YALE L.J. F. 717, 717–18 (2022); Game Stopped?
Who Wins and Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail Investors Collide, Part III:
Virtual Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. 5–6 (2021) [hereinafter House
Gamification Hearing III] (statement of Gary Gensler, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
15. See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Parts II.A, III.A.
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as the way to grow wealth in a capitalist economy. It risks idiosyncratic
loss and waste and generates greater wealth inequality by inhibiting
retail investors’ ability to grow wealth reliably by participating in
capital markets.17
For that reason, gamified investing has come under increased
regulatory scrutiny. Congress held a series of hearings in early 2021 to
discuss the role of retail traders in stock markets, directly scrutinizing
gamification.18 Federal and state regulators have announced responses
across the range of rulemaking, enforcement, and examination.19 The
SEC has requested information from the public about possible
regulatory interventions, and work is underway.20 This regulatory
attention reflects considerable skepticism about the consequences of
gamification in securities markets—for how retail investors engage
with these markets, how capital is allocated, how people achieve their
financial goals, and how financial intermediaries make money.
Yet securities law does not have a readymade theory for weighing
these concerns against other regulatory commitments to investor
autonomy and democratized access to financial markets.21 That
underscores the urgent need for legal scholarship situating these
practices in theory and doctrine.22 Despite a rich literature on

17. See, e.g., infra Parts II.C, III.C (discussing alternative visions of investment games and
securities law’s role in picking investment games’ winners); see also, e.g., Emily Winston, Unequal
Investment: A Regulatory Case Study, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 781, 831–44 (2022) (arguing that
securities regulation exacerbates wealth inequality by gatekeeping access to higher return-oninvestment opportunities).
18. For written testimony and transcripts of the hearings, see Game Stopped? Who Wins and
Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail Investors Collide: Virtual Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. (2021); Game Stopped? Who Wins and Loses When Short
Sellers, Social Media, and Retail Investors Collide, Part II: Virtual Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. (2021); House Gamification Hearing III, supra note 14.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra notes 57–65 and accompanying text.
21. “Securities law” is meaningful here in one sense but not another. On cryptocurrency
trading and regulation, see infra note 39.
22. In a forthcoming article, Jill Fisch defends retail investor participation in stock markets
by examining trading in “meme stocks,” and argues that regulatory interventions should be
designed to encourage rather than discourage participation by retail investors in capital markets.
See Fisch, GameStop, supra note 4, at 1, 4; see also, e.g., Ricci & Sautter, supra note 3, at 83–88.
For the literature on this populist vision of retail corporate governance, see infra notes 218–236
and accompanying text. Fisch briefly addresses gamified investing apps in acknowledging
concerns that these features may influence behavior through “manipulation” that may raise
different concerns than retail investor participation in markets in general. Fisch, GameStop, supra
note 4, at 37–39. For another forthcoming article, addressing how securities regulation should deal
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regulation of retail investment markets, legal scholars have largely
overlooked the regulation of innovative technologies that direct and
channel retail traders’ attention and shape their decisions.23 This
Article fills that gap, articulating from the ground up a theory of
gamification in securities regulation.24
Securities law has traditionally been concerned with deception but
has had a more uneasy stance toward speculation.25 Some people
with gamification as a problem of appealing to minor children’s financial activities, see generally
Nizan Geslevich Packin, Financial Inclusion Gone Wrong: Securities and Crypto Assets Trading
for Children, 74 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2022). For one arguing for a safe harbor for trading
in small-balance accounts, see generally Abraham J.B. Cable, Regulating Democratized Investing,
83 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2022). Jerry Markham mentions in passing the Massachusetts
securities regulators’ lawsuit against Robinhood in an article otherwise focusing on criticizing
Regulation Best Interest. Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Broker-Dealer Investment Recommendations
- Laying the Groundwork for the Next Financial Crisis, 13 DREXEL L. REV. 377, 443 n.396 (2021).
Practitioners and students have also addressed legal issues surrounding gamification and brokerdealer regulation. See, e.g., Dennis M. Kelleher, Jason Grimes & Andres Chovil, Securities—
Democratizing Equity Markets with and Without Exploitation: Robinhood, Gamestop, Hedge
Funds, Gamification, High Frequency Trading, and More, 44 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 51, 77–107
(2022); Nick Waters, Note, Remedying the Negative Effects of Equity Market Order Flow
Decentralization on Retail Investors, 16 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 368, 387–400 (2022); Travis C.
Studdard, Riling Up as Recommendation: How Commission-Free Brokerages Recommend Active
Investing to the Public, 29 NO. 1 PIABA BAR J. 67, 67–69 (2022); John R. Fallon, Note, Equal
Access to Investments: At Whose Expense?, 21 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTEL. PROP. L. 431, 467
(2021); Chris Mao, Note, Stealing from the Poor: Regulating Robinhood’s Exchange-Traded
Options for Retail Investors, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 344–55 (2021); Christal McCamy, Note,
Retail Investors: Why Online Investing Platforms Need More Regulation and Oversight, 16
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 255, 276–77 (2021).
23. Legal scholars have examined how behavioral economics principles like choice
architecture bear on retail investor behavior. Jacob Hale Russell has surveyed the literature on
excessive trading and distinguished the normative basis for regulatory intervention based on
taste-based or circumstance-based reasons for trading. See generally Jacob Hale Russell,
Misbehavioral Law and Economics, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 549 (2018). Russell does not,
however, address the phenomenon, regulation, or theory of gamification in broker-dealer
regulation. And because he wrote before the emergence of zero-commission trading in late 2019,
some prescriptions are based on assumptions that no longer hold. Cf. Matt Levine, Opinion, The
Trades Will Be Free Now, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2019, 12:05 PM) [hereinafter Levine, The Trades
Will Be Free Now], https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-02/the-trades-will-befree-now [https://perma.cc/CH97-LK5V] (describing how Robinhood “charges zero commissions,
and it has rapidly gained millions of customers and achieved a multibillion-dollar valuation
because zero is just self-evidently the right price to charge for stock trades”).
24. In a January 2022 essay in Yale Law Journal Forum, Kyle Langvardt and I examined
“confetti regulation,” or command-and-control regulation of mobile app design, as a highly
salient potential regulatory response to problem-use harms from gamification. See Langvardt &
Tierney, supra note 14, at 720. We wrote to highlight the administrability problems and litigation
risk associated with such a ban, but explicitly left open the higher-order theoretical, doctrinal, and
normative questions for this Article to address. See id. at 720 n.13.
25. On speculation, see infra Part II.B.2.
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speculate by actively trading stocks with eyes wide open, but others are
duped into believing they are trading based on information when they
are not. Gamification features are potentially objectionable in that
they induce trading in securities not because of information relevant to
economic payoff, but because of information’s salience or prominence
in investors’ attention. Brokers have an incentive to increase salience
of, and thereby induce trading in, the securities that will provide the
highest compensation to them. Securities law traditionally handled this
by regulating “recommendations” as a mechanism for increasing a
security’s salience to brokerage clients.26 But the legacy doctrinal
concern with recommendations fits imperfectly with the modern trend
of retail investors trading in self-directed accounts.27 Meanwhile,
securities law is ambivalent about the role of self-directed retail
investors, neither allowing them to engage without restriction in
markets nor paternalistically excluding them from trading. This raises
hard questions about whether securities law should have a role in
promoting prudent investing as compared to speculative trading.
Gamification encourages people to trade excessively and noisily
in self-directed accounts, underperforming the market on average—all
for the broker-dealer’s financial benefit. This is a diversion of
investment and capital from productive uses in the real economy to the
financial economy, and it should be discouraged. Doing so is easier said
than done, because the modern stock market generates strong
incentives for intermediaries like brokers to promote this kind of
informationally noisy order flow from retail customers.28 The
microstructure of these markets involves an all-out battle over
intermediation rents. Investment games fuel this battle; by generating
noisy order flow, investing app features that encourage retail stock
trading for reasons other than the “value” of the stock make this kind
of intermediation more profitable.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces gamification in
stock trading apps, identifies regulatory responses to it, and situates it
as the product of several convergent trends in law and market
structure. Part II articulates a theory of gamified investing as a means
of promoting retail investors to engage in a pattern of informationally
noisy and potentially excessive trades. It begins by describing different
empirical and theoretical models of how and why retail investors
26.
27.
28.

See infra notes 315–320 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 326–328 and accompanying text.
On noise, see infra notes 140–149 and accompanying text.
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trade—for entertainment or based on the mistaken reasoning that
trading is the path to wealth. It also situates gamification as a reason
for trading within two strands of securities law theory, focusing on
conflicts of interest and paternalism toward speculative trading as a
kind of gambling. Part II concludes by identifying and responding to
three alternative visions that reflect optimism, populism, and
pessimism about gamified retail investment in capital markets.
Part III turns to normative and doctrinal implications of the two
strands of securities law theory raised in Part II. There is a social
welfare case for regulating gamification features in retail investing,
arising from market failures like externalities and principal-agent
problems. Part III examines some prototypical and some relatively
unorthodox responses in securities law, including disclosure, antifraud
rules, broker sales practices rules, fiduciary-duty theories, and market
structure interventions. The SEC has many of the tools it needs to
address gamification, though there are plausible doctrinal fixes around
the edges. The SEC should not—as the brokerage industry suggests29—
leave existing law alone. Part III concludes by observing that
gamification is the product of underlying market failures that
encourage people to engage in patterns of excessive trades that
underperform the market on average, all to increase the profits of
market intermediaries. A bold and modern securities law, it concludes,
would step in to fix the market structure problems that create
incentives to make investing a “game” in the first place.
I. GAMIFICATION IN SECURITIES MARKETS
Retail investors choose brokers, then choose transactions. To
attract digitally savvy clients, many brokers offer attractively designed
mobile apps and zero-commission trading. Some also use design in
ways that influence the transactions clients make. Part I introduces the
problem of “investment games,” identifying brokers’ incentives to
shape investor behavior this way. After describing recent regulatory
scrutiny of these practices, this Part identifies three convergent
historical trends that together create an incentive to promote a pattern

29. See, e.g., Kevin M. Carroll, Managing Dir. & Assoc. Gen. Couns., Sec. Indus. & Fin.
Mkts. Ass’n, Comment Letter on Broker-Dealer and Investment Adviser Digital Engagement
Practices, Related Tools and Methods (Oct. 1, 2021) [hereinafter SIFMA Comment Letter],
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021-9315816-260052.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK45-RW
RW] (arguing that “new rules, guidance, or interpretations are not necessary or appropriate to
address [digital engagement practices] use in our industry today”).
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of retail investor orders that is unrelated to information about a
security: price competition, increased retail investor participation in
markets, and the way modern markets operate.
A. What is Gamification?
In our increasingly online world, businesses, educators, and
platforms adopt practices that reward, motivate, or encourage us to do
things we otherwise might not.30 This lets businesses appeal to the
predictably imperfect rationality of users in service of some goal,
typically including private profit.31
Features like these are sometimes called “gamification,”
especially in the popular imagination about stock trading apps.32
Across scholarly discourses examining gamification in behavioraleconomic terms, a common thread focuses on how presentation of
information bears on decisionmaking.33 This reflects a concern
common to gamification and related practices like “dark patterns” and
30. See Tae Wan Kim & Kevin Werbach, More Than Just a Game: Ethical Issues in
Gamification, 18 ETHICS INFO. TECH. 157, 157–58 (2016).
31. See Rimantas Gatautis, J rat Banyt , Rita Kuvykait , Regina Virvilait , Aist Dovalien ,
Žaneta Piligrimien , Agn Gadeikien , Elena Vitkauskait & Asta Tarut , The Conceptual Model
of Gamification-Based Consumer Engagement in Value Creation, in GAMIFICATION AND
CONSUMER ENGAGEMENT 99, 103–07 (Rimantas Gatautis, J rat Banyt & Elena Vitkauskait
eds., 2021) (drawing on marketing theory to model gamification practices that build consumer
engagement, promote behavioral change, and create economic profitability for firms); see also
James “Pigeon” Fielder, Robinhood Makes Wall Street Feel like a Game To Win—Not a Place
Where You Can Lose Your Savings, FAST CO. (Mar. 27, 2021), https://
www.fastcompany.com/90619112/robinhood-gamification-dark-side [https://perma.cc/89GF-25UT]
(describing how Robinhood turns investors into players and encourages them to spend money).
32. See, e.g., Levintova, supra note 8. In the game studies literature, gamification is “the use
of game design elements in non-game contexts.” Sebastian Deterding, Dan Dixon, Rilla Khaled
& Lennart Nacke, From Game Design Elements to Gamefulness: Defining “Gamification,” in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC MINDTREK CONFERENCE:
ENVISIONING FUTURE MEDIA ENVIRONMENTS 9, 11 (2011), http://www.rolandhubscher.org/
courses/hf765/readings/Deterding_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8FF-ENLQ]. Games are “characterized
by explicit rule systems and the competition or strife of actors in those systems toward discrete
goals or outcomes.” Id. at 11; see also, e.g., Katie Seaborn & Deborah I. Fels, Gamification in
Theory and Action: A Survey, 74 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUT. STUD. 14, 14 (2015) (defining
gamification as “the selective incorporation of game elements into an interactive system without
a fully-fledged game as the end product”).
33. See, e.g., Sebastian Deterding, The Ambiguity of Games: Histories and Discourses of a
Gameful World, in THE GAMEFUL WORLD: APPROACHES, ISSUES, APPLICATIONS 23, 40 (Steffen
P. Walz & Sebastian Deterding eds., 2015) (describing the idea that “behavioral economics [is] a
foundation for gamification,” often used to frame investment in game design as a way to
“help[] . . . marketers to drive . . . sales with choice architectures whose design patterns directly
use cognitive biases and heuristics, social influence, emotional appeals, and the power of habit”).
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habit-forming technologies: that designers will present information and
choices about goods, services, transactions, and markets that appeal to
imperfectly rational cognitive processes to elicit behavior that benefits
the designer.34 Design can distort user behavior in ways that give rise
to traditional market failures like principal-agent problems and
externalities. It can also redistribute economic surplus from users to
designers in ways that are nonsalient or only barely perceptible.
This article uses “gamification” (and occasionally the variation
“investment games”) to mean the use of “game design” elements,
including behaviorally oriented user-interface and user-experience
design practices, that influence and may exploit retail investor
behavior.35 Interface and experience design can encourage intuitive,
habitual, and uncritical responses rather than deliberation over
preferences and choices.36 Designers can intervene in decisionmaking
processes to encourage outcomes that the person otherwise would not
have chosen. The choices users make in investing apps thus may not
34. See, e.g., Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 43, 57 (2021) (describing “dark patterns” that “nudge consumers toward a
selection that is likely to be unpopular with them but profitable for the company”); Justin (Gus)
Hurwitz, Designing a Pattern, Darkly, 22 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 57, 61–64 (2020) (explaining how
designers can exploit “patterns in how users interact with information” to “present information
in ways that influence” user behavior); cf. James Ash, Ben Anderson, Rachel Gordon & Paul
Langley, Digital Interface Design and Power: Friction, Threshold, Transition, 36 ENV’T & PLAN.
D: SOC’Y & SPACE 1136, 1138 (2018) (analyzing the “interface design” of digital apps providing
high-cost short-term credit as an “experimental process of managing friction,” meaning “a series
of bodily and technical obstacles or hesitancies that interrupt, slow or stop a user from completing
a task within a digital interface, such as choosing a service or buying a product”).
35. Scholars of economic transactions by individuals in consumer law, contract law,
securities law, and the like have focused on behavioral exploitation. See Michael D. Guttentag,
Law and Surplus: Opportunities Missed, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 607, 658–60 (reviewing literature);
see also, e.g., James Fallows Tierney, Contract Design in the Shadow of Regulation, 98 NEB. L.
REV. 874, 878 (2020) [hereinafter Tierney, Contract Design in the Shadow of Regulation]; Martin
Brenncke, The Legal Framework for Financial Advertising: Curbing Behavioural Exploitation, 3
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 853, 855 (2018); OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 2 (2012). By “investment games,” this
Article does not mean to include apps that allow people to engage in “paper trading” without
putting real money at stake and without participating in the capital markets.
36. See, e.g., Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 34, at 52; Juho Hamari, Kai Huotari & Juha
Tolvanen, Gamification and Economics, in THE GAMEFUL WORLD: APPROACHES, ISSUES,
APPLICATIONS, supra note 33, at 139, 140. To one industry observer, a goal of “gamification” in
financial services is to “rewire our brains and the way we engage emotionally by promoting new
experiences that help to change investment habits and feelings.” PAOLO SIRONI, FINTECH
INNOVATION: FROM ROBO-ADVISORS TO GOAL BASED INVESTING AND GAMIFICATION 142–
43 (2016). On whether people would rationally choose the transactions that gamification
encourages them to make, see infra Part II.A.1.
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reflect the actual benefits users will experience receiving, giving rise to
an opportunity for firms to manipulate users’ choices—all with
plausible harms to users and society.37
Scholars have shown the role of user-interface design in
encouraging repeat engagement with stock trading apps.38 One
example that has attracted significant attention is Robinhood, an
investing app through which clients can trade stocks, ETFs, options,
and cryptocurrencies.39 Like many other online brokers, Robinhood’s
user experience incorporates gamification practices. In 2019, when
most discount brokers began to offer zero-commission trading, market
observers noted that gamification was driving growth.40 The rest of this

37. See infra Part III.A.
38. See Sayan Chaudhry & Chinmay Kulkarni, Design Patterns of Investing Apps and Their
Effects on Investing Behaviors, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE DESIGNING INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS
CONFERENCE 777, 782 (2021), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3461778.3462008 [https://perm
a.cc/EP9U-RZJ3] (“While latency in interfaces is generally detrimental, immediate payback of
risky bets encourages more frequent plays and the tendency to regamble any winnings with little
rational financial consideration.” (footnotes omitted)). For studies of economic consequences of
this engagement, see infra Part II.A.2.
39. See Robinhood Markets, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (July 1, 2021).
Brokerage apps sometimes let customers “buy, hold and sell a limited number of
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Dogecoin,” as Robinhood does. Id. at 73. The
elephant in the room is the regulatory status of these and other cryptocurrencies. See id.
(identifying the uncertain and contingent status of cryptocurrency regulation, and stating that
“[c]hanges” in those laws or “failure to comply with them” is a material risk that “may
significantly and adversely affect our business”). The markets are similar, dealers earn similar
sorts of intermediation rents, and as a practical matter many of the apps of regulatory concern
have a great bulk of revenue coming from crypto transaction volume. In the registration statement
filed in connection with its IPO, Robinhood also warned prospective investors that
cryptocurrency demand is a material risk given the “substantial portion of the recent growth in
our net revenues earned from cryptocurrency transactions . . . attributable to transactions in
Dogecoin.” Id. Robinhood, like many other brokerage firms, also allows customers trade options.
Id. at 2.
Regulatory interventions with respect to both options and crypto are both relevant to
this Article’s subject, as is the role of leverage. Cf. generally Liran Eliner, Essays on the Behavior
and Performance of Retail Investors (May 9, 2022) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/37372292/Dissertation_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D
T9D-H2JB] (finding evidence that leverage is an important factor in retail investor
underperformance). But given that your time is precious, reader, this Article focuses on equity
trading to simplify the discussion.
40. David Ingram, Designed To Distract: Stock App Robinhood Nudges Users To Take
Risks, NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 12, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/conf
etti-push-notifications-stock-app-robinhood-nudges-investors-toward-risk-n1053071 [https://per
ma.cc/JGH7-6KNU].
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subpart illustrates practices that may bear on promoting engagement
and directing user attention to particular information.41
1. Recommendation algorithms. Some brokers give clients lists of
stocks to consider. The stocks on these lists might be selected by
humans or instead be generated algorithmically, as Robinhood has
disclosed.42 These lists can increase salience of certain stocks, like “top
movers” with the greatest percentile changes that day, stocks with high
trading volume across the broker’s customer order flow or across the
broader market, or most concentrated holdings among clients.43 Some
securities may be more salient for reasons that are not apparent to an
investor, or that may be unrelated to reasons why the investor wants to
trade. This increased salience can induce demand, a phenomenon of
attention-induced trading.44
2. Push notifications. Some apps present users with brief messages
on the screen upon the occurrence of some event, known as a push
notification.45 Some push notifications are designed to encourage

41. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. There is a more general sense in which
“gamification” may refer to the rise of retail traders coordinating on social media over “meme
stocks,” which is thought to make a “game” of trading. That usage falls outside this Article’s focus
on behaviorally oriented design practices that influence retail investor behavior. This Article
returns to the broader criticism that gamification treats finance unseriously in Part II.C.3 below.
42. See ROBINHOOD, ROBINHOOD WEB DISCLOSURES 1–2, 4 (2020) https://cdn.robi
nhood.com/disclosures/WebDisclosures.pdf [https://perma.cc/72CG-TU6P] (representing that
Robinhood “pre-populate[s] list[s] . . . based on [stocks’] popularity on Robinhood’s platform,”
that the “[t]op [m]overs” list is generated by a “proprietary algorithm,” and that neither of these
purportedly is a “recommendation”). On that last disclaimer, see infra note 322.
43. Dan Clarendon, Robinhood Restricted Its Popularity Data, You Can Still See Top
Movers, MKT. REALIST (Jan. 21, 2021, 2:22 PM), https://marketrealist.com/p/robinhood-topmovers [https://perma.cc/5A6Y-UDKH]. Robinhood in August 2020 “turned off a feature . . . that
allowed anyone to see which companies’ shares were surging in popularity.” Jeff John Roberts,
Robinhood Will No Longer Share Stock ‘Popularity Data’ with Sites like Robintrack, FORTUNE
(Aug. 10, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/08/10/robinhood-popularity-data-robintrackstock-market-trading-tracker [https://perma.cc/RV5C-6EUE]. The public API for that feature
had for some time provided a rich source of retail trader data to financial economists. For
discussion of some of those financial economists’ findings, see infra notes 151–153.
44. See infra Part II.A.2.
45. See Langvardt & Tierney, supra note 14, at 727 (citing Nicole Casperson, Robinhood
Under Pressure for Bringing “Gamification” to Investing, INVESTMENTNEWS (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.investmentnews.com/robinhood-underpressure-for-bringing-gamification-to-investi
ng-200607 [https://perma.cc/7VR3-FSPB]).
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monitoring and trading.46 Others are informational and more benign,
as in the case of design features meant to inform or educate clients.47
3. Eye candy. People sometimes use gamification to refer to “eye
candy,” or aesthetically pleasing design.48 Robinhood’s signature piece
of eye candy was digital confetti: upon completion of a first trade,
confetti would rain down the screen, as seen in Figure 1 below.49 The

Figure 1: User flow during selection of variable reward, circa 2018

firm’s early ads showed a young man, sitting at dinner looking at a

46. See id. (noting how “push notifications might serve as calls to action,” encouraging
trading).
47. See id. (discussing benign push notifications); see also, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 34, at
71–77 (noting that “[d]esign is difficult” but “necessary,” and suggesting that regulators
distinguish between design that has bad, ambiguous, or good effects).
48. E.g., Luke Hickey, Four Ways To Think About Using Gamification – Without Turning
Your eLearning into Games, DOMINKNOW (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.dominknow.com/
blog/four-ways-to-think-about-using-gamification-without-turning-your-elearning-into-games
[https://perma.cc/7L26-BPM9]; Max Steenbergen, Eye Candy vs. Bare-Bones in UI Design, UX
MAG. (Mar. 26, 2010), https://uxmag.com/articles/eye-candy-vs-bare-bones-in-ui-design [https://
perma.cc/KE7Z-3G27] (describing “eye candy”).
49. Wursthorn & Choi, supra note 8; Tory Hobson, Gamification in the Most Delightful Way,
MEDIUM: PINCH PULL PRESS (Jan. 25, 2018), https://link.medium.com/uxXrSIPuCdb [https://
perma.cc/QBH2-QBXS]. The confetti has since been deprecated; Robinhood announced in late
March 2021 that it would “eliminat[e] digital confetti” to neutralize criticism ahead of its initial
public offering. Caitlin McCabe, Robinhood To Remove Controversial Digital Confetti from
Trading, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2021, 7:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robinhood-toremove-controversial-digital-confetti-from-trading-app-11617195612 [https://perma.cc/DK37-8V22].
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phone, and reacting in surprise when the phone showers physical
confetti over him.50
4. Surprise stock awards. Robinhood has offered users lotteries
for surprise stocks as rewards for linking bank accounts or referring
new users.51 In addition to showing confetti, Figure 1 also shows the
flow of screens that a user would experience—three card monte,
scratch ticket for the selected card, and a flurry of confetti—during
winter 2018.52
5. Engagement devices. Traditional “gamification” features
reward engagement for its own sake. Many free-to-play gaming apps
offer players opportunities to make incremental purchases within the
app to proceed to higher levels or unlock features, and reward frequent
engagers with preferential access to new features.53 Robinhood has
implemented the kinds of design features seen in these apps and in
casino gaming machines to encourage repeated and habitual
engagement for customers to keep their place on, or move up, the
waitlist for a new product or feature.54 In addition, brokerage apps are

50. See Wursthorn & Choi, supra note 8 (discussing the digital-confetti animation featured
in Robinhood’s advertising).
51. See id. (describing a new Robinhood user who “received a free share” of stock for being
referred to the app, “choosing among three stocks displayed on what looks like a virtual lottery
scratch card”).
52. Hobson, supra note 49.
53. See, e.g., Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
129, 138–41 (2019) (discussing free-to-play games that offer “small in-game advantages” for inapp “micropayments”).
54. See, e.g., Scott Galloway, Robinhood Has Gamified Online Trading into an Addiction,
MEDIUM: MARKER (July 23, 2020), https://marker.medium.com/robinhood-has-gamified-onlinetrading-into-an-addiction-cc1d7d989b0c [https://perma.cc/HMX2-MP77] (discussing addiction,
and finding similarities between online trading platforms and casinos); Matthew Knipfer,
Optimally Climbing the Robinhood Cash Management Waitlist, MEDIUM (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://matthewknipfer.medium.com/optimally-climbing-the-robinhood-cash-management-waitl
ist-f94218764ea7 [https://perma.cc/G3TR-FZFF] (describing how Robinhood encouraged
engagement as a strategy for climbing the waitlist for a new cash-management product); George
Vasiliadis, How Robinhood Got Nearly 1 Million Users Before the Company Even Existed,
MEDIUM: INSIDE VIRAL LOOPS (Nov. 23, 2017), https://medium.com/inside-viral-loops/how-rob
inhood-got-nearly-1-million-users-before-the-company-even-existed-dfb1a57231f8 [https://perm
a.cc/9R5G-Z8BP] (explaining how when Robinhood first launched, prospective users engaged
with a “referral-based viral loop” allowing them to move up the waitlist by referring other
prospective users to sign up for the waitlist); Josh Constine, Robinhood App Will Offer ZeroCommission Stock Trades Thanks to $3M Seed from Index and A16Z, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 18,
2013, 9:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2013/12/18/zero-commission-stock-trading-robinhood
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similar to these free-to-play games in that investors deposit funds and
make incremental purchases but don’t pay extra for the privilege of
doing so because trades are zero-commission.55 For these reasons,
Bloomberg columnist and market commentator Matt Levine has
compared trading to “in-app purchases” for which “you can end up
spending a lot of money”: Candy Crush but with more at stake.56
B. Regulatory Scrutiny of Gamification
Gamification has increasingly become an object of legislative and
regulatory scrutiny. The Biden administration’s SEC has made
gamification a priority.57 Testifying before Congress in May 2021, SEC
Chairman Gary Gensler objected to brokerage apps that use
psychological “features [to] encourage investors to trade more,” even
though active trading likely “results in lower returns.”58 The
Democratic members of the Commission at that time expressed
support for regulating gamification.59 The SEC’s then Republican
commissioners urged a more cautious approach.60

[https://perma.cc/W9LX-PPK5] (explaining that “tweeting about Robinhood will bump up your
place” on the waitlist to access “free stock trading”).
55. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
56. Matt Levine, Opinion, Playing the Game of Infinite Leverage, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5,
2019, 12:11 PM) [hereinafter Levine, Playing the Game], https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2019-11-05/playing-the-game-of-infinite-leverage [https://perma.cc/Z9ED-999J].
57. Benjamin Bain & Robert Schmidt, Gensler Targets Broker “Gamification” After
Trading Tumult, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2021, 11:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2021-03-02/gensler-says-scrutinizing-trading-apps-would-be-focus-at-sec#xj4y7vzkg
[https://perma.cc/G6FQ-JJQC].
58. House Gamification Hearing III, supra note 14, at 5, 90 (statement of Gary Gensler,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
59. See id.; Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Leveraging
Regulatory Cooperation To Protect America’s Investors: Remarks at the 2021 Section 19(d)
Conference (May 21, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-2021-section-19d-conference
[https://perma.cc/CM95-4SAS] (discussing Regulation Best Interest and the gamification of
trading); Chris Ekimoff & Kurt Wolfe, Enforcing the Regulations – A Conversation with
Commissioner Crenshaw, PRACTISING L. INST., at 18:00–22:00 (June 17, 2021), https://insecur
ities.podbean.com/e/enforcing-the-regulations-–-a-conversation-with-commissioner-crenshaw
[https://perma.cc/5473-JEY7] (discussing the existing regulatory framework for investment apps).
60. See, e.g., Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at George
Washington University Law School Regulating the Digital Economy Conference: Atomic
Trading (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-atomic-trading-2021-02-22
[https://perma.cc/T79L-APPH] (defending gamification in capital markets and encouraging the
Commission to gamify its own communications with investors); Dean Seal, SEC’s Roisman Wary
of Playing into “Gamification” Fears, LAW360 (Nov. 16, 2021, 8:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1441062/sec-s-roisman-wary-of-playing-into-gamification-fears [https://perma.cc/GK3S-
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The SEC’s response remains open-ended. The staff is considering
whether existing securities laws are adequate, or whether “fresh” rules
are needed to address gamification.61 In August 2021, the SEC
published a request for information focusing on broker-dealer and
investment adviser use of “digital engagement practices” (“DEPs”).62
Brokers are sales-based advisers who mainly make money when
customers trade, while investment advisers are fiduciaries who
typically charge flat or percentage fees for their advice.63 These
business models are subject to different regulations under current law.
As regulatory interventions may depend on weighing different costs
and benefits of engagement practices in each case, the SEC has
signaled that it may pursue separate DEP rulemakings for brokers
(who sponsor trading apps) and registered investment advisers
(“RIAs”) (who sponsor roboadvisor and other digital advisory apps).64
And it defined DEPs to “broadly include behavioral prompts,

XETP] (urging an approach that emphasizes “consensus” in making “regulatory enhancements”
to avoid getting the agency “mired in litigation”).
61. House Gamification Hearing III, supra note 14, at 90 (statement of Gary Gensler,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
62. See DEP RFI, supra note 13, at 49,067. Hundreds of public comments have been filed
with the agency. See Comments on Request for Information and Comments on Broker-Dealer
and Investment Adviser Digital Engagement Practices, Release No. 34-92766, https://www.se
c.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021.htm [https://perma.cc/2TWT-SFJX] (collecting and releasing
comments); James Fallows Tierney, Comment Letter on Digital Engagement Practices (Oct. 1,
2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021-9316496-260091.pdf [https://perma.cc/AS
7G-TXKX].
63. See infra Part III.B.5.
64. See, e.g., Agency Rule List - Spring 2022: Securities and Exchange Commission, OFF. OF
INFO. & REGUL. AFFS. (2022), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain?operation=
OPERATION_GET_AGENCY_RULE_LIST&currentPub=true&agencyCode=&showStage=
active&agencyCd=3235 [https://perma.cc/4D6K-2H2W] (identifying two separate proposed rulemakings
about digital engagement practices for broker-dealers and investment advisers); Gary Gensler,
Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Prepared Remarks at SEC Speaks (Oct. 12, 2021), https://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-sec-speaks-2021-10-12 [https://perma.cc/PGC6-K9JG] (noting
that he had asked the staff to consider “existing rule sets, or updates to those rules, . . . both
related to brokers and to investment advisers”). Roboadvisors are automated online platforms,
including mobile apps, that take information about client attributes (risk preferences, existing
assets, time to retirement) and use computer algorithms to generate investment advice about
portfolio diversification, asset allocation, and security selection at low cost. Jill E. Fisch, Marion
Labouré & John A. Turner, The Emergence of the Robo-Advisor, in THE DISRUPTIVE IMPACT
OF FINTECH ON RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 13, 13 (Julie Agnew & Olivia S. Mitchell eds., 2019).
Roboadvisors are typically regulated by the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and
may or may not be also regulated as broker-dealers. Id. at 15–16.
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differential marketing, gamelike features, and other design elements or
features designed to engage retail investors.”65
Gamification has also attracted the attention of the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the self-regulatory
organization for broker-dealers.66 FINRA makes and enforces rules for
brokers, and it implements these by examining and monitoring
brokerage firms for compliance and risk.67 FINRA notified members
in early 2021 that it was scrutinizing firms for compliance about
communications with clients in app-based investing platforms.68
FINRA noted the tradeoff between the increased access to trading
markets that digital platforms provide, and the possibility of “increased
risks to customers if not designed with the appropriate compliance
considerations in mind.”69 FINRA has continued to discuss responses
to gamification and the business model.70

65. DEP RFI, supra note 13, at 49,068 (providing a list of examples: “[s]ocial networking
tools; games, streaks and other contests with prizes; points, badges, and leaderboards;
notifications; celebrations for trading; visual cues; ideas presented at order placement and other
curated lists or features; subscriptions and membership tiers; and chatbots”).
66. FINRA is a registered national securities association under Exchange Act Section 15A,
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3.
67. Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate About Securities SelfRegulation: It’s Time To End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax Exemption, 31 VA. TAX REV. 135,
149–50 (2011).
68. See FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., 2021 REPORT ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION AND RISK
MONITORING PROGRAM 2 (2021) [hereinafter FINRA 2021 REPORT], https://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/2021-02/2021-report-finras-examination-risk-monitoring-program.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5HPG-4Q8Q] (explaining that FINRA was “increasingly focused” on “risks associated
with app-based platforms with interactive or ‘game-like’ features that are intended to influence
customers”); FINRA MANUAL § 2210 (FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., amended 2019) [hereinafter
FINRA MANUAL], https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2210 [https://per
ma.cc/3WYB-PHMN] (providing FINRA’s rules for communications with the public). FINRA
has also settled enforcement actions related to receipt of payment of order flow and other issues
arising from the business model underlying zero-commission brokerage. See, e.g., Robinhood Fin.,
LLC, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent No.
2017056224001, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/robinhoodawc-121919.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZVP-2JJP] (settling such a suit with Robinhood).
69. FINRA 2021 REPORT, supra note 68, at 22.
70. See, e.g., Al Barbarino, FINRA To Seek Public Input on “Gamification” of Stock Market,
LAW360 (May 19, 2021, 8:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/securities/articles/1386379/finra-toseek-public-input-on-gamification-of-stock-market [https://perma.cc/2FRF-7LAU] (discussing
FINRA’s efforts to outline additional guidance and rules to address the gamification of stock
market trading platforms).
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State securities regulators also play a role in enforcing brokerdealers’ obligations under the securities laws.71 Massachusetts
regulators have been boldest in pursuing gamification claims under
state law. In administrative proceedings, Massachusetts has alleged
that gamification violates state fiduciary-duty rules, unethical practices
rules, and supervision rules.72
C. Convergent Trends Creating an Incentive for Gamified Investing
Why did gamification emerge in securities trading apps? This
subpart identifies three trends that created incentives for brokers to
adopt design practices that encouraged informationally noisy trading.
First, technology enabled greater participation by retail investors in
stock markets, raising the stakes of that participation. Second, brokers
experienced fierce, decades-long price competition for commissions,
resulting in a zero-commission trading model that required brokers to
look elsewhere for revenue. Finally, a nationally fragmented stock
market created an opportunity for proprietary trading firms to profit
by trading against retail orders, and to pay zero-commission brokers
for the privilege of doing so. Taken together, these trends have
plausibly given rise to an incentive to design free-to-play mobile apps

71. Broker-dealers are licensed by regulators in states where they operate. See generally
Andrew K. Jennings, State Securities Enforcement, 47 BYU L. REV. 67 (2021) (discussing state
enforcement actions involving broker-dealers). This can give rise to different standards of conduct
at federal and state levels. Massachusetts’s enforcement action, discussed infra at notes 72 and
345–346, is predicated on the theory that broker-dealers owe state law fiduciary duties to clients
even though federal law imposes no such duties. On federalism and state-law fiduciary rule
developments, see generally Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fate of State Investor Protection, 21
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 213 (2020).
72. See generally Administrative Complaint, In re Robinhood Fin., LLC, 2020 WL 7711667
(Mass. Sec. Div. Dec. 16, 2020) (No. E-2020-0047) (alleging violations of state broker-dealer
regulations). The regulator sought to file an amended complaint seeking to revoke Robinhood’s
registration as a broker-dealer in the state, alleging that Robinhood targeted unsophisticated
investors, luring them in with gamification features and strategies. Motion for Leave to File
Amended Administrative Complaint at 2, In re Robinhood, 2020 WL 7711667; see also MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 110A, § 204(a)(2)(G) (providing that action may be taken against a broker-dealer
or investment adviser that “has engaged in any unethical or dishonest conduct or practices in the
securities, commodities or insurance business”); 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(1)(a) (providing
that “unethical or dishonest conduct or practices” include “[f]ailing to act in accordance with a
fiduciary duty to a customer when providing investment advice or recommending an investment
strategy, the opening of or transferring of assets to any type of account, or the purchase, sale, or
exchange of any security”). For more on this litigation, see infra notes 341–347 and accompanying
text.
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that encourage excessive trading for reasons other than the value of a
stock.
1. Re-retailization. One trend that has encouraged gamification—
and vice versa—has been the reemergence of retail investors in
securities markets. Ten years ago, this seemed an unlikely outcome.
Retail interest in stocks was moribund. Between the 1970s and 2012,
retail traders had in significant numbers exited the market for
individual equities and shifted instead into diversified funds.73 This was
the “deretailization” era.74
Are markets still deretailized in an era of zero-commission trading
apps in retail traders’ pockets? In 2021, it looked as if the
deretailization trend was slowing or even reversing; as this subpart will
explain, retail traders had started participating more deeply and
broadly in the stock market than in recent years. Consider some ways
retail participation can be measured. Retail’s share of total trading
volume in a period reflects how much retail traders are buying and
selling relative to institutional traders. In addition, retail’s share of
stock ownership reflects how much people own—buying and holding,
not selling.
Trading volume is of particular interest for those concerned that
gamification may generate too much trading. Retail investors have
made up a larger share of trading volume, which rose significantly
between 2019 and 2021, before waning again at the end of that year as
the bull market in equities and other risky assets came to a close.75
Figure 2 reports data from Bloomberg Intelligence for individual

73. See, e.g., Sarah C. Haan, Corporate Governance and the Feminization of Capital, 74
STAN. L. REV. 515, 569–72 (2022) (describing deretailization and the shift to holding corporate
equity through institutional investors, and focusing on implications for how the gendered nature
of shareholder power has changed across time); see also, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure
for “Excessive” Trading?, 81 VA. L. REV. 713, 733 n.65 (1995) (finding that the trading volume by
individuals in 1993 was 53.8 percent of total trading volume). The former SEC official who coined
“deretailization” has noted that retail investors “have not vanished” as beneficial owners of
securities but “simply shifted to investing primarily through financial intermediaries such as
mutual funds.” Brian G. Cartwright, Whither the SEC Now?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1092 (2009).
But that would mean they’re no longer “retail” as this article has defined the term. See supra note
1.
74. See Cartwright, supra note 1 (coining the term).
75. Katie Martin & Robin Wigglesworth, Rise of the Retail Army: The Amateur Traders
Transforming Markets, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/7a91e3ea-b9ec4611-9a03-a8dd3b8bddb5 [https://perma.cc/F5AJ-7A8B]. On waning trading volume, see infra
note 86 and accompanying text.

TIERNEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

374

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/16/2022 11:36 AM

[Vol. 72:353

investors’ share of U.S. equities trading volume between 2011 and the
first quarter of 2021.76 Retail investors’ trading volume is also
disproportionately high relative to their ownership share of total
market value.77 Retail investors are not just becoming more active; as
a group they are growing in size and becoming more diverse.78 Given
wealth and income inequality, equity market participation remains out
of reach for perhaps most people.79 And the wealthiest households’
share of ownership has only grown over time.80

76. The data for 2021 is from first quarter, not annual. For replication data, see James F.
Tierney, Replication-Investment-Games, GITHUB (Apr. 1, 2022) [hereinafter Tierney,
Replication-Investment-Games], https://github.com/jamesftierney/Replication-Investment-Games
[https://perma.cc/F4DC-W4ZP]; Caitlin McCabe, It Isn’t Just AMC. Retail Traders Increase Pull
on the Stock Market, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/it-isntjust-amc-retail-traders-increase-pull-on-the-stock-market-11624008602 [https://perma.cc/XJB2DEEG] (sourcing the data and providing other insights). For more recent data, see infra note 85
and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Richard Stanley, Retail Investors Comprise 10 Percent of U.S. Daily Trading,
PRECISE INVS. (July 1, 2021), https://preciseinvestors.com/retail-investors-comprise-10-percentof-u-s-daily-trading [https://perma.cc/2AP5-N3WY] (explaining that in 2021, retail investors
comprised 10 percent of daily trading).
78. Mark Lush, Angela Fontes, Meimeizi Zhu, Olivia Valdes & Gary Mottola, Fin. Indus.
Regul. Auth. Found. & NORC at the Univ. of Chi., Investing 2020: New Accounts and the People
Who Opened Them, CONSUMER INSIGHTS: MONEY & INVESTING, Feb. 2021, at 1–2, https://
www.finrafoundation.org/sites/finrafoundation/files/investing-2020-new-accounts-and-the-peop
le-who-opened-them_1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF7U-WZTR].
79. See generally, e.g., Winston, supra note 17 (discussing growing economic inequality in
the U.S. and the role of exclusive investment opportunities in fueling the wealth divide).
80. See id. at 781, 789.
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Figure 2

The size of the retail market has also grown as record numbers of
ordinary people have been participating in the stock market.81 Greater
liquidity in household finance, from lower pandemic-era entertainment

81. See, e.g., Madison Darbyshire, ‘The Stimulus Has Landed’: US Retail Traders Set To Hit
Stock Market, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/e67f5076-c517-4bd5-9688c70cde011452 [https://perma.cc/LRD2-NXXH] (explaining how Americans are investing billions
of dollars from stimulus checks into the stock market).
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Figure 3

budgets and exogenous positive wealth shocks from social welfare
programs, has enabled more investment.82

82. See, e.g., Matt Phillips, Recast as ‘Stimmies,’ Federal Relief Checks Drive a Stock Buying
Spree, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/21/business/stimulus-checkstock-market.html [https://perma.cc/6MN4-ST5S] (explaining how stimulus payments led to a
surge in investing); Annie Massa & Sarah Ponczek, How Robinhood’s Addictive App Made
Trading a Pandemic Pastime, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2020, 4:12 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/features/2020-10-22/how-robinhood-s-addictive-app-made-trading-a-covid-pandemic-pastime
[https://perma.cc/2RDU-AAP5] (discussing the “frenzy of often speculative retail investing in the
pandemic lockdowns”). On entertainment reasons for trading, see infra Part II.A.1. The reretailization trend in 2020 and 2021 lends credence to market commentator Matt Levine’s
“boredom markets” hypothesis: with other entertainment shut down during the pandemic,
markets for risky assets offered a substitute form of entertainment. Matt Levine, Opinion, If
You’re Bored You Can Trade Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2020, 12:01 PM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/opinion/articles/2020-04-30/if-you-re-bored-you-can-trade-stocks#xj4y7vzkg [https://pe
rma.cc/J7HF-T34Q]; Matt Levine, Opinion, The GameStop Game Never Stops, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 25, 2021, 12:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-25/the-gamenever-stops [https://perma.cc/R42J-5RZ8]; see also Mardy Chiah, Xiao Tian & Angel Zhong,
Lockdown and Retail Trading in the Equity Market, 33 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL FIN., 1, 7
(2022) (finding evidence of pandemic-related gambling-like substitution into stock trading);
Eliner, supra note 39, at iii (finding evidence that pandemic-related work-from-home retail
investors monitored portfolios more closely and performed better).
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That it is easier to trade stocks than ever before is also a function
of technology enabling access to asset markets at low transaction costs
on a nearly 24-7 basis on mobile devices. Indeed, retail investors are
also increasingly using online brokerage apps to access trading
markets.83 Industry reports also suggest more investors are trading
exclusively online.84
What’s more, the number of monthly active users of an app is one
metric for the popularity of app-based methods of accessing the
market. This metric shows explosive growth over the last few years.
Figure 3 reports data on monthly active users of ten popular online
brokerage apps between January 2017 and August 2021.85 As the farright side of Figure 3 suggests, however, retail investor engagement
with brokerage apps started to subside in mid-2021. Retail traders
remain in the market, but their engagement has subsided as the equity
market has cooled.86
2. Competition and innovation. Price competition has also helped
encourage gamified investing. Trading involves transaction costs, and
historically a significant one was the commission brokers charge for
effecting a buy or sell order.87 Commissions were once fixed, providing
83. See Lush et al., supra note 78, at 19 (describing a surge of investors trading via online
brokers during 2020).
84. David Forman, Chief Legal Off., Fidelity Invs., Comment Letter on Digital Engagement
Practices, at 2 (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s71021-9315880-260065.p
df [https://perma.cc/FY54-HKA3].
85. This figure was produced by retrieving from Statista the monthly active user data of ten
mobile brokerage apps reported by mobile-app market-trend repository Airnow. See Tierney,
Replication-Investment-Games, supra note 76 (reporting data collected from F. Norrestad,
Monthly Number of Active Users of Selected Leading Apps that Allow for Online Share Trading
in the United States from January 2017 to July 2021, by App, STATISTA (Jan. 27, 2022),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1259920/etrading-app-monthly-active-users-usa [https://perma
.cc/DQZ6-HYQU]). The figure plots the time series of monthly active users for each app and
stacks these series to show each app’s active user base’s contribution to the size of the combined
mobile phone brokerage app market over time. July 2021 is the last period in the time series for
which data is available.
86. The rise in retail trader interest might therefore be a fluke, all things considered; it
remains to be seen whether this is evidence of sustained re-emergence of retail traders as a
significant bloc of active market participant. See generally Charles M. Jones, Xiaoyan Zhang &
Xinran Zhang, Retail Investors in the Pandemic (June 4, 2022) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4151106 [https://perma.cc/3V5L-TSBT] (examining unusual retail
investor behavior during the pandemic).
87. See, e.g., Charles M. Jones, A Century of Stock Market Liquidity and Trading Costs 7
(May 22, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/rese
arch/pubfiles/4048/A%20century%20of%20Market%20Liquidity%20and%20Trading%20Cost
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exchange-member brokers with monopoly profits but dragging returns
and dampening trading volume.88 But procompetition reforms in the
1970s deregulated commissions, altering Wall Street’s culture and
encouraging cutthroat price competition.89 Discount brokerage firms
emerged, offering cheap order execution without the other high-touch
services that full-service brokers offered like financial planning,
security selection, and research and information.90 This was attractive
to self-directed retail investors.91 Together with technological
innovation, competition let retail investors select how much
handholding they wanted.92
Over time, retail-oriented discount brokers competed aggressively
on commission pricing. Early leaders included Robinhood, which
launched in 2013 and from the beginning offered commission-free
trading in an app with slick user-interface design.93 Most of the industry
responded by offering commission-free trading in 2019.94 Now perhaps

s.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZY2-9WBR] (explaining how in 1962 “[t]rading 100 shares” of an
average-priced NYSE stock “would result in a one-way commission of $39, or 0.975% of the
money involved,” and that before reforms starting in the late 1960s the historical “NYSE
commission schedule” always increased linearly with number of shares traded). For examples of
other costs that retail investors may bear in trading stocks, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider
Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33
CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 88–89 (2004) (discussing bid-ask spread); Yu-Chuan Huang, Determinants of
Trading Costs, in MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPED MARKETS 233,
235 (H. Kent Baker, Halil Kiymaz, Nazli Sila Alan, Recep Bildik & Robert A. Schwartz eds.,
2013) (discussing implicit trading costs).
88. See, e.g., 6 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION
277 (5th ed. 2016); Jones, supra note 87, at 7–9 (explaining that “bid-ask spreads and commissions
represent an important and variable friction in trading US equities over the 20th century,” and
“together represented at least 1.00% of the dollar value of trade for the entire period from 1953
to 1975”).
89. See 6 LOSS ET AL., supra note 88, at 289–93.
90. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended
Securities Purchases: An Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535, 537 n.3
(2005) (explaining that discount firms “generally provide only general financial information and
order-execution services,” unlike full service firms).
91. See Janice M. Traflet & Michael P. Coyne, Ending a NYSE Tradition: The 1975
Unraveling of Broker’s Fixed Commissions and Its Long Term Impact on Financial Advertising,
25 ESSAYS ECON. & BUS. HIST. 131, 133 (2007).
92. See Caroline Bradley, Disorderly Conduct: Day Traders and the Ideology of “Fair and
Orderly Markets,” 26 J. CORP. L. 63, 67 (2000).
93. See Patrick McKenzie, How Discount Brokerages Make Money, KALZUMEUS (June 26,
2019), https://www.kalzumeus.com/2019/6/26/how-brokerages-make-money [https://perma.cc/R
XS5-4ZQZ]; Constine, supra note 54.
94. See Levine, The Trades Will Be Free Now, supra note 23.
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most retail investors can trade without paying commissions for publicly
traded equity securities.95
Commission pricing is important to retail investors, in part
because it is highly salient. “Salience” models of choice focus on how
people decide between options based on attributes that are at the
forefront of their attention. As in other markets, we are imperfectly or
boundedly rational in making informationally complex decisions. In
deciding between competing goods and services, we are subject to
cognitive processing constraints, and can’t consider all attributes of a
good or service. No one person has cognitive processing power to
comparison shop across all attributes of a good or service, and across
all consequences of our choices. So even well-informed consumers
consider and decide based on fewer than all attributes and
consequences. We tend to focus on a subset of highly salient attributes
that are at the front of our attention—price, quality, and so on.96 When
ignored, nonsalient attributes do not bear on our decision to transact,
so they don’t bear on competition either.97 The implication is a business
model seen across markets and industries: “Firms exploit these
propensities by designing products and contracts that make appealing
attributes salient while shrouding fees and quality problems.”98
“Free” pricing is highly salient, at least relative to substitutes.99 But
when for-profit firms offer “free” salient pricing, they typically crosssubsidize with revenue from less salient or even nonsalient sources.100
95. See Lyle Daly, The Largest Brokerage Firms in 2022, ASCENT (Dec. 29, 2021),
https://www.fool.com/the-ascent/research/largest-stock-brokerage-firms [https://perma.cc/7CDW
-KQH9] (listing popular retail brokers, including several that do not require commission for
investors).
96. See John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Behavioral
Household Finance, in 1 HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: APPLICATIONS AND
FOUNDATIONS 177, 225 (B. Douglas Bernheim, Stefano DellaVigna & David Laibson eds., 2018)
(collecting literature on “situations in which households have been shown to overweight salient
attributes and underweight shrouded attributes”); Pedro Bordalo, Niccola Gennaioli & Andrei
Shleifer, Salience and Consumer Choice, 121 J. POL. ECON. 803, 803 (2013); Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203,
1206 (2003).
97. Tierney, Contract Design in the Shadow of Regulation, supra note 35, at 882.
98. Beshears et al., supra note 96, at 225.
99. A similar dynamic has occurred in the mutual-fund market, as investors have become
more sensitive to highly front-end-load fees and commissions, relative to less salient operating
expenses. See Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean & Lu Zheng, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The
Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095, 2098 (2005).
100. See Tierney, Contract Design in the Shadow of Regulation, supra note 35, at 889 (noting
that firms recoup “with nonsalient cost dimensions like the sale of user data”); Levine, The Trades
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A customer that downloads a mobile phone game app for free like
Candy Crush might end up paying a lot over time with hidden
subscription renewals or in-app micropayments.101 Or third parties
might pay for information about the user.102 Zero-commission brokers
use a combination of similar revenue sources, such as selling clients
financial advice, margin lending, net interest income, and payment for
order flow (“PFOF”).103 The last of these, PFOF, has encouraged
gamification in stock trading apps. Let’s take a step back and consider
why.
3. Market fragmentation and intermediation. Gamification is
perhaps most directly a consequence of a business model that gives
brokers strong incentives to encourage uninformed trades by retail
investors. In a zero-commission world, that business model depends in
large part on revenue sources like payment for order flow from thirdparty firms that want to buy from retail traders who want to sell (and
vice versa). It is unlikely that we would see gamification absent a
fragmented market structure that generated incentives to trade against
uninformed retail order flow.
The modern stock market looks remarkably different from the
popular imagination. Changes in technology, competition, and
deregulation have dramatically changed how retail investors and more
sophisticated market participants alike buy and sell stocks.104 What
happens when a retail investor tells their broker to trade?
Suppose retail investor Biff has a brokerage account and wants to
buy one share of Tesla common stock. One option is for the broker to
execute the order internally, selling the share of Tesla to Biff from its
Will Be Free Now, supra note 23 (noting that the business model is to “give people a good deal
on the salient . . . thing, and . . . make your profits where they aren’t looking”).
101. See Langvardt, supra note 53, at 138–41, 139 n.54.
102. See Adam B. Thimmesch, Transacting in Data: Tax, Privacy, and the New Economy, 94
DENV. L. REV. 145, 154 (2016) (discussing markets in which “access to ‘free’ digital products . . .
is not free at all, [as] . . . consumers pay for that access by relinquishing their data”).
103. Markham, supra note 22, at 443; see also Shane Swanson, The Impact of Zero
Commissions on Retail Trading and Execution, GREENWICH ASSOCS. (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.greenwich.com/equities/impact-zero-commissions-retail-trading-and-execution [http
s://perma.cc/2VBW-VDRL] (discussing how zero-commission brokerages are part of the trading
landscape, including explanation of revenue models like acceptance of PFOF).
104. See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock
Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 191 (2015) (observing that “the way stocks are
traded in the United States . . . has been totally transformed over the last twenty years”); WALTER
MATTLI, DARKNESS BY DESIGN: THE HIDDEN POWER IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 2 (2019).
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own inventory like a stock market store, or matching it with the order
of another of its customers who wants to sell a share of Tesla.105
Another option is for the broker to “route” the order to stock
exchanges or alternative trading systems, where the order may be
matched with an order of another anonymous trader who has put in an
order to sell a share of Tesla stock at a compatible price.
But many retail investors’ orders don’t go to exchanges, because
of a compensation model driven by market fragmentation that has
enabled zero-commission trading. Suppose again that Biff places an
order to buy a share of Tesla stock. Biff’s broker may send the order to
one of many sophisticated financial firms in the business of “making”
markets and providing liquidity: standing ready to buy from traders
who want to sell (and vice versa). As discussed below, some of these
firms are eager to take the other side of retail orders in this way and
will pay brokers for the privilege of buying from retail investors who
want to sell (and vice versa).
One way these firms, known in the industry as wholesalers, do so
is by paying the broker for that order flow using the kickback-like
PFOF arrangement.106 This PFOF arrangement is legal if the payments
are disclosed.107
105. See Fox et al., supra note 104, at 199. In the former case, the firm would be operating as
a dealer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A) (defining dealer as one “engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities . . . for such person’s own account”); see also Huang, supra note 7, at 1067
(“Many securities firms are brokers and dealers as those terms are defined in the Securities
Exchange Act.”).
106. See Swanson, supra note 103. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFF. OF ECON.
ANALYSIS, SPECIAL STUDY: PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW AND INTERNALIZATION IN THE
OPTIONS MARKETS (2000), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ordpay.htm [https://perma.cc/PD
D4-5J5Z] (describing PFOF arrangements); Exchange Act Rule 10b-10(d)(8), 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-10(d)(8) (2021) (defining PFOF in connection with a disclosure requirement); HITESH
MITTAL & KATHRYN BERKOW, THE GOOD, THE BAD & THE UGLY OF PAYMENT FOR ORDER
FLOW (2021), https://f.hubspotusercontent10.net/hubfs/4982966/BestEx%20Research%20PFOF
%2020210503.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D62-DSG2] (explaining PFOF’s market structure and
analyzing its impact on investors).
107. See Exchange Act Rule 10b-10(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(2)(i)(C) (2021)
(requiring broker-dealers to disclose “whether [PFOF] is received . . . for transactions in such
securities and the fact that the source and nature of the compensation received in connection with
the particular transaction will be furnished upon written request of the customer”); Memorandum
from the Staff of the Div. of Trading and Mkts., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to the Equity Mkt.
Structure Advisory Comm. 7–8 (Jan. 26, 2016) [hereinafter TM Staff Mem.], https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/equity-market-structure/issues-affecting-customers-emsac-012616.pdf [https://perma.c
c/JM3J-H6Y5]; In re Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, 2020 WL 7482170,
at *7–9 (Dec. 17, 2020) (enforcement action against Robinhood about misleading omissions from
these disclosures over its business model).
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The broker must also comply with its duty to route the customer’s
order to the market that will provide “best execution.”108 But because
PFOF gives a broker an incentive to send order flow to that wholesaler,
it can conflict with the broker’s duty. That’s one reason why PFOF is
controversial.109
Wholesalers’ preference for trading against retail orders gives rise
to an incentive for brokers to encourage more retail orders. But why
would they want to do this? The same deregulatory reforms in the
1970s that promoted price competition among brokers also created a
“national market system” for stock prices.110 There are many physical
locations around the country where stocks trade. At the risk of
simplifying, at any given time securities law tries to identify a single
best nationwide set of prices—the lowest a seller will accept (ask) and
the highest a buyer will pay (bid)—that certain orders are eligible to
receive, no matter where traded.111 These prevailing best prices update
as orders come in and are executed and as market participants rush to
update their own “bid” or “ask” quotes in response to new

108. As the SEC has described it, “Best execution requires that a broker-dealer endeavor to
execute customer orders on the most favorable terms reasonably available in the market under
the circumstances,” including “price, order size, trading characteristics of the security, as well as
the potential for price improvement and other factors.” In re Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities
Act Release No. 10906, 2020 WL 7482170, at *4 (Dec. 17, 2020); see also, e.g., FINRA MANUAL,
supra note 68, § 5310(a)(1) (requiring broker-dealers to “use reasonable diligence to ascertain the
best market for the subject security and buy or sell in such market so that the resultant price to
the customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions”); Newton v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270–72 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing the duty of
best execution). See generally Allen Ferrell, A Proposal for Solving the “Payment for Order Flow”
Problem, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2001) (suggesting that the conflicts of interest created by PFOF
could be resolved if brokers could choose to provide retail investors with the national best bid or
offer price at time of sale).
109. TM Staff Mem., supra note 107, at 7–8; see also Who Wins on Wall Street? GameStop,
Robinhood, and the State of Retail Investing: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. &
Urb. Affs., 117th Cong. 13 (2021) [hereinafter Fletcher Statement] (statement of Gina-Gail
Fletcher, Professor of L., Duke Univ.) (urging Congress to consider measures to protect retail
investors from self-interested broker-dealers).
110. See Market Data Infrastructure, Exchange Act Release No. 90,610, 2020 WL 7413527,
at *570–77 (Dec. 9, 2020). For a Hayekian criticism of the national market system that builds on
those ‘70s reforms, see Hester Peirce, Rethinking the National Market System, 43 J. CORP. L. 649,
653–55, 660–61 (2018).
111. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(43) (2021) (describing the “national best bid and national best
offer” or NBBO); cf. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Best Execution: An Impossible Dream?, in
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 7–8 (Arthur B. Laby ed., 2022) (discussing
the relationship between the NBBO, best execution, and the emergence of order routing
practices).
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information.112 Updates to the national best bid and offer prices occur
continuously, reflecting conditions prevailing in trading venues around
the country that may be physically very far apart. But those prices don’t
update right away, especially across wide distances. Signals can be sent
between the west and east coasts quickly but not immediately. Delay
can be potentially economically valuable: prices on one trading venue
may become “stale” if new information has changed prices on another,
faraway venue but hasn’t yet arrived locally.113 As detailed in the
popular book FLASH BOYS, this has created incentives for certain firms
to make investments in speed to earn fractions of pennies by
identifying and trading against stale quotes faster than they can be
updated.114
Trading against retail order flow helps wholesalers avoid a
problem with this situation that economists call “adverse selection.”115
The business model is predicated on capturing the bid-ask spread.
Firms in this business update prices continuously, hoping to earn a
small profit from buying at an average bid that is lower than the
average ask at which they sell. The business model suffers if there is
adverse selection—if unknown traders on the other side have better
information about (1) their own intent or (2) asset pricing. Suppose the
wholesaler buys low from a trader who is selling, hoping to resell at a
higher price. But suppose first that the other trader keeps selling (own
intent), or the seller knew some other information about the world that
continues to push the price down (asset pricing). The price keeps going
down, inhibiting the wholesaler from a profitable exit from the trade.

112. Eric Budish, Peter Crampton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race:
Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1547, 1553 (2015).
113. Donald MacKenzie, Material Signals: A Historical Sociology of High-Frequency
Trading, 123 AM. J. SOC. 1635, 1645 (2018).
114. Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 489–91 (2015). See generally
MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS (2014) (detailing how delay times have incentivized firms to make
investments in speed); DONALD MACKENZIE, TRADING AT THE SPEED OF LIGHT: HOW
ULTRAFAST ALGORITHMS ARE TRANSFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS (2021) (describing the
mechanics of ultrafast trading algorithms); MATTLI, supra note 104 (outlining markets’
transformation to automation and their increasing complexity and fragmentation).
115. See Robert H. Battalio & Tim Loughran, Does Payment for Order Flow to Your Broker
Help or Hurt You?, 80 J. BUS. ETHICS 37, 38, 40 (2007) (explaining that PFOF addresses the “real
world . . . adverse selection risk” to market makers who “trad[e] with people who know more than
they do,” and illustrating with an example); MAUREEN O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE
THEORY 190 (1995) (discussing efforts to “attract uninformed order flow,” such as by “paying
retail brokers for their order flow,” as solutions to the adverse selection problem).
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For a wholesaler, the solution is to buy from retail traders. In
placing trades with their brokers, retail traders typically buy and sell in
small enough quantities—a few shares, maybe a few more—that they
won’t have this kind of price impact. In addition, retail trades tend to
be informationally noisy. To extend the example above, suppose retail
investor Biff buys a share of Tesla because he thinks its CEO is super
cool,116 not because of any information about whether the price is
below Biff’s private valuation for Tesla stock so as to make a good
purchase. A wholesaler might prefer to sell to Biff rather than against
other kinds of more sophisticated traders, like a mutual fund. Mutual
funds that place a buy order for a share might be buying many other
shares, raising the price and reducing the likelihood of a profitable exit
for a wholesaler selling Tesla shares. And Biff is unlikely to know
better information than the wholesaler about the company’s
fundamentals, at least not information that insider trading law allows
him to lawfully trade on.117 The wholesaler steps in to take the other
side of Biff’s trade (i.e., selling when he is buying).
Wholesalers have an incentive this way to buy from retail
investors, because their order flow is informationally “noisy”: small
enough not to impact the price and uncorrelated with information that
is relevant to the future price or payoff of the stock.118 By paying
brokers for informationally noisy retail order flow, wholesalers reduce
the risk of adverse selection. That’s why “nearly all market orders in
listed securities are routed to wholesale dealers rather than an
exchange.”119 Recent research in financial economics finds that upon
offering zero-commission trading and switching to a PFOF-based
revenue model, brokers gain market share and send more customer
trades to wholesalers; it’s unclear whether customers realize narrower
bid-ask spreads, but in general the evidence confirms that wholesalers
pay for order flow because it is relatively uninformed.120
116. Cf. Esha Dey, Tesla’s Loyal Retail Fan Club Set To Rev Up Stock’s Recovery,
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2022, 4:08 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-0531/tesla-s-loyal-retail-fan-club-set-to-rev-up-stock-s-recovery [https://perma.cc/DPG4-2FZP] (describing
Tesla’s “loyal following” among a retail-investor “army of [CEO Elon] Musk-fans” whose buying
has been “steadfast even as the company’s troubles have mounted”).
117. See infra notes 140–141 and accompanying text.
118. TM Staff Mem., supra note 106, at 6. On why retail order flow is noisy or uncorrelated,
see infra notes 140–148 and accompanying text.
119. Dombalagian, supra note 111, at 7.
120. See generally Pankaj K. Jain, Suchismita Mishra, Shawn O’Donoghue & Le Zhao,
Trading Volume Shares and Market Quality: Pre- and Post-Zero Commissions (Apr. 2022)
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Fragmentation may well promote liquidity and price discovery,
but market quality is not the only measure in securities law.
Informationally noisy order flow is so profitable to wholesalers that it
can subsidize zero-commission trading and create a stream of
nonsalient broker revenue. This plausibly reduces the costs of trading.
Why does securities law allow retail investors to be confused into
thinking that noisy trading is the same as investing?
II. DILEMMAS OF GAMIFICATION IN RETAIL INVESTMENT
Drawing on financial economics, Part II examines theoretical and
empirical models of retail investor decisionmaking. It then situates
those models within securities law theory.
A. Theoretical and Empirical Models of Retail Trader
Decisionmaking
Concerns about “gamification” reflect a longstanding puzzle
about retail investors. Because retail investors on average won’t beat
the market net of trading costs, financial theory (and perhaps most
investment advisers) would encourage nonprofessional investors to
allocate assets to a risk-adjusted portfolio that minimizes transaction
costs associated with trading.121 Yet many people pick stocks and trade
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3741470 [https://perma.cc/3U9L-PXSJ] (describing
effects of zero-commission trading on retail orders); Samuel Adams, Connor Kasten & Eric K.
Kelley, Do Investors Save When Market Makers Pay? Retail Execution Costs Under Payment
for Order Flow Models (Nov. 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3975667
[https://perma.cc/6VBP-7FR2] (comparing off-exchange retail investor execution costs with onexchange costs and finding that PFOF likely does not harm retail investors); SVIATOSLAV ROSOV,
CFA INST., PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: INTERNALISATION, RETAIL
TRADING, TRADE-THROUGH PROTECTION, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET STRUCTURE
(2016), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/article/position-paper/payment-for-orde
r-flow-united-kingdom.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C8W-CDCU] (examining the 2012 clarification of
the U.K.’s rule regarding illegality of PFOF and finding that the clarification likely increased the
percentage of retail-sized trades executed at the best quoted prices).
121. See, e.g., BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIMETESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 17–19, 291–300 (10th ed. 2012) (reflecting on
forty years of evidence supporting the first edition’s “simple” claim that retail investors “would
be far better off buying and holding an index fund than attempting to buy and sell individual
securities or actively managed mutual funds,” including evidence that most “professional
portfolio managers” couldn’t beat the “unmanaged S&P 500 Index”); Brad M. Barber & Terrance
Odean, The Behavior of Individual Investors, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE
1533, 1547 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rene M. Stulz eds., 2013) (concluding
from the “empirical evidence” on long-term retail-investor returns that, “in aggregate,” retail
investors “would be better off had they invested in a low-cost index fund”); see also, e.g., Max M.
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actively—even though the odds are stacked against them, and for
reasons unrelated to liquidity, tax, or rebalancing needs.122 They do so
to their detriment.123 Yet excessive and noisy active trading by retail
investors is a persistent feature of securities markets.
Securities law often overlooks that there is no single explanation
for the excessive trading phenomenon.124 As this subpart explains,
across active-trading retail investors, reasons for trading differ.125 Some
people engage in losing trades rationally, because they are
“consuming” something; they trade for entertainment, sensationseeking, aspiration for riches, or expressive reasons. Others trade
because they have been nudged or duped into doing so, which is the
concern about gamification and related digital engagement practices.
Calls to regulate gamification often elide these distinctions, with
potentially undesirable implications for securities regulation.126
Securities law has traditionally not prohibited people from trading for
entertainment or risk preferences and has instead tried to protect them
from being duped, defrauded, or manipulated into trading when they

Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, The Prudent Investor Rule and Market Risk: An Empirical
Analysis, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 129, 135 & n.9 (2017) (discussing the gradual
replacement of the risk-averse “prudent man rule” of trust law with the “prudent investor rule,”
which instead promoted “portfolio-as-a-whole investing” and “risk management consistent with
modern portfolio theory”); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §§ 2–3 & cmt. (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1994) (supposing a model of a reasonable investor who allocates
capital in the shadow of traditional finance’s normative prescriptions, buying and holding a
portfolio allocated to assets that are suitable for the investor and that produce an optimal riskreturn tradeoff unless some other allocation would be in the best interest of the beneficiary).
122. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 73, at 717; Brad M. Barber, Yi-Tsung Lee, Yu-Jane Liu
& Terrance Odean, The Cross-Section of Speculator Skill: Evidence from Day Trading, 18 J. FIN.
MKTS. 1, 2 (2014).
123. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber, Yi-Tsung Lee, Yu-Jane Liu & Terrance Odean, Just How
Much Do Individual Investors Lose by Trading?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 609, 622 (2009); Barber &
Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Health, supra note 5, at 799–800.
124. For a notable exception, see Lin, supra note 114, at 468–71 (discussing a range of
behavioral and cognitive factors contributing to excessive and uninformed trading by “irrational”
investors).
125. See, e.g., Henrik Cronqvist & Danling Jiang, Individual Investors, in FINANCIAL
BEHAVIOR: PLAYERS, SERVICES, PRODUCTS, AND MARKETS 45 (H. Kent Baker, Greg Filbeck
& Victor Ricciardi eds., 2017).
126. Cf., e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy, 104 VA.
L. REV. 1065, 1068–69 (2018) (arguing that “the normative foundation of the federal securities
law regime” is “flawed” to the extent that securities law overlooks the wrongness of the premise
that retail investors are financially literate).
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otherwise would not.127 But practices in securities markets can still be
objectionable absent fraud. This subpart explores the reasons why
people trade, and the extent to which those reasons are defensible, by
reviewing the empirical literature on two different models of retail
investor behavior. One model looks at active, uninformed trading as a
kind of entertainment or consumption trading. Another model looks
at active, uninformed trading as a product of efforts by intermediaries
to make certain securities more salient or prominent in investors’
attention. In doing so, this subpart illustrates why gamification might
seek to encourage active trading.
1. Rational trading as consumption. One answer to the question of
excessive active trading by retail investors is that it is not excessive by
the traders’ own lights. Some people indeed trade rationally because
they are trying to satisfy nonpecuniary preferences for entertainment
or consumption. Researchers studying clients of a German discount
broker identified several plausible reasons for entertainment trading,
including “recreation, sensation seeking, and an aspiration for
riches.”128 Some active traders thus appear to treat it as a substitute for
gambling.129 As other researchers have found, some active traders may
want to feel the wind through their hair.130 Still others may have a
preference for high-volatility lottery-like assets when trying to grow
their wealth.
In addition, a new body of scholarship has focused on expressive
or group-affinity motives for coordinating with likeminded traders

127. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in
the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 713 (1999) [hereinafter Stout, Why the Law
Hates Speculators].
128. Daniel Dorn & Paul Sengmueller, Trading as Entertainment?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 591, 593
(2009).
129. See id. at 592 (linking gambling and portfolio turnover, a measure of trading frequency);
see also, e.g., Michal Strahilevitz, A Closer Look at the Causes and Consequences of Frequent Stock
Trading, in FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR: PLAYERS, SERVICES, PRODUCTS, AND MARKETS, supra note
125, at 209, 212 (discussing how investing is for many investors a gambling substitute); Łukasz
Markiewicz & Elke U. Weber, DOSPERT’s Gambling Risk-Taking Propensity Scale Predicts
Excessive Stock Trading, 14 J. BEHAV. FIN. 65, 66 (2013) (discussing the connection between
gambling, risk-taking propensity, and trading).
130. See, e.g., Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, Sensation Seeking, Overconfidence, and
Trading Activity, 64 J. FIN. 549, 551–52 (2009) (linking excessive trading to propensity to engage
in other sensation-seeking activities like speeding).
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online—though empirical evidence on this point is mixed.131 Lower
costs of coordinating online have made it easier for retail traders to
engage in herding or momentum trades.132 These trades may also have
expressive or affective dimensions.133 Some traders participating in
these strategies report being motivated by concerns about wealth
inequality and disparate opportunities for different kinds of traders to
earn returns in capital markets.134 Nonpecuniary reasons for trading
may make online trading appear more like a “game.”135

131. See, e.g., John P. Anderson, Jeremy Kidd, & George A. Mocsary, Social Media,
Securities Markets, and the Phenomenon of Expressive Trading, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1223,
1224 (2022) (“There is evidence that at least some of the recent [social-media-driven] retail
trading in GameStop and other securities is not only motivated by the desire to make a profit, but
rather to make a point.”). Financial economists, by contrast, have concluded that most retail
traders of GameStop they examined were not doing so for affective reasons—protesting Wall
Street—given trading that reflected prior patterns of risky trading behavior and “their desire for
gambling.” Tim Hasso, Daniel Müller, Matthias Pelster & Sonja Warkulat, Who Participated in
the GameStop Frenzy? Evidence from Brokerage Accounts, 45 FIN. RSCH. LETTERS, no. 102140,
2022, at 1, 9.
132. In their simplest, naïve versions, momentum, trend-following, or herding strategies are
those that encourage buying stocks that have recently had positive returns and selling those that
have not. See, e.g., MARKO KOLANOVIC & ZHEN WEI, J.P. MORGAN, MOMENTUM STRATEGIES
ACROSS ASSET CLASSES: RISK FACTOR APPROACH TO TREND FOLLOWING 9 (2015),
https://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/jpm-momentum-strategies-2015-04-15-1681565.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BF8C-BVBE]. On investors’ herding behavior, see generally David Hirshleifer
& Siew Hong Teoh, Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: A Review and Synthesis,
9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 25 (2003) (discussing incentives for herding behavior, as well as incentives for
parties to shield themselves from or use others’ herding to their advantage). When mediated
through social media, these strategies are popular for other than-expressive reasons because they
let people get in early, coordinate, and help construct demand for the trade. In doing so, they
offer a plausible leg up over the market to retail traders who typically lack any information
advantage over other (typically institutional) traders. Cf. infra note 140 and accompanying text
(discussing insider trading). Thanks to Brian L. Frye for suggesting that this might make trader
flow a form of “new fundamentals” presenting potential career risks to institutional traders who
do not account for it. See also, e.g., Sue S. Guan, Meme Investors and Retail Risk, 63 B.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4002708 [https://perma.cc/P9ED48J9] (discussing the risk associated with coordinated retail trading); Terrence Hendershott &
Albert J. Menkveld, Price Pressures, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 405, 421 (2014) (discussing “inventory risk”
for dealers in connection with retail trades of this kind).
133. See Anderson et al., supra note 131, at 1224.
134. See Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Regulation and Class Warfare, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 796, 804.
135. Aegis J. Frumento, [In]Securities: Mind Games, BROKE & BROKER: GUEST BLOG (May
7, 2021), http://www.brokeandbroker.com/5835/insecurities-aegis-frumento-gamification [https://
perma.cc/Y4PQ-H9H4]. As with other games, it’s possible to pursue expressive, performative,
and “gameful” ends that don’t involve making money—like engaging in meme stock herding
trades. See Levine, Playing the Game, supra note 56 (observing that “impressing people with your
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Nonpecuniary benefits can come at pecuniary cost. If traders lose
more than they make up for in other benefits, we should expect them
to stop trading. Research on “trading to learn” suggests that losing
traders are more likely to stop trading, but that losing traders persist as
a group.136 The point is not merely academic, as Robinhood’s
cofounder has indicated that firm clients traded to learn—and
suggested that performance improved with learning.137 The persistent
presence of “rational” losing retail traders in markets is puzzling, but
securities law has so far shown little ambition to address it.138
2. Attention-induced noise trading. Another model of retail
investor behavior focuses on imperfect rationality and informational
asymmetry in shaping human behavior. Bounded rationality is a limit
on all kinds of human decisionmaking.139 And securities law theory
recognizes that bounded rationality leads retail traders to act noisily—
in ways uncorrelated with the market.
Retail investors routinely but incorrectly believe that knowledge
of already public information about a company gives them an
informational edge.140 Suppose a company issues an announcement,
wit and boldness” on social media is a motivation). On “gameful” ends, see Deterding, supra note
33, at 34–47.
136. See Brad M. Barber, Yi-Tsung Lee, Yu-Jane Liu, Terrance Odean & Ke Zhang,
Learning, Fast or Slow, 10 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 61, 65 (2020).
137. See E736: Robinhood Uses Free Stock Trading To Open Access to the Entire American
Financial System; Co-Founder Vlad Tenev Talks Mission, Building a Billion Dollar Startup & the
Business of Millennial Money Management, THIS WEEK IN STARTUPS, at 28:30 (May 30, 2017),
https://thisweekinstartups.com/vlad-tenev-robinhood [https://perma.cc/GE5W-X8J6].
138. I plan to consider in future work the social welfare and other implications of rational
consumption trading, including the extent to which it’s desirable to have markets that act as
substitutes for gambling but are regulated in very different ways. Whether we want markets to
accomplish something more than deference to the preferences of speculators is ultimately a
question of the public interest. Although a preliminary normative hot take is that rational
consumption trading is bad because it encourages gambling, the bottom-line assessment on that
question may depend on how much we care about the second order effects on how markets
allocate capital to socially valuable uses (whatever criteria we have for assessing that). Cf. infra
notes 190, 255 and accompanying text.
139. See Roger P. Alford & James Fallows Tierney, Moral Reasoning in International Law,
in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 34 (Donald Earl Childress, III ed., 2009).
140. See, e.g., Charles M. Jones, Donghui Shi, Xiaoyan Zhang & Xinran Zhang, Understanding
Retail Investors: Evidence from China 34 (June 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://ss
rn.com/abstract=3628809 [https://perma.cc/U97P-YG2Z] (studying Chinese retail investors,
finding heterogeneity in ability to “predict and process public information,” and noting that
ability is correlated with account size); cf. Henry L. Friedman & Zitong Zeng, Retail Investor
Trading and Market Reactions to Earning Announcements 3 (July 1, 2021) (unpublished
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and sophisticated, informed traders buy or sell on this information,
promptly impounding it into the price of a security as the efficient
market hypothesis proposes. The next day after the market reopens,
the price has changed to account for this information. A retail investor
comes along later that day and decides to buy because the information
improves the company’s prospects—and thus, she believes, the value
of its stock. The retail investor didn’t have superior private
information; the announcement had already been reflected in the
security’s price.141 When ordinary people buy and sell securities, it is
usually for reasons uncorrelated with information that is relevant to
the economic payoff of the trade (say fundamental value of the
underlying asset, or the future price path).142 When we don’t have
superior private information, our transactions can be thought of as
uninformed, uncorrelated, or noisy.143
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3817979 [https://perma.cc/ZA9R-7Y32] (finding that the
presence of retail investors “seem[s] to improve the price response to public earnings information
for firms whose prices may be expected to be less efficient ex ante,” and interpreting this as
evidence that retail investors “provid[e] liquidity to sophisticated traders whose activity impounds
information into prices” rather than earn arbitrage profits themselves). Meanwhile, it’s usually
illegal for them to trade when they do have an informational edge. See Karen E. Woody, The New
Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594, 600–14 (2020) (explaining that insider trading law prohibits
people in most circumstances from personally benefiting from trading on material nonpublic
information when they have a duty of trust and confidence to the source of the information).
141. See Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading
Regulation, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 277 (1999) (noting that under the semi-strong version of
the efficient capital markets hypothesis, there is “no benefit . . . to be gained from trading on . . .
formerly secret information” once the “stock price has adjusted to reflect the new information”).
142. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714–15 (2006); WAI MUN FONG, THE LOTTERY MINDSET:
INVESTORS, GAMBLING AND THE STOCK MARKET 2 (2014).
143. Noise has an important role in financial markets. Some level of noise, in the sense of
mistaken or heterogeneous beliefs about the quality of information relevant to the payoff from
an economic asset, is necessary for liquidity to exist. Otherwise, there will not be the kind of
difference of opinion needed for buyers and sellers of securities to transact on beliefs about their
private information, knowing that others likewise have analogous beliefs informing their own
trade. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 528, 530 (1986) (“If there is no noise trading, there
will be very little trading in individual assets. People will hold individual assets, directly or
indirectly, but they will rarely trade them.”). Lynn Stout offered a “heterogeneous expectations
model of speculation posit[ing] that differences in traders’ beliefs—that is, subjective bullishness
and bearishness—can be a catalyst for trading.” Lynn A. Stout, Irrational Expectations, 3 LEGAL
THEORY 227, 228 (1997); see also Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 127, at 741–
51 (outlining heterogeneous expectations mode of speculation); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, OLIVIER
SIBONY & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NOISE: A FLAW IN HUMAN JUDGMENT 3–7 (2021) (describing
noisiness as highly variable, widely scattered data in a variety of contexts). Recent literature on
sociology in financial markets may also be instructive in this regard. Jens Beckert argues that, to
decide about future states of the world under incomplete information and cognitive power, people
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Retail investors are typically uninformed in this way, so their
orders are informationally “noisy.” It usually isn’t cost-effective for
retail investors to engage in fundamental analysis or research to learn
private information that can be traded on for profit. As the volume of
noisy order flow from retail investors increases, it creates liquidity
because other people want to trade against them.144 Noise is defined in
distinction with information. Because their orders are typically
uninformed in this way, retail traders have become nearly synonymous
with “noise.”
“Noise traders,” then, are those who trade for reasons other than
superior private information about a security’s payoff.145 Financial
economics models of trader behavior distinguishing between informed
and noise traders began emerging in the 1980s and 1990s.146 These noise
trader models have influenced securities regulation scholarship in the
behavioral law and economics tradition.147 This literature has touched
on issues such as how law should conceive of and respond to the
presence of uninformed and noisy retail order flow in capital markets.
Noise trader models continue to be influential in securities law theory,
with noisy retail being a key category of stock market participant.148
Whatever the origin of these traders’ propensity to trade based on
noise, “[o]vertrading phenomena are . . . likely to be exacerbated by
individual investors’ operating through financial intermediaries, who
have generally a specific economic incentive to encourage trading.”149
One of the noisy reasons people decide to buy or sell securities is
that they are susceptible to the presentation of information. The
decision to buy, sell, or hold a risky asset is partly about the expected
rely on “fictional expectations” that bring about future states of the world. JENS BECKERT,
IMAGINED FUTURES: FICTIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND CAPITALIST DYNAMICS 9 (2016).
144. Black, supra note 143, at 532 (“[I]t will become more profitable for people to trade on
information, but only because the prices have more noise in them.”); see supra Part I.C.3.
145. See Alex Preda, The Ethnography of Noise in Electronic Finance, in NOISE: LIVING AND
TRADING IN ELECTRONIC FINANCE 1, 1 (2017).
146. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1980) (describing a model that
compares informed and uninformed traders).
147. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations
Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1409–12 (2002) (summarizing other
academics’ treatment of noise in undermining efficiency in the market).
148. See Lin, supra note 114, at 466–67; Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 142, at 714–15.
149. Alessio M. Pacces, Financial Intermediation in the Securities Markets Law and
Economics of Conduct of Business Regulation, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 479, 494 (2000). On
plausible sources of that propensity, see supra note 143.
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outcome of different states of the world. It’s costly to calculate these
expected outcomes and weigh them against other attributes, and
ordinary people don’t make asset trading decisions on that basis.
Rather, retail investors often act like ordinary consumers in other
markets; as discussed above, we focus on attributes that are most
salient among the choice set.150
The concern for regulators and scholars is that gamification
induces noise trading in particular assets that are salient. Empirical
research in financial economics has found evidence of this kind of
attention-induced noise trading. One study of days when Robinhood’s
app experienced outages have found that indicia of market quality are
higher when Robinhood users exit the market, suggesting that these
users are uninformed noise traders whose ownership of stocks is
unrelated to future returns.151 Other studies have found that retail
investors trade disproportionately in highly salient stocks, like those
that enter the “leaderboards”—like the lists of stocks held most by
clients, or lists of stocks that have gained or lost the highest percentage
that day.152 Yet another study found that widespread access to raw
financial data may lead to higher trade volume and less predictable
future returns, an indicator that trades are noisy or uninformed.153
Taken together, this research suggests a significant role of trading app
features in calling trader attention to stock, activating preferences for
trading in salient securities, and inducing noise trading (to the extent
that salience may not be payoff-relevant information).
Recognizing that gamification and app design can intervene in
decisionmaking processes to encourage outcomes the person otherwise
150. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
151. See Gregory W. Eaton, T. Clifton Green, Brian S. Roseman & Yanbin Wu, ZeroCommission Individual Investors, High Frequency Traders, and Stock Market Quality 4 (Apr.
2021) (unpublished manuscript); see also Friedman & Zeng, supra note 140, at 2 (reporting that
“Robinhood outages are associated with less retail trading activity” and “that retail frictions are
associated with weaker price responses to earnings announcements”).
152. See Roberto Stein, The Top 5 Predictable Effects of New Entries in Robinhood’s “100
Most Popular” List 4 (Sept. 17, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3694588 [https://perma.cc/3Z64-2T4C]; Brad M. Barber, Xing Huang, Terrance Odean &
Christopher Schwarz, Attention-Induced Trading and Returns: Evidence from Robinhood Users,
J. FIN. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3715077 [https://per
ma.cc/BJU4-K529].
153. Taha Havakhor, Mohammad S. Rahman, Tianjian Zhang & Chenqi Zhu, Tech-Enabled
Financial Data Access, Retail Investors, and Gambling-like Behavior in the Stock Market:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment 20 (Apr. 26, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssr
n.com/abstract=3434812 [https://perma.cc/7L34-BLWS].

TIERNEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

INVESTMENT GAMES

10/16/2022 11:36 AM

393

would not have chosen—trading in this security at this time—does not
help us completely define the scope of objectionable attention-induced
noise trading. In securities markets it can be hard to discern what
people would have chosen “otherwise.” Empirical strategies that rely
on observed trading behavior are particularly hard because trading
preferences are endogenous. And as Michael Guttentag has pointed
out, a full assessment of the allocation of economic surplus can’t be
limited to behavioral exploitation in simple cases where people are
duped into transactions they wouldn’t have entered; it also bears on
cases where behavioral exploitation leads them to enter into a
transaction that disfavorably reallocates economic surplus to the
counterparty, even where they have not exceeded their reservation
price.154
Broader literatures on the effect of user-interface design practices
on consumer behavior may also help delineate the boundaries of how
gamification and other engagement practices generate attentioninduced noise trading and distinguish other bases for objection.
Suppose a brokerage app offers a subscription to some information or
news service for a monthly fee and hides an option to cancel within
layers of settings menu options. That might be objectionable for the
same reason that “dark patterns” are in other areas—such as because
they put up “hurdles to performing a behavior that’s bad for the
company,” like canceling a subscription that has a monthly cost
nonsalient to the customer but is valuable to the company.155 But that
basis for objection is very different from suggesting that gamification
features in mobile apps are eliciting noisy trading behavior. In
considering interventions, regulators should remain attuned to the
limits of what the more general academic research about user-interface
and user-experience design can tell us about how apps encourage
trading.156

154. Guttentag, supra note 35, at 611–16, 659.
155. Eric Ravenscraft, How To Spot—and Avoid—Dark Patterns on the Web, WIRED (July
29, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-spot-avoid-dark-patterns [https://perm
a.cc/8MMP-Q57H] (noting that this kind of design requires people to put in cognitive or other
effort “to make a task harder because, from the company’s perspective, it shouldn’t be easy”
(emphasis deleted)).
156. Cf. Rachel Geoffroy & Heemin Lee, The Role of Academic Research in SEC
Rulemaking: Evidence from Business Roundtable v. SEC, 59 J. ACCT. RSCH. 375, 376 (2021)
(discussing the role and benefits of academic research in SEC rulemaking broadly).
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B. Situating Gamification Within Securities Law Theory
These models of investor behavior reflect that some people have
preferences for speculative trading, while others are essentially duped
into trading speculatively. Duping, not speculation, has traditionally
been the concern of securities law. This subpart introduces several of
the underlying theoretical and normative policies of the securities laws
and assesses how these bear on regulatory interventions toward
gamification.
1. Agency costs in brokerage and investor protection. Retail
traders must access markets through brokers, who act as agents. As in
other principal-agent relationships, brokers’ pursuit of their own
rational self-interest may conflict with the client’s interests.157 Agents
have different incentives than principals. So where it’s costly to
monitor or build trust in the relationship, agents can act in ways that
aren’t in the principal’s interests. One such misaligned incentive arises
from brokerage compensation. The receipt of transaction-based
compensation is a hallmark of brokerage.158 This kind of compensation
gives rise to an incentive to encourage more trading—perhaps even
more than clients want.159
This kind of agency cost problem is intimately familiar to scholars
of capital markets.160 And so too to regulators: the SEC’s guidance on
economic analysis in rulemakings, for instance, identifies “principal-

157. See Deborah A. DeMott, Rogue Brokers and the Limits of Agency Law, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (Arthur B. Laby ed., forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at
7) (“Notwithstanding a client’s right of control as principal in an agency relationship, the risk of
betrayal by the agent is always present, as it is in all fiduciary relationships.”).
158. See, e.g., In re James S. Tagliaferri, Exchange Act Release No. 80047, 2017 WL 632134,
at *4 (Feb. 15, 2017) (describing receipt of “[t]ransaction-based compensation, or commissions”
as “one of the hallmarks of being a broker-dealer” (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Helms,
No. A-13-CV-01036, 2015 WL 6438872, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2015))).
159. See, e.g., Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 184
(2017) (“Some products offer the advisors larger commissions, and advisors have an incentive to
steer clients toward products that maximize advisor commissions.”).
160. See, e.g., Pacces, supra note 149, at 481, 483. See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT &
DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES I: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL (2001)
(offering synthesis of the literature on incentives when a principal delegates to an agent). For
other examples from the literature using an agency cost model for the brokerage industry, see
James Fallows Tierney & Benjamin P. Edwards, Secretly Recidivist Stockbrokers: An Error Cost
Theory of BrokerCheck Expungement 2–6 (Aug. 10, 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the author); DeMott, supra note 157, at 2; Benjamin P. Edwards, The Professional Prospectus: A
Call for Effective Professional Disclosure, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457, 1469 (2017).
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agent problems (such as economic conflicts of interest), and
asymmetric information” as justifications for regulatory action.161 In
fact, concerns about the conflict of interest in brokerage have been a
mainstay of broker-dealer regulation for nearly a century.162
This model is premised on provision of advice consistent with
professional duties of care. As a result, securities law has traditionally
distinguished between self-directed investors and those advised by
brokers.163 Even more recent disputes over sales practices rules like
Regulation Best Interest (“Reg BI”) reflect tradeoffs between
competing visions of what securities regulation should do about this
agency cost.164 The SEC under the Trump administration’s chair, Jay
Clayton, adopted in that regulation a model that largely preserved the
most significant source of agency costs for retail brokers, limiting most
of the duties in cases of self-directed trades not involving a
“recommendation.”165
But the basic problem of shaping consumer behavior for private
profit is not new.166 One traditional worry of broker-dealer regulation
was the boiler room, memorialized in the Leonardo di Caprio film THE
WOLF OF WALL STREET: a call center in which high-pressure salesmen
compete for high commissions by pitching speculative securities to
strangers.167 The boiler room has been a longtime target of securities
regulators and has largely gone away in its silver-screen form.
161. Memorandum from Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation & Off. of Gen. Couns., Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, to Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. & Offs., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Mar. 16,
2012) [hereinafter SEC Staff Memorandum], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_
econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC4V-R7PX].
162. See, e.g., Allen Ferrell & John D. Morley, The Regulation of Intermediaries, in
SECURITIES MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 311, 370 (Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R.
Glosten, Edward F. Greene & Menesh S. Patel eds., 2018); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, No. H. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. Ch. 3, 254
(1964).
163. See, e.g., Christine Lazaro, The Future of Financial Advice: Eliminating the False
Distinction Between Brokers and Investment Advisers, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 381, 398–99 (2013).
164. See infra Parts III.B.4–5.
165. See infra notes 326–328 and accompanying text; see also William D. Cohan, “It’s the
Trumpification of the SEC”: As Standards Are Lowered for Investment Pros, “Mr. and Ms. 401(k)”
Could Be Screwed, VANITY FAIR (June 5, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/06/secnew-rule-broker-investors-401k [https://perma.cc/Z7H7-USKM] (observing that the 2019
reforms left us with “not a great system” in which brokers can recommend complex securities for
commissions to people who lack the “financial sophistication” to “challenge their recommendation”).
166. See Hurwitz, supra note 34, at 63.
167. THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (Paramount Pictures 2014); see also, e.g., BOILER ROOM
(Team Todd 2000) (providing another cinematic depiction of the broker-dealer boiler room). On
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What increasingly worries regulators is that technology has
allowed the boiler room to take a new form. Gamification may appeal
to retail investors’ cognitive psychology in much the same way.168 In a
world in which trading commissions have been bid down to zero,
broker-dealers compete for clients on other attractive product and
service attributes: flashy app design, push notifications, leaderboards,
lotteries for stock awards, and highly salient attention-grabbing lists of
attractive stocks.
The use of “game design,” however, should not itself be of concern
to securities law or an object of regulatory intervention.169 Some design
features are the natural evolution of sales techniques that have long
existed in physical space.170 Gamification should not be primarily
objectionable because it is digital, flashy, or appeals to children.171 It is
objectionable because it encourages maladaptively excessive patterns
of trades and trading in securities for reasons that are unrelated to the
payoff of the security, in service of greater profits in the financial
sector.
To build out this intuition, imagine the following hypothetical.172
A brick-and-mortar brokerage office is slickly designed with lots of
glass, video monitors, free coffee, and other attributes that make the
waiting area an attractive place to wait while another customer is
helped. A client walks into the brokerage office to place a securities
trade. The client looks at the video monitors in the lobby, sees that a
stock has been volatile recently, and places an order to buy that stock.
Upon confirmation that the order has been executed, the broker’s
representative hands a trade confirmation to the client without saying
a word, then flings confetti in the air and sets off an air horn (“🎉

the history of boiler rooms, see 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SEC. REG.
§ 14:150 (May 2022 update).
168. See Chris Gullotti, Why I’m No Fan of Trading Apps That Treat Investing Like a Game,
KIPLINGER (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.kiplinger.com/investing/602326/why-im-no-fan-of-trad
ing-apps-that-treat-investing-like-a-game [https://perma.cc/8FNT-6LQQ] (suggesting that DEPs
make apps like boiler rooms).
169. See Langvardt & Tierney, supra note 14, at 720.
170. Cf. SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that DEPs reflect “the same
potential conflicts” as in any client communication).
171. Cf. infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing when gamification may be
objectionable for these reasons).
172. Thanks to Alex Platt for suggesting the basic contours of the hypothetical.
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📣”).173

What about that should securities law consider
objectionable?174
In this hypothetical, the confetti and air horn are meant to be a bit
tongue in cheek. They are an illustrative stand-in for various attributes
of gamification that regulators are solving for. One implication is the
causal consequence of gamification features. If the confetti and air
horn encourage the client to place another trade that would not have
otherwise been made, they would be the means through which the
broker alters the client’s propensity—or makes a “call to action”—to
trade in a way that increases revenue to the broker.175 John C. Coffee,
Jr. has pointed out that what may matter is the refinement of the
interaction over time to encourage trading.176 Several other observers

173. Cf. Christina Ayele Djossa, Bwaaat! How the Air Horn Made Noise in Pop Music,
ATLAS OBSCURA (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/airhorn-pop-reggaehiphop-music-history [https://perma.cc/4VUN-LGDL] (noting that air horns are widely recognized
in music as a celebratory sound).
174. That investment games might appeal to children raises special issues not applicable to
gamified investing apps generally. See Packin, supra note 22, at 22–24 (addressing special legal
issues with FinTech and decentralized finance apps that appeal to children). Suppose there are
two differently situated traders, one 14 and the other 24. Children typically lack legal capacity to
accept brokerage contracts. See DEP RFI, supra note 13, at 49,074 (“Broker-dealers . . . are
required to maintain customer account information, including whether a customer is of legal
age.”). Perhaps, too, there is a social judgment that children are not competent to bear equity risk,
at least without being underwritten by adults. Or perhaps the broker has failed to maintain
supervisory practices and procedures reasonably designed to assure compliance with know-yourcustomer duties in connection with high school freshmen showing up with fake IDs to start trading
options. See, e.g., FINRA MANUAL, supra note 68, § 4512 (providing FINRA’s rules for what
customer account information is required or reasonably expected to be on file for each account);
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(a)(17) (2021) (requiring brokers to keep accurate books and records about
customers).
These objections disappear for the 24-year-old trader. That trader’s circumstances may still
relate to ability to bear equity risk—and it may make a particular product unsuitable, especially
for a novice. But the capacity and know-your-customer issues would be eliminated. All we are
left with is a broker flinging confetti and setting off an air horn at an adult who probably should
feel sheepish about the whole thing. We might still consider that practice crass, or out of the norm
for the typically staid brokerage industry’s norms governing communications. Yet even this would
not be the sort of expression that would fall within FINRA’s rules providing for review and
content standards for communications with retail investors, which apply only to written and
electronic communications distributed to more than 25 retail clients. See FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 68, § 2210. This reflects, apparently, the policy judgment that non-written, non-electronic
expression poses relatively little investor-protection risk if it does not constitute a
“recommendation.” See infra notes 329–331 and accompanying text.
175. On recommendations as “calls to action,” see infra Part III.B.4.
176. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gamification: Why Do We Care About Robinhood? What Could
the SEC Realistically Do?, LAW.COM: N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 17, 2021, 12:45 PM)
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have suggested that the SEC might care about an empirical upward
deviation in a retail customer’s propensity to take action.177
But it would be difficult to implement and administer a standard
that focuses on empirical upward deviations in trading propensity.
How could we measure deviation from a counterfactual baseline in
which investors had not experienced the confetti and air horn? Market
structure and the conduct of market participants are inseparable from
the rules that constitute and construct those markets.178 There is no
obvious “pure” and noninterventionist baseline of trading volume
against which to assess whether changes in retail trading behavior are
an upward deviation. The pre-gamification model of retail trading had
many transaction costs that impeded trading, and we cannot be sure
that this was the optimal level of trading.179 If the shift to commissionfree brokerage itself increases demand for trading but is also
endogenous to the rise of gamification, it would seem difficult to
disaggregate gamification features’ effect on propensity to trade.
This suggests some caution about the suggestion in Part III.B.4 to
rely on sales practices rules that focus on whether gamification features
are recommendations, understood as “calls to action.” But that there
are evidentiary problems here does not make the regulatory challenge
insurmountable. The SEC doesn’t typically look to causal evidence in
deciding whether something is a recommendation. Nor is it as tied to
economic analysis when it relies on its statutory authority as a market
fairness regulator.180 Indeed, securities law is in safe territory in
responding to the brokerage conflict of interest on fairness grounds.
Part III.B suggests ways of addressing the problem through sales
practices and fiduciary-duty rules, and through more ambitious market
structure reforms.

https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/11/17/gamification-why-do-we-care-about-robinh
ood-what-could-the-sec-realistically-do [https://perma.cc/Y7X5-WGML].
177. See, e.g., Blaine F. Aikin, Founder and Principal, Fiduciary Insights, LLC & Frank C.
Mindicino, Founder and Managing Partner of Practice Growth Partners, Comment Letter on
Digital Engagement Practices (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-21/s710219314900-259986.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU4R-S5K6] (arguing that “DEPs that lead to statistically
significant changes in investment behavior are rendering either recommendations or advice”).
178. See infra notes 359–367 and accompanying text.
179. Thanks to Adam Thimmesch for discussion on these points.
180. See J.W. Verret, Robinhood’s Threat To Sue the SEC over Broker-Inducement
Regulation Unlikely To Succeed 30 (George Mason Univ., L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 21-38,
2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3974960 [https://perma.cc/H862-SP46].
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2. Trading, gambling, and paternalism. How should securities law
account for the fact that some people trade actively for “rational”
gambling-like reasons, while others trade because they think
incorrectly that they have an informational edge? That retail investors
might be unable to fend for themselves is a core feature of modern
securities law. But what kind of regulatory intervention, if any, does
that imply here?
For as long as there’ve been noise trader models of retail investor
behavior, securities regulation scholarship has considered whether law
should respond by tamping down on noise trading.181 Donald C.
Langevoort suggested that if securities law were to direct attention to
behavioral economics and the problem of unsuitable investment, this
“scrutiny, in turn, might allow a coherent policy on retail investor
protection to emerge.”182 And Alicia J. Davis has argued that “[i]f
individuals, as a group, act as noise traders, society might be better
served if the direct participation of retail investors in securities markets
did not exist.”183
These perspectives reflect the intuition that if noise trading is
maladaptive, it should be discouraged. It might logically follow that
securities law should discourage gamification features that generate
informationally noisy trading: gamification leads at least some people
to make unreflective decisions to trade too much—and to confuse
“trading” with “investing” as the way to build wealth. Even if some
users trade excessively for rational reasons, others speculate
unintentionally. They want to make money but trade excessively for
imperfectly rational reasons to their disadvantage. For all but a tiny
fraction of professional traders and asset managers, it is nearly
impossible to beat the market over time by picking stocks and trading
actively.184 Traders are overconfident in their ability to do so. Retail
investors in particular trade for uninformed reasons and are attracted
to things that are salient. They exhibit herding behavior in stocks that

181. For an early example suggesting that noise trader models “underscore[] the need for a
general market remedy” to protect uninformed retail traders, see Mark H. Van De Voorde, Note,
The Fraud on the Market Theory and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis: Applying a Consistent
Standard, 14 J. CORP. L. 443, 478–79 (1989).
182. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1081 (2009).
183. Alicia J. Davis, Market Efficiency and the Problem of Retail Flight, 20 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 36, 44 (2014).
184. See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 121, at 415.
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are salient for whatever reason—a broker’s recommendation, a social
media tout, a coordinated manipulation (like a pump and dump), local
exposure, or other exogenous publicity (like a movie character dying
after using the company’s product).185
If noise trading is unintentional and maladaptive, involving
unwitting casino-like speculation in stock markets, one solution would
be to prohibit it entirely. After all, at least gamblers know what they’re
doing; mightn’t it be better if we just said retail investors had to invest
in target-date index funds? This kind of proposal reflects a
longstanding concern in U.S. thinking on financial markets about the
function and desirability of speculation.186 Securities markets are not
lotteries, of course, and there are disparate regulatory regimes covering
gambling and gaming in jurisdictions where they are legal.187
What would it look like to say that ordinary people could not trade
stocks because it is too speculative—too much like gambling? The
main implication is that only institutions could trade stocks.188
Securities law would thereby put a thumb on the scale in favor of a
particular view of securities trading: that people should quit

185. See, e.g., Fernando Chague, Bruno Giovanetti & Guilherme Paiva, Out of Sight, Out of
Mind: Local Stores and Retail Day-Trading 1 (July 12, 2022) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4054018 [https://perma.cc/ES7W-6WD5] (finding that local familiarity
with a business leads to increased day trading); Aimee Picchi, Peloton Stock Slumps After Morbid
Product Placement in “Sex and the City,” CBS NEWS (Dec. 10, 2021, 1:24 PM), https://ww
w.cbsnews.com/news/peloton-stock-death-by-peloton-just-like-that-mr-big [https://perma.cc/GK
43-JV7G] (noting that Peloton’s stock price dropped following a morbid scene in a popular TV
show casting its product in a negative light).
186. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, SPECULATION: A HISTORY OF THE FINE LINE BETWEEN
GAMBLING AND INVESTING 1 (2017) [hereinafter SPECULATION] (recounting the historical
debate in American law and society about how to encourage investment while discouraging
speculation, and about how to distinguish the two); Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra
note 127, at 712–33 (considering the history of antispeculation rules in the U.S.). See generally
STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL
ROOTS, 1690-1860 (1998) (considering longstanding debates about how to regulate securities
markets, and especially the trading of corporate equities, in England and the United States).
187. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities
Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
375, 375 (2005) (discussing the different regulatory schemes for securities and non-securities, like
gambling and gaming). But see John Luttig, Finance as Culture, SUBSTACK: LUTTIG’S LEARNINGS
(Feb. 28, 2021), https://luttig.substack.com/p/finance-as-culture [https://perma.cc/QB6M-VXUC]
(noting that day trading looks like a “nihilistic lottery”).
188. Langevoort offered this thought experiment in considering what such a market would
look like if protected by an antifraud-only rule. He suggested that it would look something like
today’s Rule 144A market, which is limited to institutional participants. Langevoort, supra note
182, at 1057–58.
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speculating and trading.189 The view that people should not trade
because it is bad for them smacks of paternalism and burdens
transactional freedom in order to protect people from themselves.
Consider those who trade excessively for rational and clear-eyed
reasons—perhaps because they are doing so as entertainment,
satisfying risk-seeking or sensation-seeking preferences. If they would
otherwise be gambling, who are we to object and tell them they can’t
play the stock market instead?190
The problem with the objection that securities law shouldn’t be
paternalistic is that it doesn’t reflect securities law’s stance toward
retail investors generally. Securities law routinely intervenes in the
transactional freedom of retail investors. Sometimes, it shuts them out
of the market entirely, as in the Rule 144A market for resale of private
placements between qualified institutional buyers. Other times,
securities law tailors those interventions by looking at existing wealth
as a proxy for sophistication or ability to bear risk.191 While the
Securities Act of 1933 usually protects investors by requiring
registration and disclosure, under a statutory exemption private
company securities can be sold without those protections to those
sophisticated enough to “fend for themselves.”192 A regulatory safe
harbor to that exemption, Regulation D, provides that “accredited
investors” are sophisticated enough—and has historically defined that
status in a way that limits investment in private-company securities to
sufficiently wealthy individuals and institutions.193

189. That view is in significant tension with the longstanding approach to American securities
regulation preferring disclosure over merits review, which would prescribe which investments
people should make. Cf. Wendy Gerwick Couture, A Glass-Half-Empty Approach to Securities
Regulation, 76 MD. L. REV. 360, 371 (2017) (describing how the SEC was largely set up to be a
disclosure regulator rather than merit regulator).
190. Cf. supra note 138 and accompanying text (pondering whether rational consumption
trading’s encouragement of gambling is bad, and how its second-order market effects may help
inform our normative opinion on the topic).
191. See generally Greg Oguss, Note, Should Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal
Securities Laws?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 285 (2012) (considering wealth proxies in the offering
exemptions).
192. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1952); see also Securities Act of 1933
§§ 4(a)(2), 5(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a)(2), 77e(a), (c) (providing together that “transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering” are exempt from otherwise applicable registration
requirements for the offer and sale of securities).
193. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2020) (defining terms used in Regulation D (§§ 230.500–
.508)). This definition has been criticized for some time for over- and under-inclusiveness. See
STAFF OF U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N., REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF
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Securities law intervenes in transactional freedom in other ways
that discourage active speculative trading. For example, it limits shortterm speculation on price momentum in asset markets by requiring
retail investors to put up a sufficient amount of money in advance.194
Consider the problem of “pattern day trading,” a risky activity
involving more than four “day trades”—roundtrip purchases and sales
of the same security on the same day—within a five-day period in an
account financed with margin.195 Pattern day traders try to profit off
price momentum, buying low and selling high after short holding
periods. In these cases, regulators’ primary concern is in the day
trader’s use of borrowed money for intraday trades.196 The pattern day
trader rules gatekeep access to the already wealthy by requiring
customers to post $25,000 minimum collateral in a margin account to
engage in roundtrip day trading.197 Pattern day trader rules were an

“ACCREDITED INVESTOR” 43–44 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/files/review-definition-ofaccredited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5MG-A7X7]. Despite recent amendments,
the definition remains contested to this day. See Accredited Investor Definition, 85 Fed. Reg.
64,234, 64,234–78 (Oct. 9, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240); see also Bill Myers,
Gensler Eyes Accredited Investor, Shareholder of Record Reforms, REGUL. COMPLIANCE WATCH
(June 27, 2022), https://www.regcompliancewatch.com/gensler-eyes-accredited-investor-shareho
lder-of-record-reforms [https://perma.cc/JS76-PWDE] (reporting that the SEC Chairman “is
pushing Commission staff to come up with new rule proposals that would change the definition[]
of accredited investor[],” and collecting possible changes, including “[r]aising the wealth
thresholds . . . and pegging them to inflation”); Lydia Beyoud, SEC ‘Accredited Investor’
Definition Tweak Faces Equity Concerns, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 23, 2022, 6:00 AM), https://
www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/securities-law/XB357SBC000000 [https://perma.cc/
4KR9-TLCY] (explaining how changing the definition of “accredited investor” could limit
investment opportunities for those from underrepresented communities). This illustrates the
difficulty with dividing investors based on proxies for ability to bear risk without financial ruin.
194. See Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 127, at 703.
195. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 68, § 4210(f)(8)(B)(i)–(ii) (defining “day trading” and
“pattern day trader”); see also Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The
Case of the Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 75, 77–78 & n.109 (2006) (noting
that pattern day trading rules reflect a policy intervention in which “certain classes of investors
[are] barred from types of trading that are viewed as particularly risky”). Like other margin rules
applicable to taking downside bets by selling shares short, the pattern day trading margin rules
mean that you can’t play if you can’t maintain the applicable margin. See Winston, supra note 17,
at 817–18 (discussing the margin rules applicable to short sales).
196. Margin is typically calculated based on end-of-day holdings, but day trading exposes
brokers to financial risk even if traders close out their holdings and have a flat account balance at
the end of the day.
197. In addition to requiring pattern day traders to post $25,000 minimum equity in their
margin accounts, securities law also limits day-trading buying power, and subjects traders to
further restrictions if they exceed buying power and do not meet a margin call. See, e.g., FINRA
MANUAL, supra note 68, § 4210(f)(8)(B)(iv) (providing the relevant FINRA restrictions on day-
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explicit response to retail investor behavior limiting their transactional
freedom.198
These examples reflect that securities law is already thick with
paternalism, everywhere you look.199 Securities law limits investors’
transactional freedom all the time, justifying these interventions for
their consequences rather than for their burden on transactional
freedom.200 It shapes not only the allocation of transactional
opportunity but also the distribution of economic surplus. As Emily
Winston has recently argued, that is a reason for securities law to
consider explicitly the effect of unequal access to investment
opportunity on worsening wealth inequality.201
Securities law can do only so much to solve the problem of active
trading for noisy reasons, because the problem is ultimately not one of
law. Its policy interventions limit who can speculate in securities

trading buying power and equity minimums); Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating
to Margin Requirements for Day Trading, 66 Fed. Reg. 13,608, 13,610 (Mar. 6, 2001).
198. In approving these margin rules in 2001, the SEC emphasized the role “advances in
technology” played in encouraging “a dramatic increase in day trading by customers.” Order
Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Margin Requirements for Day Trading, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 13,609. Individual commenters had suggested the rule would be a barrier to entry and was
“designed to exclude” small retail investors. Id. at 13,613.
199. See, e.g., Susanna Kim Ripken, Paternalism and Securities Regulation, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 1, 2 (2015) (“[T]he federal securities laws have always contained significant elements of
paternalism, and over the last eighty years, have become increasingly protectionist and
paternalistic.”).
200. As far as it is practiced, securities law is not particularly concerned with being too
“paternalistic.” See, e.g., Mercer Bullard, The Fiduciary Standard: It’s Not What It Is, but How It’s
Made, Measured, and Decided, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 337, 351 (2013) (observing that securities
law debates rest on assumptions that “deregulatory policies” and “market-directed outcomes”
will “create greater net social wealth,” and not on concerns about “the enhanced freedom of
markets, and their participants” (emphasis removed)); cf. Ripken, supra note 199, at 2–3, 11–15
(considering the tension between securities law’s supposedly high-level “anti-paternalistic
philosophy” and the specific paternalistic rules that “abound”).
201. See generally Winston, supra note 17 (considering the relationship between rising wealth
inequality in the U.S. and securities laws that limit access to investment opportunity); see also
James Tierney, Securities Law’s Effects on Wealth Inequality: The Case of Asymmetric Investment
Opportunity, JOTWELL (Feb. 4, 2022), https://corp.jotwell.com/securities-laws-effects-on-wealthinequality-the-case-of-asymmetric-investment-opportunity [https://perma.cc/L77M-SAK2] (observing
that because “expanding the pool of people who can access particular investments” will just
“shift[] where we allow the inequality gap to widen” but not “alter the structural” relationship
identified in Winston’s framework, regulators “have to take into account whether tinkering with
individual access to investment opportunities will be . . . in the public interest”).
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markets, and those interventions may have expressive effects.202 But we
ought to be humble about the ability of law or regulation to tamp down
on people’s excitement for speculative asset markets not based on
superior private information. Some noise trading will be inevitable so
long as people trade based on irrational exuberance (and so long as
securities law does not “save” them from doing so).203 What’s more,
noise trading is a necessary component of markets in which informed
trading is profitable. Because “[n]oise trading cannot be prohibited as
such,” the question is how much to tolerate, and by whom.204
All of this suggests that, in designing interventions to address
gamified investing, securities law should consider the different reasons
people trade. That some people are essentially duped into trading
based on salience does not change the fact that others trade
“rationally” for entertainment or consumption reasons. The case for
regulatory intervention is weaker in the latter case than where there is
evidence of market failures in which participants are subject to
cognitive or behavioral errors. As Jeffrey Rachlinski has described this
field, “the cognitive error story suggests placing significant restrictions
on access to the markets.”205 Behavioral interventions may be
particularly warranted where there is a risk that these cognitive errors
lead to people getting bilked.206 If people are overtrading to their

202. So, too, interventions like the prudent investor rule express a normative preference for
certain kinds of investment behavior. See generally Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 121
(explaining the prudent investor rule and its impact on investment behavior).
203. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, at xii–xxiii (3d ed. 2005)
(examining psychological factors underlying market behavior). As markets for crypto may well
illustrate, when retail demand can’t fill its risk preferences in regulated securities and derivatives
markets, it exerts hydraulic pressure elsewhere in the system as people try to substitute into other
speculative assets. See, e.g., Sudheer Chava, Fred Hu & Nikhil Paradkar, Gambling on Crypto
Tokens? 5 (July 25, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4149937
[https://perma.cc/5AC8-H5RH] (reporting evidence from 2016–18 that “investor interest in
[initial coin offerings] appears to be driven by gambling preferences, which have real effects on
both token and investor outcomes”); W.C. Bunting, A Better Legal Definition of Gambling 1–2,
61–67 (Aug. 5, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4137847 [https://
perma.cc/6TQ2-838K] (articulating a model statutory definition of gambling as involving “risk
creation as a limiting principle to distinguish [it] from other bilateral risk transactions,” and
offering that certain cryptocurrency markets are “the theoretical equivalent of a casino chip”);
supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting that trading can substitute for gambling).
204. Pacces, supra note 149, at 497.
205. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1165, 1185 (2002).
206. Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities
Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 581 (1999).
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detriment, the paternalistic view would deem it “better for a wise and
sympathetic central authority to limit that freedom.”207 Not by
prohibiting them from trading directly, but by intervening in the
processes that result in them getting bilked by investment apps that
encourage excessive trading.
Regulating gamification in investing apps raises hard questions
about the role of retail investors in securities markets—and whether
securities law should promote not just prudent investing but also
speculative gambling. It likewise raises questions about when retail
investors should be left to their own devices or protected from
exploitation and opportunism. Suppose that we think exploitative
gamification is the kind that can be reasonably expected to generate
informationally noisy trading for brokers’ profit. Once we take that
step, “[w]e are right back to the task of defining opportunism . . . in the
laws regulating the securities industry, which the SEC cannot
comfortably ignore.”208
That question becomes even more urgent when we consider why
we care about retail investor regulation. One reason is that investor
protection promotes the confidence necessary to ensure the system
does not unravel. But there is an often overlooked but equally
important second reason. In a capitalist society without a robust social
welfare system, prudent investing is essential to ensure successful and
comfortable smoothing of income across time to achieve financial
goals. Leaving that responsibility up to individuals is a daunting enough
prospect when we are predictably bad at it. It is even worse when the
financial firms with whom we entrust our money depredate against us.
C. Contemplating Alternative Visions of Investment Games
This Part has identified relevant models of retail investor behavior
and situated these within accounts of the securities laws’ normative
policies. It turns now to briefly identifying and responding to three
alternative visions of gamification: the techno-optimist view that it will
promote investor education, the techno-populist view that it will

207. Mahoney, supra note 73, at 714. Rachlinski argues that “[t]he psychological case for
paternalism . . . must rest on a relative assessment of the cognitive costs of improved decision
against the costs of supplanting individual choice.” Rachlinski, supra note 205, at 1168. On the
asymmetric deployment of cost-benefit arguments in cases where transactional freedom is being
constrained or broadened, see Bullard, supra note 200, at 347.
208. Langevoort, supra note 182, at 1047.
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enable shareholder democracy, and the techno-pessimist view that it
will undercut confidence in markets.
1. Techno-optimism. Some “techno-optimist” observers are
bullish that gamified investing can improve motivation and
engagement. Across society financial literacy is low, and interventions
to improve it are hard to design effectively.209 Might gamification be a
solution?210 Among other proponents, SEC Commissioner Hester
Peirce has argued that thoughtful design might encourage greater
motivation and engagement among end users, closing the financial
literacy gap.211 This may be attractive for its promise of a light
regulatory touch.212 In addition, if financial literacy is an important

209. See Fairfax, supra note 126, at 1077, 1107–11; see also infra notes 212–215 and
accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of designing gamification methods in a way that
successfully encourages financial literacy). Meta-analysis of research has suggested that most
financial-literacy interventions have weak explanatory value for observed financial behavior, may
be weaker for lower-income groups, and may operate differently on the kind of household
financial behavior (e.g., savings, consumption, or debt) targeted by the intervention. See generally
Luís Filipe Rodrigues, Abílio Oliveira & Carlos J. Costa, Playing Seriously – How Gamification
and Social Cues Influence Bank Customers To Use Gamified e-Business Applications, 63
COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 392 (2016) (arguing that gamification can lead to increased customer
engagement); Margaret Miller, Julia Reichelstein, Christian Salas & Bilal Zia, Can You Help
Someone Become Financially Capable? A Meta-Analysis of the Literature, 30 WORLD BANK
RSCH. OBSERVER 220 (2015) (noting that financial literacy increases savings but does not
decrease loan defaults); Daniel Fernandes, John G. Lynch, Jr. & Richard G. Netemeyer, Financial
Literacy, Financial Education, and Downstream Financial Behaviors, 60 MGMT. SCI. 1861 (2014)
(finding that financial literacy does not explain changing financial behaviors).
210. Cf. Arjen van der Heide & Dominik Želinský, ‘Level Up Your Money Game’: An
Analysis of Gamification Discourse in Financial Services, 14 J. CULTURAL ECON. 711, 713 (2021)
(diverging from the techno-optimist view that “celebrate[s] the problem-solving potential of
gamification”).
211. See Al Barbarino, SEC’s Peirce on Crypto Ambitions, GameStop’s Lessons, LAW360
(May 3, 2021, 11:48 AM), https://www.law360.com/securities/articles/1379758/sec-s-peirce-oncrypto-ambitions-gamestop-s-lessons [https://perma.cc/CL4K-QSE6]; see also Mike Lee, How
Gamification Could Take Investor Experiences to a New Level, ERNST & YOUNG (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://www.ey.com/en_us/digital/how-gamification-could-take-investor-experiences-to-a-newlevel [https://perma.cc/AMK8-HAF6] (arguing that gamification simplifies and makes the
experience of trading more engaging). For other comments by Peirce, see Dean Seal, SEC’s Peirce
Has ‘Reservations’ About Recent Agency Action, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2020, 11:19 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1322567/sec-s-peirce-has-reservations-about-recent-agency-action [htt
ps://perma.cc/ZRS7-LFGE] (describing a statement in connection with an enforcement action
against a firm offering simulated day trading accounts with real payoffs, in which Peirce urged the
role of investment games in “provid[ing] incentives to take the game seriously and thus increase
the educational value of the experience”).
212. Cf. Ismail Erturk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver & Karel Williams, The
Democratization of Finance? Promises, Outcomes and Conditions, 14 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 553,
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social goal, then there are plausible welfare benefits to interventions
that expand financial literacy in their own right.
There are several reasons for skepticism about the technooptimist position, however. First, these interventions may have only
weak effects on behavior.213 Superficial gamification, focusing
primarily on easy-to-implement extrinsic rewards and incentives, does
not build engagement and motivation in the long term; those effects
tend to dissipate once the extrinsic rewards are taken away.214
Calibrating the right kinds of gamification, responsibly designed to
generate engaging and intrinsically motivating experiences, requires
thoughtful design and implementation.215 This probably goes beyond
what we can expect the market to produce.216
Second, and more fundamentally, the engagement function of
gamification might be normatively objectionable even if it has benefits
to end users. Gamification intervenes in cognitive processes and
decisionmaking in ways that seek to alter our behavior, typically in
service of private profit. Even when inflected with prosocial ends (like
increasing financial literacy), it still involves using people as means to

571 (2007) (noting that while investment in financial literacy programs is “probably justified
because reductions in gross [financial] illiteracy are highly desirable,” they are unlikely to
“prevent” as compared to “discourage . . . irresponsible behaviour,” so “it is unlikely that literacy
can be raised far and fast enough to justify a lighter regulatory touch” (parentheses omitted)).
213. See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 263
(2008); Peter H. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence Affect, Happiness, & Trust?, 3 J. BUS.
& TECH. L. 257, 300 (2008); supra note 209.
214. See Lachlan Ford, Gamification Often Misses the Point, SMART SPARROW (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://www.smartsparrow.com/2016/01/07/gamification [https://perma.cc/ATB8-EKD2].
215. Some of the challenges are in making a game intriguing—in activating the same kinds of
responses that make children want to play Minecraft for twelve hours straight. Replicating that
same kind of intrinsic motivation in the educational context is not a matter of adding badges and
notifications to facilitate disclosure but building disclosure and information into a framework that
provides a kind of intrinsic challenge, offers feedback, and encourages support and growth. See
Kevin Bell, Gameful Design: A Potential Game Changer, EDUCAUSE REV., May–June 2018, at
40, 41; Richard N. Van Eck, Digital Game-Based Learning, EDUCAUSE REV., Nov.–Dec. 2015, at
12, 22.
216. Without regulatory intervention, market-led efforts at gamification will prioritize
engagement for profit over other learning-related functions like improving intrinsic motivation,
because firms face a collective action problem in investing in learning and forgoing profit
opportunities. On similar themes, see generally Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private Ordering
Within Financial Markets, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 183 (2014–15) (considering the limits of
private ordering and exploring how changes to regulatory regimes could lead to significant
improvements).
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generate private profits—which is, to some, an objectionable basis on
which to relate with others.217
Even those sympathetic to prosocial use of technology should
recognize these concerning implications. They call for a healthy
measure of skepticism that securities law can improve education and
disclosure-delivery processes with “white hat” rather than “black hat”
gamification.
2. Techno-populism. Another group of scholars supposes that
gamified investing will promote ordinary people’s participation in
finance and corporate governance.218 This article refers to these claims
as “techno-populist.” The notion that technology might “democratize”
finance is not new.219 But gamification has renewed hopes of
broadening participation in equity markets.
Most prominent is the hope that gamification will encourage
participation in corporate governance. Shareholder democracy has a
well-known collective action problem resulting in retail apathy and free
riding; it’s rarely worthwhile for retail investors to participate.220 This
equilibrium means that the results of shareholder votes won’t reflect

217. For discussion of normative objections to gamification, see generally Tae Wan Kim,
Gamification of Labor and the Charge of Exploitation, 152 J. BUS. ETHICS 27 (2018); John
Danaher, Sven Nyholm & Brian D. Earp, The Quantified Relationship, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Feb.
2, 2018, at 3; Kim & Werbach, supra note 30.
218. See infra notes 220–224.
219. See Bradley, supra note 92, at 69. Other recent efforts to democratize access to capital
markets have included equity crowdfunding platforms. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital
Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 625–29 (2015) (offering an optimistic prediction for equity
crowdfunding markets). Exempting equity crowdfunding offerings was supposed to help level the
playing field for “ordinary non-accredited investors . . . to take a chance and invest in the same
type of unregistered securities of a stranger’s startup” as the wealthy can. Id. at 626. For recent
mixed empirical research on issuers and offerings in the crowdfunding market, see Iman
Dolatabadi, Cesare Fracassi & Lin Yang, Equity Crowdfunding in the U.S. 1 (Oct. 1, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3934662 [https://perma.cc/KS9X-ZSY5];
Douglas J. Cumming, Sofia Johan & Robert S. Reardon, Governance and Success in U.S.
Securities-Based Crowdfunding 2 (Nov. 15, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3950966 [https://perma.cc/7825-YKJ7]; Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Issuers in
the United States, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 155, 155 (2020); cf. Jacob Hellman, Venture Capitalists
in Miniature? Deregulation and Equity Crowdfunding in the United States, 51 ECON. & SOC’Y 443,
443 (2022) (describing ethnographic study suggesting limits to crowdfunding’s democratization
ambitions).
220. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail
Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 44 (2017).
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the participation of retail investors, a problem “regardless of whether
retail shareholders vote differently from institutional voters.”221
Digital brokerage and social media offer a potential corrective,
especially as activating even a modest number of retail investors might
make a significant difference for corporate governance.222 Sergio
Alberto Gramitto Ricci and Christina M. Sautter have thus argued that
social media-enabled affective participation in mass coordination can
plausibly be harnessed for prosocial corporate-governance ends.223
Some scholars are optimistic for this reason that dispersed retail
trading, mediated by digital brokerage apps, will help overcome typical
barriers to retail participation in shareholder voting and corporate
governance.224 And we ought not discount too much gamification’s role
in disrupting corporate governance, which might be a blind spot in a
securities-law-based approach that focuses on trading and markets
rather than the work of governance. In particular, the welfare
implications of gamification-mediated retail-investor trading may start
looking more murky when we account for the corporate governance
implications of retail investors owning individual company stocks.225 To
the extent increased retail-investor participation in corporate
governance is valuable in its own right, or for the superior results it
generates, then we might cautiously celebrate how retail investors are
disrupting corporate governance.226

221. Id. at 15–16; see Gaia Balp, The Corporate Governance Role of Retail Investors, 31 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 47, 71–88 (2018) (suggesting that the passivity of retail shareholders is not a
trivial matter and describing efforts to activate retail votes).
222. Fisch, GameStop, supra note 4, at 23.
223. See Ricci & Sautter, supra note 3, at 83–88.
224. See id.; Fisch, GameStop, supra note 4, at 27–28.
225. See, e.g., Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New
Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 66 (2016) (suggesting that even a
modest increase in retail investor participation in corporate governance would have meaningful
consequences for contested outcomes).
226. There is reason to hesitate before concluding that gamifying corporate governance will
lead to prosocial outcomes—rather than the wealth-extractive shareholder activism that has
dominated corporate governance in the last thirty years. Much of that activism has sought to
maximize return to shareholders, with disastrous consequences across the real economy. See, e.g.,
James Fallows Tierney, Woke Capital?, LPE BLOG (May 5, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/
woke-capital [https://perma.cc/35J2-4ZML] (collecting evidence of the “dystopia” that has
resulted from the shareholder value revolution); see also, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH 11 (2012) (“[M]any and perhaps most of our corporate problems can be traced . . .
to . . . the idea that corporations are managed well when they are managed to maximize share
price.”).
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The related techno-populist claim is that gamification will help
“democratize finance.”227 Wealth creation is, of course, the primary
reason retail investors participate in capital markets: in a capitalist
society, the main reason to own stock is that returns to equity capital
outpace returns to other, safer kinds of assets.228 As only a small
percentage of the population has historically owned equity capital,

So there is cause for concern that mediated retail trading is just the newest form of
shareholder activism: looking out solely for itself, mediated through Reddit rather than through
pension and hedge funds. And even if social media encourages ordinary investors’ participation
in shareholder democracy, it doesn’t follow that this improves social welfare if shareholders’
preferences differ from the rest of society’s. As Fisch correctly notes, retail shareholders have
multifaceted roles in society, as workers, consumers, and people living on earth—so their
“interests reflect [their] overall role in society, and each shareholder’s individual utility function
reflects his or her preferences with respect to stakeholder issues” bearing on corporate
governance. Fisch, GameStop, supra note 4, at 32. Through voting rules and the like, law endows
shareholders’ preferences with legitimacy and priority—over outsiders, anyway—in influencing
firms’ actions. That shareholders have different social roles with different interests might imply
they should rationally prefer for firms to maximize overall social welfare, measured in the
distribution across those different roles. But that has only the weakest bearing on whether the
outcomes of shareholder democracy will reflect the aggregate, equally weighted preferences of
the rest of society, an important criterion in assessing rules about economic ordering. Cf. Jedediah
Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-andPolitical-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784,
1827 (2020) (arguing that “law’s creation of economic order should be accountable to those who
live in that order,” and that a purportedly neutral vision of shareholder priority “erect[s] barriers
to political judgments about economic order”).
227. Robinhood, for its part, says its “mission is to democratize finance for all.” Complaint
at 3, Robinhood Fin., LLC v. Galvin, 2022 WL 1720131 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2021) (No.
2184CV0084) [hereinafter Robinhood Compl.]. Invoking the mythical outlaw and his band of
outsiders, this framing suggests limited, ad hoc redistribution. See ROBIN HOOD: MEN IN TIGHTS
(Brooksfilms 1993); cf. E.J. HOBSBAWM, PRIMITIVE REBELS: STUDIES IN ARCHAIC FORMS OF
SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES 24 (1959) (describing Robin Hood as
the archetype of “a modest and unrevolutionary” social banditry, with the limited ambition to
correct specific excesses of injustice rather than to fundamentally reorder structures of
distribution). Zero-commission trading plausibly effects redistribution. See infra Parts III.A.2–3.
But the entire business model depends on the “poor”—ordinary investors with surplus capital—
making capital allocation decisions without regard to information relevant to a security’s payoff,
so that the “rich” can benefit. It generates profit to principal trading firms, rather than investment
in economic coordination and social provisioning that will grow the real economy. At risk of
straining the reader’s patience and belaboring the metaphor, the result is a different kind of
redistribution than in the outlaw legend: enticing unsuspecting travelers for a “free” visit to
Sherwood Forest in the illusion of participating in the commonwealth, so the highwayman’s real
customers—principal trading firms—can take a nonsalient toll for the privilege. Meanwhile, the
rest of King John’s England suffers from underinvestment.
228. See, e.g., Òscar Jordà, Katharina Knoll, Dmitry Kuvshinov, Mortiz Schularick & Alan
M. Taylor, The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870–2015, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1225, 1228 (2019)
(finding historically high returns to housing and equity, with higher returns for equity since the
1950s).
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limited participation in capital markets deepens wealth inequality.229 In
the techno-populist view, gamification can broaden access to equity
capital, helping solve the inequality problem.230
Investment games probably cannot bear the weight of that burden.
For starters, it’d be one thing if “democratized finance” meant
everyone had equitable access to ownership of equity interests in—and
to democratically mediated governance claims over—corporate means
of social provisioning.231 Rather, it focuses on “democratizing” finance
by encouraging people with surplus capital to start trading, even though
the main consequence is to generate profit for sophisticated
intermediaries.232 Scholars of household finance have identified
preconditions to effective “democratization”: predictability of income
and wealth, baseline financial literacy, and access to financial products

229. See, e.g., Winston, supra note 17, at 11–12 (citing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23–27 (2013)).
230. See, e.g., Fisch, GameStop, supra note 4, at 24, 26–27.
231. See, e.g., Lenore Palladino, Democratizing Investment, in DEMOCRATIZING FINANCE
244, 246 (Fred Block & Robert Hockett eds., 2022) (exploring how “new innovations in
distributed technologies allowed instead for public facilitation of new opportunities for wealth
appreciation and a rebalancing of power within capital markets”); Erik Olin Wright, Introduction
to JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUAL SHARES: MAKING MARKET SOCIALISM WORK 1, 2–3 (Erik Olin
Wright ed., 1996) (collecting proceedings of a workshop on John Roemer’s “market socialism”
proposal for “relatively freely functioning market mechanisms along with a sustainable egalitarian
distribution of property rights, a roughly equal distribution of profits, and a significant planning
capacity of the state over broad investment priorities”).
232. See, e.g., Luke Savage, The Gamestop Affair Is Just the Latest Incarnation of the
“People’s Capitalism” Delusion: An Interview with Edward Ongweso Jr, JACOBIN (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://jacobin.com/2021/02/gamestop-stock-market-reddit-robinhood [https://perma.cc/6PZ7NCH6] (describing democratization of finance as “open[ing] up the casino to as many people as
possible, while masking it in a language of universal stock ownership”). This also highlights the
sociological criticism of gamification’s role in neoliberal capitalism. Democratizing finance
disperses noise-trading labor in markets, encouraging ordinary people to volunteer and discipline
their labor toward generating the uncorrelated volatility necessary to generate liquidity and price
discovery in service of private profit. See, e.g., Gordon Kuo Siong Tan, Democratizing Finance
with Robinhood: Financial Infrastructure, Interface Design and Platform Capitalism, 53 ECON. &
SPACE 1862, 1870 (2021); see also Kim & Werbach, supra note 30, at 159–65 (identifying concerns
that “gamification adds a new dimension to the economic relationships and power dynamics that
normally hold sway in business,” and considering implications for exploitation and manipulation).
To one critic, gamification “appropriates . . . non-alienated activity,” or the things we spend time
doing other than in exchange for wages, “and renders it useful to the capitalist goal of wealth
accumulation.” PJ Rey, Gamification and Post-Fordist Capitalism, in THE GAMEFUL WORLD:
APPROACHES, ISSUES, APPLICATIONS, supra note 33, at 277, 280; see also, e.g., WOLFGANG
STREECK, HOW WILL CAPITALISM END? 46 (2016) (noting that “[c]apital accumulation after the
end of capitalist system integration hangs on a thin thread: on the effectiveness, as long as it lasts,
of the social integration of individuals into a capitalist culture of consumption and production”).
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with legible risk and return.233 Most nonparticipation in equity markets
is because people lack that kind of predictability of income and wealth;
even with capital windfalls like unexpected inheritances, cognitive or
behavioral constraints also contribute to nonparticipation.234
The techno-populist vision has little to say about barriers to the
democratization of finance. Nor is encouraging trading likely to fix the
problem: empirical evidence suggests that trading actively, for
informationally noisy reasons, is a volatile and risky strategy to build
wealth.235 If active traders lose on average, and do so as risk
consumption as a substitute for gambling, then even a modestly
antipaternalist view of the securities laws might tolerate this
behavior—but it should not promote it.
3. Techno-pessimism. A third set of claims might be considered
“techno-pessimist,” in that they claim that gamification undermines
public confidence in markets and capitalism. Investment games make
market participation appear less serious, obscuring the risks of capital
drawdown and loss.236 And it casts finance as a game played by Wall
Street with a deck stacked in its favor.237 These techno-pessimist claims
are premised on the importance of robust public confidence in markets
as mechanisms for allocating capital to high-value uses.
Yet that confidence might justifiably reflect whether price
mechanisms reflect reality.238 Asset markets have for some time
233. See Erturk et al., supra note 212, at 555.
234. See, e.g., Steffen Andersen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Participation Constraints in the
Stock Market: Evidence from Unexpected Inheritance Due to Sudden Death, 24 REV. FIN. STUD.
1667, 1668–70 (2011).
235. See infra notes 264–266 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Gullotti, supra note 168; Memorandum from Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., to Members, H. Comm. Fin. Servs. 5 (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.congress.gov/117/
meeting/house/111355/documents/HHRG-117-BA00-20210317-SD002-U2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J7FM-J9JY]. Peter Huang has cited this as a reason against financial education that “treat[s]
investing like playing a video game”: trying to make financial education “engaging, fun, and
relevant” risks leading the audience to discount “the seriousness of investing and irreversibility
of financial ruin.” Huang, supra note 213, at 302.
237. See, e.g., van der Heide & Želinský, supra note 210, at 712 (noting that while some firms
adopting gamification “explicitly embrace the label . . . others . . . seem more reluctant to do so in
public, most likely for the simple reason that it may undermine finance’s claims to be a productive
activity”).
238. The concern that turning finance into a game “obscures the connection between price
and value, fueling the phenomenon known as meme stocks,” Annie Massa & Tracy Alloway,
Robinhood’s Role in the ‘Gamification’ of Investing, WASH. POST (June 19, 2021, 11:39 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/robinhoods-role-in-the-gamification-of-
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experienced a disconnection between price and “value,” at least as it is
measured by traditional normative finance.239 The techno-pessimist
worries that this is a problem now that retail investors are involved.
But it seems desirable to spread public awareness of that disjoint and
the forces that have produced it, rather than carry on as if market
failures do not exist. And while we can’t expect neoliberal capitalism
to do anything but foster public support for markets as markets, we
might also question how much effort society should invest in salvaging
public confidence in markets that reflect an unceasing drive toward
financialization.
Public confidence in markets may also be endogenous to other
things, like how wealth endowments differ between generations of
retail traders and how these endowments will change over time.
Financial commentators have predicted that gamification will play a
role in advisers attracting and retaining younger clients.240 Millennials
and younger generations are less wealthy than their parents’
generations were at the same age.241 But they stand to inherit
significant amounts from the wealthiest generation ever—baby
boomers—in what has been called an unprecedented looming wealth
transfer.242 Social theorists have suggested that worries about
gamification shape incumbent firms’ and regulators’ views about this
generational wealth transfer and the extent to which “high earner, not
rich yet” millennials and younger generations will in years to come be

investing/2021/07/16/11b0dbc6-e5eb-11eb-88c5-4fd6382c47cb_story.html [https://perma.cc/y8qnbaqf], may reverse the causal arrow. Meme stock trading reflects that people understand and
celebrate a disconnect between price and value—and now they can finally play it as a game, just
as if they had $1,000-a-month Bloomberg terminals too. In this view, social media has permitted
the kind of coordination needed to generate returns to herding trades. See Tom Duterme,
Bloomberg and the GameStop Saga: The Fear of Stock Market Democracy 3 (Louvain Papers on
Democracy & Soc’y, Working Paper No. 80, 2021).
239. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., van der Heide & Želinský, supra note 210, at 716–17 (analyzing gamification
narratives about “digital natives” and “multigenerational wealth transfer” to “millennials”).
241. See William G. Gale, Hilary Gelfond, Jason J. Fichtner & Benjamin H. Harris, The
Wealth of Generations, with Special Attention to the Millennials 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 27123, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27123 [https://perma.cc/VW7H9NSL].
242. See, e.g., Victoria J. Haneman, Intergenerational Equity, Student Loan Debt, and Taxing
Rich Dead People, 39 VA. TAX REV. 197, 203 (2019).
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responsible stewards of wealth, and their business will be up for
grabs.243
If these perspectives are right, gamification discourse hits
differently. It highlights that regulating gamification means intervening
in a fight among market actors about capturing and distributing profits
from market intermediation. For digitally savvy retail investors in
particular, intermediation profits may not be salient in a market that
increasingly offers salient zero pricing, must cross subsidize with other
revenue sources, and competes primarily based on attractive user
interface. If traders do not understand they are transferring surplus
from trading to their brokers, competition is unlikely to eliminate these
practices from the market.244 Whether the distributively sensitive
investor-protection policy of the securities laws should intervene as to
gamification may in turn reflect who benefits from noisy flow, and who
would benefit by regulating it.245
Focusing on the political economy of gamification in this way
might also shift the prescription away from gamification’s three techno
futures—optimism, populism, and pessimism. Our society has an
interest in retirement and other kinds of social provisioning—to say
nothing of an interest in discouraging wide disparities in distributions
of wealth or of life chances. Unstable social provisioning for old age,
let alone for smoothing consumption across the lifecycle, is
destabilizing and impedes human flourishing. Securities law should
encourage responsible planning for retirement and other financial
goals in the public interest—not trading for the sake of participating in
capital markets. An ambitious and public-interest-oriented securities
law would not encourage bare engagement with markets without
regard to the effects on other desirable social goals.

243. See van der Heide & Želinský, supra note 210, at 716; see also, e.g., 12 Industries that Will
Thrive Thanks to Millennials, CBINSIGHTS (June 30, 2021), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/
report/millennials-industries-thriving [https://perma.cc/3CWL-BEC4] (explaining that to compete for
millennial market share and “stay relevant, legacy financial institutions will need to offer mobile
apps that are both technologically sophisticated and simple to use,” not like a website “from the
1990s”—ugh, as if!); Melkorka Licea, Millennials ‘Only’ Making $100k a Year Feel Strapped, N.Y.
POST (Oct. 23, 2019, 7:34 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/10/23/millennials-only-making-100k-ayear-feel-strapped [https://perma.cc/C6JW-UP2C] (deploying the arsenal of tropes about “High
Earner[] Not Rich Yet” millennials who spend too much on frivolities like artisanal fair-trade
avocado toast and save too little).
244. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
245. See infra notes 367–370 and accompanying text.
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III. WHETHER AND HOW TO REGULATE GAMIFICATION?
This Part sets up a framework for thinking about the harms from
gamification and offers a typology of regulatory interventions for
addressing those harms. It concludes with observations about how
securities law accounts for innovative technologies that shape markets
and influence investor behavior—and how this position promotes a
narrow vision of what modern stock markets should be for.
A. The Social Costs of Gamification in Retail Investment Markets
There are many reasons to suspect that gamification in this context
runs against the public interest—and in turn, many possible
justifications for regulation. Turning investing into a more casino-like
environment threatens prospective losses to investors, plausibly
reallocates surplus from traders to financial intermediaries, and
threatens to disrupt the traditional capital allocation functions of
secondary capital markets. Gamification imposes second-order harms
on market quality and capital allocation, encourages traders’ worst
impulses, and may burden their ability to achieve financial goals. These
are all reasons for regulators to embrace their roles in promoting
fairness with respect to gamification and digital engagement
practices.246
246. Congress has authorized the SEC to adopt rules “as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest and for the protection of retail customers” relating to “the legal or regulatory
standards of care for brokers, dealers, investment advisers,” and their associated persons. DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(f), 124 Stat.
1376, 1827–28 (2010). The SEC relied on this authority in adopting Reg BI. See Regulation Best
Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,330 n.122 (July 12,
2019) [hereinafter Reg BI Adopting Release] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). The SEC has
substantially more leeway in fulfilling its investor-protection function as a fairness regulator than
when relying also or instead on its “public interest” authority. When adopting rules implicating
its “public interest” authority, the SEC has to consider “efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.” National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
77b(b). This implicates economic analysis in rulemaking, as the D.C. Circuit has held the SEC has
a “statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic implications of [a proposed] rule.”
Chamber of Com. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005). For an argument that “SEC
rulemaking” under the investor-protection “fairness objective alone” would not implicate
“economic analysis requirements,” while rulemaking considering the “fairness objective and
another objective together” would, see Verret, supra note 180, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
The agency is therefore on strong footing in responding to supposed market failures and
in protecting investors. Its fairness mission permits it to consider the cross-sectional and
transactional allocation of surplus in support of an investor protection mission. Moreover, in
response to D.C. Circuit cases on economic analysis in SEC rulemaking, staff at the agency have
explicitly identified a number of justifications for adopting rulemaking. These include correcting
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1. External harms to market quality and capital allocation.
Encouraging unreflective consumption of goods and services tends to
distort individual decisionmaking in ways that can produce systemic
external harms. Capital markets play a coordinating role in a capitalist
economy. When people trade stocks for unreflective or distorted
reasons, the potential harms can be acute. These harms include the
price discovery and capital-allocation functions of capital markets.247
Consider price discovery first. One role for markets is to aggregate
information about the value of assets, which then gets impounded into
the asset’s price. Remember that retail investors are not, as a group,
more informed than the market about the fundamental value of the
security. But retail investors’ noisy trading might still promote price
discovery: that their orders are informationally noisy in this way
attracts more informed traders to “bring prices in line with
fundamental values.”248 The combination of zero-commission trading
and gamification may distort price discovery processes by increasing
both price movement and volatility in the stocks most popular among
retail investors.249 One study referenced above looked at indicia of
market quality on days when Robinhood experienced service outages.
On these days, the stocks most popular with Robinhood users showed
less price volatility and less trading volume.250 “Taken together,” the
authors wrote, “the findings support the view that zero-commission
traders have negative effects on stock market quality, consistent with
behavioral noise trader and inventory risk models.”251
Gamification also tends to distort the process of capital allocation.
Financial markets are thought to be tools for directing valuable

market failures of the sort identified here. See SEC Staff Memorandum, supra note 161, at 5–6.
This subpart has identified several undesirable social welfare effects of broker-dealer regulation.
In economic terms, the first is an externality, while the other two are forms of residual costs
associated with principal-agent problems.
247. Gamification and shift to a zero-commission model might also reduce incentives for the
production of sell-side brokerage research. Thanks to George Georgiev for this point.
248. Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1119–20
(2009).
249. See Eaton et al., supra note 151, at 29 (“[W]hen zero-commission trading is restricted,
stocks favored by Robinhood users experience reduced bid-ask spreads and price impacts as well
as lower return volatility.”); Jain et al., supra note 120, at 38 (noting “a decrease in the amount of
price improvement per share after commissions decreased to zero, especially for stocks that are
popular among retail investors”).
250. See Eaton et al., supra note 151, at 29.
251. Id. at 6.
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resources to particular (and ideally productive) uses in the real
economy.252 The accuracy of stock prices is one channel through which
financial markets direct capital this way.253 Yet gamification practices
can capture retail investors’ attention and thereby induce trading in
stocks for reasons—like the payoff that the intermediary receives from
generating this order flow—that are unrelated to the “value” the
investment offers. Legal scholar Benjamin P. Edwards has explained
that conflicts of interest of this sort between brokers and their clients
“drive[] capital misallocation, causing significant macroeconomic and
other harms.”254 As a product of this kind of conflict, gamification’s
encouragement of informationally noisy active trading tends to
generate capital misallocation that has effects across the
macroeconomy: increasing the cost of capital to businesses seeking
external financing, encouraging excessive investment in financial
innovation, and diverting valuable social resources from the real
economy.
Indeed, protecting markets from investors—not the other way
around—offers the strongest normative case for intervening to
regulate investment games. It is about promoting the value, whatever
it may be, of having lots of retail investors participate in securities
markets: to provide liquidity and price discovery; to increase the
amount of capital that can be allocated across the real economy; to
ensure people can achieve their financial goals; and to spread across a
broader population economic claims over and rights to participate in
shared governance over the means of social provisioning and
production.255 These are reasons for thinking about investor protection
in ways that are attuned to allocation and distributive issues—but are
252. See Wallace C. Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial
Regulation: Inefficiency of Capital Intermediation in a Deregulated System, 72 MD. L. REV. 1173,
1176 (2013) (“[T]he principal social value of financial markets is not to assure the lowest
transaction costs for market participants. Rather, it is to facilitate the efficient deployment of
funds held by investors to productive uses.”).
253. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41
DUKE L.J. 977, 1005 (1992). In the case of secondary securities markets—outsiders buying and
selling stock after the firm has already issued it—price discovery promotes capital allocation
mainly through the indirect channel of permitting investors to exit for liquidity or diversification
reasons. See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Stock Market
Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 67, 84–85 (2018); Michael Morelli,
Regulating Secondary Markets in the High Frequency Age: A Principled and Coordinated
Approach, 6 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 79, 99 (2016).
254. Edwards, supra note 159, at 186.
255. On the goals of “democratizing finance,” see supra Part III.C.2.
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concerned not primarily with idiosyncratic losses but to the reasons for
encouraging trading rather than even more productive investment of
time and money that will promote the real economy.256
2. Loss and waste. Another concern about gamification is that it
leads to first-party harms to users, for whom the financial outcomes are
suboptimal or maladaptive. The late professor Lynn Stout foresaw in
1997 that zero-commission retail trading would be socially wasteful.
Stout predicted that (if it ever were to happen) retail traders would
“daily waste hours at their computers . . . in their statistically hopeless
quest to beat the market.”257 Today, regulatory concern that
gamification makes it too easy to trade echoes what Stout predicted
but characterized as an “exaggerated” image in 1997 when she
considered the social welfare effects of these trades.258
Remember that some trade excessively for rational reasons. The
main payoff for this kind of trade is not engaging with the design; in
Matt Levine’s telling, “seeing if you made money” is “the main
dopamine payoff.”259 But that payoff can be manipulated through the
presence of other gamification features, even where customers can see
that they have not made money. Some subset of traders will experience
idiosyncratic or catastrophic loss of principal. And where people trade
too much, engaging on average in a series of transactions that have
negative net present value, encouraging that kind of losing transaction
is itself socially wasteful.260 That is especially so if people are led to
256. Cf. supra note 138 and accompanying text.
257. Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, and Investor Welfare: Is a Motley Fool
Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791, 810 (1997).
258. Id. at 810 n.44. Although she hoped this prediction “prove[d] exaggerated,” Stout
suggested that “observer[s] sensitive to speculation’s peculiar welfare effects” might not be
“reassur[ed]” by the prospect of regular access to markets on your “PC, pager, or other wireless
device.” Id.; John Crabb, Opinion: Robinhood Needs More Regulatory Oversight, IFLR (Sept. 18,
2020), https://www.iflr.com/article/2a645eymbcnhnuvads2dc/opinion-robinhood-needs-more-reg
ulatory-oversight [https://perma.cc/59V8-EZCS] (urging legal restrictions against “allowing
unsophisticated retail investors 24/7 access to complex equity and option trading in a manner that
simulates a computer game, while offering little in the way of education about the downsides”).
259. Matt Levine, Opinion, Melvin Capital Had a Better Month, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4, 2021,
12:27 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-04/melvin-capital-improves-fro
m-gamestop-reddit-struggle [https://perma.cc/8GFM-QQVF]; cf. Brian Knutson & Peter Bossaerts,
Neural Antecedents of Financial Decisions, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 8174, 8174–75 (2007) (summarizing
studies that identified connections between anticipation of gain and activity in different regions
of the brain).
260. Mahoney, supra note 73, at 728 (“These expenditures also prompt excessive investment
of human and physical capital in the securities industry.”). It is not always wasteful, of course.
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believe they are “investing” rather than speculating on their ability to
beat the market through trading.261
Gamification can also lead us to make unreflective decisions that
are bad for us, in the sense that they are against our otherwise
undistorted preferences. Many retail investors lack financial literacy
and are relatively uninformed participants in capital markets.262 But
behavioral biases are another drag on investment return. As in other
markets for complex financial products and services, retail investors
tend to be overconfident in our abilities, be myopic about the
consequences of our action, and avoid the cognitively complex tasks
required to assess financial choices.263
Inexperienced and unsophisticated investors can experience
significant harm from the kind of compulsive trading enabled by zerocommission brokerage and behavioral-design strategies.264 Selfdirected retail investors who try to pick stocks are almost never able to
beat the average return on a market portfolio—especially when they

Suppose someone engages in transactions that might not have incurred losses had they made
better securities-selection or asset-allocation decisions, like putting it in an index fund. But they
also could have played the lottery, or toured around the country going to the jam band Phish’s
concerts, or bought avocado toast. Cf. supra note 243. Perhaps spending time thinking about
investing prevents them from spending time on even more wasteful endeavors, like thinking about
stare decisis as “law,” or tweeting. But as Part III.A.1 suggests, the strongest case for an investorprotection is not primarily about protecting people from idiosyncratic losses, for people can find
ways to make worse choices about their money. Cf. Benjamin J. Burton & Joyce P. Jacobsen,
Measuring Returns on Investments in Collectibles, 13 J. ECON. PERSPS. 193, 202 (1999) (noting that
investment in a diversified portfolio of Beanie Babies theoretically could have been profitable for
those who got in on the ground floor, before the market fell out).
261. See SPECULATION, supra note 186, at 279–306 (discussing modern implications,
including for active equities trading, of longstanding debates in American securities law theory
and practice about how to draw the line between good long-term investment and bad short-term
speculation).
262. See Fairfax, supra note 126, at 1077–83.
263. See BAR-GILL, supra note 35, at 17–23 (2012); see also Tierney, Contract Design in the
Shadow of Regulation, supra note 35, at 882 (discussing contractual complexity, myopia, and
overconfidence).
264. This raises the question whether Robinhood investors are good or bad traders at the
aggregate level. For discussion of the evidence, see Part II.A.2. If you focus at aggregate level, it
“might mask substantial investor heterogeneity, making it difficult to understand potential
redistributive effects of this technology.” Ankit Kalda, Benjamin Loos, Alessandro Previtero &
Andreas Hackethal, Smart(Phone) Investing? A Within Investor-Time Analysis of New
Technologies and Trading Behavior 6 (Leibniz Inst. for Fin. Rsch. Sustainable Architecture for
Fin. in Eur., Working Paper No. 303, 2021).
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try to chase price momentum in high-volatility stocks.265 Retail
investors who actively trade underperform inactive traders as well as
benchmarks net of transaction costs. For instance, Barber and Odean
reported a significant performance penalty for actively trading
households; in their sample it was “the cost of trading and the
frequency of trading, not portfolio selections, that explain the poor
investment performance of [these] households.”266
Gamification’s goal of encouraging engagement with the app may,
in this view, create conditions for poor financial decisions. Whether
that is a sufficient reason to justify regulatory intervention depends on
empirical evidence about the magnitude of the social welfare effects of
idiosyncratic loss. The difficulty is if loss is idiosyncratic; harms may be
concentrated in a small number of excessively trading investors but not
representative of the median.267
3. Distribution in the brokerage agency relationship. A third kind
of objection to gamification is that it redistributes trading profits to
intermediaries. Some practices are commonly seen as objectionable,
such as in the simple case where people are deceived into entering into
transactions that they otherwise would not make.268 Other times, the
normative analysis is more complex, as where there is no deception but
the practice shifts economic surplus without inducing a transaction that
otherwise would not have occurred.269
Securities regulation is concerned at a high level with the
distribution of economic surplus between broker-dealers and their
clients. The SEC’s powers as a fairness regulator reflect these
distributive commitments.270 For instance, as legal scholar Deborah
265. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, All That Glitters: The Effect of Attention
and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors, 21 REV. FIN. STUD.
785, 790 (2008).
266. Barber & Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Health, supra note 5, at 776.
267. Thanks to Eleanor Wilking for this point.
268. For example, Kim and Werbach survey several normative objections to gamification,
drawing on “varied fundamental values about decisionmaking” including autonomy. Kim &
Werbach, supra note 30, at 164. It is not enough that gamification “shap[es] actions without
conscious rational consideration,” they argue; there must also be “some factor that inhibits
rational self-reflection.” Id. They offer “the following as a rule of thumb: when a player would,
upon rational reflection, conclude the time participating in a gamified activity would have been
better spent otherwise, there is good prima facie reason to believe the line has been crossed.” Id.
at 165.
269. See Guttentag, supra note 35, at 658–60.
270. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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DeMott has recently modeled, brokerage relationships are principalagent relationships in which conflicts of interest are rampant.271 If
brokers profit from higher trading volume, they have an incentive to
encourage trading. The history of brokerage regulation is largely about
trying to constrain and channel how brokers can earn profits at the
“expense” of their clients.272 This reflects ongoing scholarly and
regulatory contestation about whether the distribution of these profits
should be ordered by the market or should be constrained through
fiduciary duty.273
The weaker form of the objection is that gamification distorts and
obstructs the processes by which retail investors make informed and
pro-adaptive choices about asset allocation and security selection. It
encourages retail investors to undertake risky trading behavior
primarily to benefit third-party intermediaries. This is not only a tax on
the entire system; it is plausibly a zero-sum redistribution to financial
intermediary firms from retail investors who don’t know better.274
The stronger form of the distribution objection is that the
economic flows underlying gamification—payment for order flow, and
losses from breaches of the duty of best execution—effect a
reallocation of trading profits that is itself objectionable.275 The SEC
has said that commission-free trading comes “with a catch” of potential

271. DeMott, supra note 157, at 6, 9, 34.
272. See, e.g., James Fallows Tierney, The Political Economy of Securities Industry Bars 33–
38 (Feb. 24, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3761903 [https://perma.cc/
TWA2-Y4XU] (“The New Deal settlement in securities law was in large part about allocating
power between investors and industry over how to split the economic surplus from the capital
markets.”).
273. See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Steven R. McNamara, The Law and Ethics of High-Frequency Trading, 17
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 71, 74–75 (2016); Daniel Avis, Warren Says ‘Sharks’ Citadel, Robinhood
Prey on Customers, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2021, 8:02 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2021-03-09/warren-says-sharks-citadel-robinhood-profit-off-of-customers [https://perma.
cc/Y363-VNYG] (quoting Senator Elizabeth Warren at a Senate Banking Committee meeting:
PFOF can be thought of as “skim[ming] off the top at the expense of small investors”); see also,
e.g., Battalio & Loughran, supra note 115, at 37 (“Purchasers and internalizers of order flow in
the market may cause prices quoted on the NYSE to deteriorate, making all investors worse
off.”); MITTAL & BERKOW, supra note 106, at 18 (describing “price improvement on retail market
orders [as] akin to getting a 30% discount on an item after the shopkeeper raises the price by
40%”); BETTER MKTS., FACT SHEET: REDDIT, ROBINHOOD, GAMESTOP & RIGGED MARKETS:
THE KEY ISSUES FOR INVESTIGATION 2 (2021), https://bettermarkets.org/wp-content/uploads/
2022/03/Better_Markets_Reddit_Robinhood_Gamestop_RiggedMarkets_02-01-2021.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/RJ9Z-WQ32] (describing PFOF as “legalized bribery”).
275. See Fletcher Statement, supra note 109, at 14–17.
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breach of best execution.276 And legal scholar Gina-Gail Fletcher has
noted that while payment for order flow enables brokers to offer “price
improvement,” it is not clear that customers are actually receiving
better prices from internalization than from having their orders routed
to exchanges.277
We should be careful about explaining the nature of the strongform distributional criticism. Breach of best-execution duty “is often
imperceptible to the retail investor.”278 Even a stylized illustration
helps show why it is unclear whether PFOF effects a redistribution in a
way that leaves retail traders noticing that they are worse off.
In 2018, before the emergence of zero-commission pricing, it
would have cost an ordinary retail investor about $5 to trade a stock or
ETF.279 This would make it economically infeasible to put a small
amount of money into the stock market at any time. Suppose a trader
buys 5 shares of a stock worth $20 each. The trader would pay $105
including commissions and keep $100 in value, for a tax of 5% (or 25%
per share). Even at higher transaction amounts—say a “round lot” of
100 shares at $20 each—the commission would have cost 5 cents or
0.25% per share.
In an era of zero-commission pricing, the trader gets closer to full
value. She buys 5 shares at $20 each and receives the full $100 in value
(ignoring some negligible transaction costs that would apply in either
case). The flipside is that she might get slightly inferior “execution”
relative to her legal rights. Best execution relates to whether my order
was filled in the best manner, in terms of price, speed, and the like.
Inferior execution shows up on the price at which the retail order
executes. Suppose a stock trading for $19.95 at the midpoint is bid
$19.90 and ask $20. The trader submits a market order that gets filled
for $19.98 per share, including $0.02 in price improvement; the
wholesaler sells her stock that costs it $19.90, and it (and the broker)
pockets the difference. Retail traders in this situation have more to fear

276. See In re Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, 2020 WL 7482170, at
*1 (Dec. 17, 2020).
277. See Fletcher Statement, supra note 109, at 16–18.
278. Dombalagian, supra note 111, at 1.
279. See, e.g., James Royal, In the Race to Zero-Fee Broker Commissions, Here’s Who the Big
Winner Is, BANKRATE (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.bankrate.com/investing/zero-fee-brokercommissions-long-term-investors-win [https://perma.cc/PF6Y-Y8RW] (collecting legacy discount
brokers’ commissions ranging from $4.95 to $6.95 for equities trades, after an earlier round of
price cuts in 2017); Constine, supra note 54 (noting in 2013 that, before Robinhood’s introduction
of free trading, other brokers were charging commissions of “$7 to $10 a trade”).
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from a wide bid-ask spread in an illiquid security, which if wide enough
might approximate the 5% effective commission on that order in a
commission world. For retail investors to care about poor execution,
net of savings from zero-commission pricing, the spread must be very
wide (or price improvement must be small). Measured solely by cost
metrics like commissions and best execution—and holding equal how
much trading people are doing—it seems retail traders may give up less
trading surplus to other participants under zero-commission trading
and PFOF than before. This undermines the strong-form distributional
objection, which focuses on pricing as the relevant criterion for
consumer welfare.
But there are other plausible distributional objections, as in the
weak form above. For instance, even if PFOF is not itself objectionable
on a pricing dimension, it may induce investor demand for trading
stocks. If this increase in trading generates misallocation of capital,
diversion of investment from the real economy, or loss and waste, these
consequences may all effect an objectionable redistribution from
ordinary people to financial firms. This is another way of saying that
encouraging wasteful trading is bad for the additional reason that it
lines the pockets of financial intermediaries. It is a sympathetic
objection. But this weak-form objection is different from saying that
the harm comes from a redistribution of trading surplus in the form of
poor execution quality, net of the savings from zero-commission
pricing.
B. Securities Law’s Typical Regulatory Interventions
How might securities regulators respond to gamification in trading
apps? In other areas, law has adopted different kinds of regulatory
interventions in response to behavioral exploitation.280 Transactional

280. See Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue &
Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1224 (2003) (identifying “existing and
potential regulatory responses to errors in decision making”: “(1) default rules; (2) provision or
re-framing of information; (3) cooling-off periods; and (4) limiting consumer choices”);
Langvardt, supra note 53, at 154–60.
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frictions,281 mandatory downtime or cooling-off periods,282 and direct
bans of dangerous features283 are likely to be politically infeasible or
unworkable solutions to the problem of gamified investing apps.

281. If the problem with gamification is that it elicits too much noisy trading by retail
investors, regulators might seek to address that root problem by imposing transactional frictions,
such as minimum commission pricing. Commissions were fixed until deregulation in 1975 brought
about competitive pricing. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. Economists began
examining transactional frictions in potentially excessive speculative short-term trading in
securities. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy To Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading,
3 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 101, 101 (1989); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When
Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN.
SERVS. RSCH. 261, 261 (1989). Surveying the debate in 1995, Paul Mahoney noted that transfer
taxes could implement transactional frictions against noise traders’ excessive speculation. See
Mahoney, supra note 73, at 714. If excessive speculation through securities trading substitutes for
gambling, these might be analogous to excise taxes on gambling. For examples of other kinds of
transactional frictions that securities regulation has adopted recently, see Investors’ Exchange,
LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78101, 81 Fed. Reg. 41,142, 41,150, 41,165 (June 23, 2016)
(determination on application for registration as a national securities exchange) (adopting a
“speed bump” in a matching engine to cut down latency arbitrage) and MacKenzie, supra note
113, at 1670–71. Thanks, too, to Jeremy Kress for suggesting that widening the tick size might
work as a transactional friction. Cf., e.g., Rui Albuquerque, Shiyun Song & Chen Yao, The Price
Effects of Liquidity Shocks: A Study of the SEC’s Tick Size Experiment, 138 J. FIN. ECON. 700,
701 (2020) (examining the SEC’s tick size pilot and finding that “quoted spreads, effective
spreads, and price impact increase and trading volume decreases as compared to stocks in the
control group after the increase in tick size”).
We might be skeptical about the adoption of these kinds of frictions, however, because
it would be “politically terrible.” Matt Levine, Opinion, People Are Worried About Payment for
Order Flow, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2021, 12:09 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2021-02-05/robinhood-gamestop-saga-pressures-payment-for-order-flow [https://perma.cc/JXY2
-65C4]. Progressive efforts to legislate financial transaction taxes have been unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
Joe Light, Wall Street Transaction Tax Gets Fresh Look After GameStop Frenzy, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 19, 2021, 1:54 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0219/wall-street-transaction-tax-gets-fresh-look-after-gamestop-furor [https://perma.cc/UZ4U-7J6D].
282. Another regulatory technique is to require monitoring of customer use patterns and
intervening in problematic use with warnings, salience shocks, or mandatory downtime. On
monitoring, see infra note 306 and accompanying text. Through the same mechanism as
gamification, consumer financial behavior might be manipulable through just-in-time
interventions. On education, see supra Part II.C.1. Warnings, salience shocks, and downtime
might focus attention to nonsalient attributes they are overlooking. In this respect, regulators
might look to comparative securities law. China’s securities exchanges have responded to
concerns about “excessive” speculative trading by prohibiting same-day round-trip transactions
in certain kinds of securities, known as the T+1 trading rule. See, e.g., TRADING RULES OF
SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE §§ 3.1.4, 3.1.5 (2018). See generally Ming Guo, Zhan Li & Zhiyong
Tu, A Unique “T + 1 Trading Rule” in China: Theory and Evidence, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 575
(2012) (studying the T+1 trading rule and comparing it to a scheme allowing same-day trades).
Research indicates that this may reduce trading volume and “speculative trading,” but may also
hinder price discovery in times of low liquidity. Xinyun Chen, Yan Liu & Tao Zeng, Does the T
+ 1 Rule Really Reduce Speculation? Evidence from Chinese Stock Index ETF, 57 ACCT. & FIN.
1287, 1287 (2017).
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This subpart focuses instead on the prototypical regulatory
interventions in securities law, including reforms to mandatory
disclosure, antifraud, compliance, sales practices, fiduciary duties, and
market structure. Some of these are more aspirational than others.
None is singly required in order to respond to gamification, and none
is a goldilocks solution to the problems this Article has identified,
though some interventions are more likely to be effective than others.
The simplest and most politically salable solution involves modest
tweaks to existing sales practices rules like Regulation Best Interest.
As this Article suggests, existing law gets most of the way there, though
a new regulatory category might need to be developed so gamification
features do not carry with them all the trappings of
“recommendations.” Regulators might be attracted to other solutions,
like supervisory compliance rules that discourage gamification features
reasonably expected to result in noisy trading, but these raise hard

283. Securities law does not directly regulate features trading apps must have. One solution
is command-and-control regulation of app design—perhaps requiring apps to be dull and
monotonous. Or as computer-human interface design scholars have suggested, FINRA might
mandate “actionable design guidelines for retail investing applications.” See Chaudhry &
Kulkarni, supra note 38, at 785. To those who consider “design” the objectionable aspect of
gamification, this solution is superficially easy. But whatever the social welfare case for addressing
gamification, we argued, regulators should avoid “making regulations about the software.”
Langvardt & Tierney, supra note 14, at 721. Confetti regulation would be hard to design, and also
to justify; how much confetti is too much? See generally id. (identifying difficult definitional
problems in direct command-and-control regulation of user-experience design features like
“confetti”). A similar definitional problem about what draws attention to securities offerings
plagues the crowdfunding space, in which crowdfunding platforms can’t make recommendations.
Joan MacLeod Heminway, The New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals Under the
CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 177, 195 (2013). The SEC’s “Regulation
Crowdfunding” purports to identify “objective criteria” that crowdfunding platforms can rely on
in deciding to “highlight offerings on the funding portal’s platform.” Regulation Crowdfunding,
17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(2) (2021); see Ann Lipton, Robinhood’s Interface, BUS. L. PROF BLOG
(Feb. 5, 2021), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2021/02/robinhoods-interface.h
tml [https://perma.cc/6TPK-2GHM] (noting that the definitional problem is “not easy to
resolve”); Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,463 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts
200, 227, 232, et al.).
In addition, the more regulatory responses look like direct command-and-control
regulation of software, the greater the litigation risk under the First Amendment theories from
the technology bar. In other work, I have argued that instead of targeting app design, regulators
should look to the underlying harm: modestly expressive design choices that encourage financially
irresponsible trading behavior. See Langvardt & Tierney, supra note 14, at 721 (“Regulators
should consider framing gamification and other digital-engagement practices as . . .
technologically mediated efforts to appeal to cognitive and behavioral tendencies that encourage
self-directed clients to behaviorally churn their own accounts, maximizing revenue to the
broker.”).
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definitional problems. Other simple interventions, like mandatorydisclosure rules, are unlikely to be effective.
More ambitious and public-interest-oriented solutions involve
going beyond small tweaks. A securities law that is aspirational in this
way would also address the artificial split between fiduciary advisers
and nonfiduciary brokers, and deem as manipulative efforts to gin up
retail order flow for artificial reasons. And it would also eliminate the
stock-exchange market-structure problems that give an incentive to
gamify retail stock trading in the first place.
1. Disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is securities law’s favored
intervention.284 Disclosure interventions can help inform investors and
markets, and potentially can de-bias their consumption choices.
Securities law already mandates some disclosure about incentives for
brokers to adopt gamification practices. Brokers must deliver to retail
investors at the beginning of their relationship a client relationship
summary that describes conflicts of interest.285 They must tell
customers about the compensation they receive for order flow,286 and
must tell regulators and the market about the transactions they route
to other venues for execution.287 Greater disclosure would be welcome
because what is currently disclosed is spotty. In the case of trade
confirmation, notices come too late to bear on a retail investor’s
decision to transact, and pertain to the business model but not the
gamification practices themselves.288

284. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 182, at 1043.
285. Form CRS Relationship Summary, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,492, 33,493, 33,533 (July 12, 2019)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 240, 249, 275, 279).
286. Supra note 107 and accompanying text.
287. Regulation NMS Rule 606, 17 C.F.R. § 242.606 (2021); Disclosure of Order Handling
Information, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,338, 58,340 (Nov. 19, 2018) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242).
288. See, e.g., Disclosure of Order Handling Information, 83 Fed. Reg. at 58,340 (requiring
brokers to make quarterly reports of “aggregated order routing disclosures,” and to provide on
request “customer-specific disclosures” about order handling “for the prior six months”);
Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,022,
55,024 (Sept. 28, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). See generally Form CRS Relationship
Summary, 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,492 (requiring broker dealers to provide a summary of information
about the firm, its business, compensation, conflicts, legal relationship, disciplinary history, and
other information). Robinhood discloses on its Form CRS that “[it] earns revenue from your
trade activity and therefore has a monetary incentive for you to trade more.” Robinhood
Financial LLC Form Customer Relationship Summary (“CRS”), ROBINHOOD 2 (June 17, 2022),
https://cdn.robinhood.com/assets/robinhood/legal/RHF%20Customer%20Relationship%20Sum
mary.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8QC-ZUZH].
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But disclosure will be an ineffective solution standing alone, and
regulators should not rest on that solution.289 As in other markets for
complex financial products where ordinary people are overconfident
and myopic, and avoid cognitively complex tasks, retail investors tend
not to read existing disclosures.290 Additional disclosures would also be
additive, and likely to get lost due to oversaturation.291 If disclosures
are not salient and there are too few disclosure-reading consumers on
the margin selecting on the disclosures, those consumers are unlikely
to move the market.292
2. Antifraud rules. Antifraud and antimanipulation rules are
another favored intervention of securities law.293 The Exchange Act
makes it unlawful “to use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance” in violation of implementing regulations.294 Manipulation
claims under the antifraud rules, for instance, involve the “deception
of investors into believing that prices at which they purchase and sell
securities are determined by the natural interplay of supply and
demand, not rigged by manipulators.”295 These doctrines have
implications for modern securities market structure, in which market
making can often look like manipulation.296 Implementing gamification
features might be the predicate manipulative act, where part of an
intentional scheme to induce an artificial supply of order flow in
securities the broker’s retail customers otherwise would not transact

289. See Dombalagian, supra note 111, at 10.
290. See Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure,
2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1070. See generally BAR-GILL, supra note 35 (discussing consumer
psychology and behavior in other markets).
291. See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 8 (2014).
292. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also Tierney & Edwards, supra note 160,
at 23–27 (discussing practical issues with disclosures).
293. Thanks to Ann Lipton for discussion on this point.
294. Exchange Act Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); SEC Rule 10b-5(a), (c), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2022).
295. City of Providence v. Bats Glob. Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 49 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1999)) (finding complaint stated a claim under
antifraud and antimanipulation rules by charging different fees to different users for market
access).
296. See, e.g., Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Doctrinal Quandary of Manipulative Practices in
Securities Markets: Artificial Pricing, Price Discovery, and Liquidity Provision, 45 J. CORP. L. 1,
26–33 (2019).
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in.297 Doctrine around manipulation claims is uncertain and opentextured, however, making it a risky strategy—to say nothing of the
evidentiary difficulties with trying to prove manipulative intent.298
More fundamentally, antifraud rules are tailored to rooting out
practices that deceive the investing public. They would be a blunt
instrument for encouraging socially beneficial brokerage sales
practices. Although some gamification practices may be manipulative,
it is hard to characterize most that way.299 Gamification encourages
patterns of trading that are unreflective and potentially maladaptive—
with first- and third-party harms that flow from it.300
3. Compliance and supervisory procedures. If the concern with
gamified stock trading apps is that they encourage excessive trading,
regulators could conceivably seek to prohibit excessive trading. In
practice, that would mean imposing on brokers some duty to detect
potentially “excessive” trades—and either report them or prevent their
execution. Indeed, FINRA has alerted member firms to the possibility
that they will be examined for compliance with supervisory rules
requiring adequate policies and procedures that might be implicated
by gamification.301 This might be a preferable framing for the problem
of gamification: one as supervision, compliance, and knowledge about
customers. Securities regulators rely on these tools to fill gaps where
substantive regulations do not exist.
One option would be to adopt a compliance and supervisory duty
that imports concepts like communications rules (or other concepts
that do not quite rise to the level of a “recommendation” under sales
practices rules).302 FINRA’s communications rules apply to brokerage

297. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN, DONALD C. LANGEVOORT & ANN M.
LIPTON, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 712 (10th ed. 2021) (noting that
Bats Global Markets involved claims that the exchanges had “[sold] special services to [high
frequency traders] and [misled] others about those services,” thereby “creat[ing] a fraudulent
scheme . . . that catered to the HFT firms at the expense of individual and institutional traders”);
3 HAZEN, supra note 167, § 12:2 (“Although it can take many forms, manipulation consists of any
intentional interference with supply and demand.”).
298. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Deterring Algorithmic Manipulation, 74 VAND. L. REV. 259,
273 (2021) (noting the “confusion and ambiguities that plague securities and commodities antimanipulation laws”).
299. See supra notes 38–56 and accompanying text.
300. See supra Part III.A.
301. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
302. See infra notes 329–330 and accompanying text.
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firm communications with retail customers, including “websites and
apps,” and require them to be “fair and evenhanded with appropriate
risk disclosure.”303 Regulators could draw on these models, requiring
brokers to adopt and implement supervisory policies and procedures
reasonably designed to result in the design and use of app features that
comply with these rules—such as by ensuring, as a matter of “fair
dealing” and just and equitable principles of trade, that they do not
encourage excessive trading or cause attention-induced trading in
securities simply because they are more salient to customers. This
approach would target the development back-end of brokerage apps,
with a goal of encouraging a culture of compliance among developers.
But it is risky to regulate “about the software.”304
Another option would link compliance to account monitoring.
Brokers do not have ongoing obligations to monitor self-directed
customers’ accounts.305 Securities law could require broker-dealers to
monitor client transactions to determine whether some threshold had
been reached.306 Yet professional proprietary traders would not want
to be covered in such a regime. In principle, it could be limited to “retail
customers” as Reg BI defines that term.307 Doing so would impose a
flat duty across the industry to monitor the accounts of retail
customers; at that point, the straightforward solution would be to
dissolve the artificial dividing line between brokerage and advice, a
solution discussed below.
Could regulators adopt a more restrictive definition, requiring
transaction monitoring in only a subset of retail investors’ self-directed
accounts? This would raise difficult definitional problems about the
population to which transaction-monitoring duties would apply.

303. House Gamification Hearing III, supra note 14, at 84–85 (statement of Robert W. Cook,
President & Chief Exec. Off., Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth.); see, e.g., FINRA MANUAL, supra note
68, § 2210 (requiring, in section (d)(1)(A), that communications be “based on principles of fair
dealing and good faith, . . . be fair and balanced, and . . . provide a sound basis for evaluating the
facts in regard to any particular security”).
304. Langvardt & Tierney, supra note 14, at 721 (emphasis removed).
305. See De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 2002).
306. Broker-dealers have certain duties to know their customer, to know the pattern of
orders, to have supervisory policies and procedures related to suitability, and the like. This is not
the same as an ongoing duty to monitor a self-directed account, but it has inched the obligation
in that direction. See Bullard, supra note 200, at 359–60.
307. See Reg BI Adopting Release, supra note 246, at 33,342 (defining a retail customer, in
part, as one who receives and “uses the recommendation primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes”).
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Regulators have already failed once to navigate a similar problem of
defining “professional” from non-professional traders, in an earlier
attempt to gatekeep access to exchange order execution systems.308
4. Brokerage sales practices: Regulation Best Interest and
“behavioral churning.” One of the more attractive options is to treat
certain kinds of gamification as the kinds of brokerage sales practices
that are already the subject of existing regulation. This approach could
be implemented in part under existing law, though some changes may
have to be made around the margins.
SEC and FINRA rules have long imposed obligations on brokerdealers in connection with the making of recommendations. Under
longstanding “suitability” doctrine, FINRA required broker-dealers to
have a reasonable basis for believing that any recommended security
was suitable for the client, under the facts and circumstances.309 In 2019,
the SEC built on suitability doctrine when it adopted Reg BI.310 That

308. Consider the “SOES bandits.” Market makers in NASDAQ were required to give
preferential electronic access to retail broker orders of 1,000 shares or fewer through the Small
Order Execution System (“SOES”). See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to
the Small Order Execution System, 56 Fed. Reg. 52,092, 52,092–93 (Oct. 17, 1991). A cottage
industry of direct-market-access discount brokerages gave freelance traders (the SOES bandits)
access to SOES, creating risk for market makers of adverse selection on pricing. This strategy
shifted trading profits from market makers to the SOES bandits. See Jeffrey H. Harris & Paul H.
Schultz, The Trading Profits of SOES Bandits, 50 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 39–41 (1998). In response to
market makers’ complaints that freelance traders were using SOES to earn riskless arbitrage
profits by picking off stale price quotations, the SEC approved a rule that (among other things)
defined professional traders and prohibited them from using the SOES system. See Order
Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Small Order Execution System, 56 Fed. Reg.
at 52,092. In sustaining a vagueness challenge to the rule, the D.C. Circuit emphasized the
definitional problem: “a trader would be hard pressed to know” when the number of trades had
passed the line into being a “professional”—putting the trader “in danger of triggering an adverse
reaction from the NASD.” Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Among other
factors the court found objectionable were references to “excessive” trading. Id. In remanding
the rule to the SEC for unrelated reasons, the court also directed the agency to adjust the
professional trading pattern definition in ways that provided more guidance and less vagueness.
Id. On remand the Commission noted that the D.C. Circuit’s decision implicitly held that
exchanges may “distinguish among [types of] investors and limit access to [their] systems for
certain trading practices if such distinctions and limitations are consistent with the [Exchange]
Act,” but determined to approve rules on remand that “would not draw distinctions between
customers based on their status as traders.” Order Partially Approving Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Small Order Execution System on Pilot Basis, Exchange Act Release No. 33,377,
1993 WL 534173, at *5, *7 (Dec. 23, 1993).
309. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 68, § 2111.
310. See Reg BI Adopting Release, supra note 246, at 33,331 (“Regulation Best Interest
imposes a duty of care that enhances existing suitability obligations.”).
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regulation governs broker-dealers’ recommendations to retail
customers.311 One part of the Reg BI duty of care is “quantitative
suitability,”
which
requires
broker-dealers
in
making
recommendations to have a reasonable basis for believing that a series
of recommended transactions—even if in the retail customer’s best
interest when viewed in isolation—is “not excessive and is in the retail
customer’s best interest . . . and does not place the financial or other
interest of the broker . . . ahead of the interest of the retail customer.”312
Scholars and industry participants have noted that Reg BI already
gives the SEC tools to address at least some objectional facets of
gamification.313 A broker that makes recommendations to elicit noisy
retail order flow for its own profit, and without regard to the retail
clients’ best interest, would violate the duty of quantitative suitability.
But absent a “recommendation,” Reg BI’s duties do not apply.314
This raises the stakes of categorizing design features as
“recommendations”—and underscores line-drawing problems about
gamification features that “bring[] certain items to the customer’s
attention.”315 The SEC does not like to get pinned down on issues like
the definition of a recommendation, so it judges them with a malleable
facts-and-circumstances standard.316 The factors that bear on whether
a communication is a “recommendation” are nonetheless well known,
and “include whether the communication ‘reasonably could be viewed
as a “call to action”’ and ‘reasonably would influence an investor to
trade a particular security or group of securities.’”317 The level of

311. Id. at 33,329 (noting that the rule addresses “broker-dealer conduct obligations when
they make recommendations to a retail customer”).
312. Exchange Act Rule 15l-1(a)(2)(ii)(C), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15l-1(a)(2)(ii)(C) (2021).
313. See Coffee, supra note 176; Lipton, supra note 283.
314. See infra notes 326–327. This is a longstanding feature of the brokerage sales practice
rules. See Nancy C. Libin & James S. Wrona, The Securities Industry and the Internet: A Suitable
Match?, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 601, 614 (“The NASD’s suitability rule . . . applies only to
securities that the broker-dealer ‘recommends’ to customers.”).
315. Lipton, supra note 283; see Langvardt & Tierney, supra note 14, at 738–39; Studdard,
supra note 22, at 75–79; Fisch, GameStop, supra note 4, at 37–39.
316. According to Reg BI’s adopting release, “what constitutes a recommendation is highly
fact-specific and not conducive to an express definition,” and thus the SEC would continue to
follow the “existing framework” for defining a recommendation under suitability doctrine. See
Reg BI Adopting Release, supra note 246, at 33,335. The SEC is reluctant to give greater
certainty, as it is concerned with not creating a roadmap for evasion. See Welle, supra note 206,
at 561–62 (discussing the roadmap-to-evasion concern about bright-line rules in securities
regulation).
317. Reg BI Adopting Release, supra note 246, at 33,335 (citation omitted).
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tailoring to the particular customer also bears on status as a
recommendation.318
But the standard is not as uncertain as it appears. Regulators have
articulated decades’ worth of rules and guidance about when brokers’
presentation of information—including in online communications with
customers—might be a recommendation. Indeed, many digital
engagement practices have been understood to be recommendations
since a 2001 release from FINRA’s predecessor that has the force of
law.319
Some gamification and engagement features may plausibly fit
within that category, like stock-picking algorithms, leaderboards of
stocks popular among the broker’s customers, and push notifications.
Yet Reg BI’s application to recommendations reflects a deeper if
largely unarticulated orientation toward broker conduct that increases
the salience of securities to traders deciding to make a transaction.
Some salience is unavoidable, as some information will be presented to
an investor by default. And it is somewhat unnatural to think of most
gamification features in terms of recommendations—“calls to
action”—to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Many are more
naturally thought of as inducements to trade generally. That question
becomes more complex, however, when these practices are combined
with data analytics that tailors content to users and targets content that
will call them, perhaps more than others, to action.320 The more that
318. Id. (noting that “[t]he more individually tailored the communication to a specific
customer or [customer segment] . . . the greater the likelihood that the communication may be
viewed as a ‘recommendation’”).
319. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS REGUL., INC., NOTICE TO MEMBERS 01-23:
SUITABILITY RULE AND ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS (2001), https://www.finra.org/rules-guida
nce/notices/01-23 [https://perma.cc/P7L5-5K6G]. A search engine for securities would not qualify
as a recommendation, but only where “the algorithms for these tools are not programmed to
produce lists of securities . . . that favor those securities in which the member makes a market.”
Id. The SEC approved this self-regulatory organization rule change, giving it force of law. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b); Exchange Act Rule 19b-4(a)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(a)(6) (2021); ABN
AMRO Clearing Chicago LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 83,849, 2018 WL 3869452, at *2 (Aug.
15, 2018) (noting that “Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act generally requires an SRO’s rules
to be filed with and approved by the Commission,” and holding that SRO disciplinary proceedings
can only be “premised upon” properly filed and approved rules). On enforcement of SRO rules,
see generally Benjamin P. Edwards & James F. Tierney, Comment Letter on Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Anti-Money Laundering
Effectiveness (Nov. 16, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3731801 [https://perma.cc/X4GN-GELT].
320. See Ana Carolina Tomé Klock, Isabela Gasparini, Marcelo Soares Pimenta & Juho
Hamari, Tailored Gamification: A Review of Literature, INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUT. STUD., Dec.
2020, at 1, 10–19. To this point, some broker-dealers appear to use algorithms that tailor what
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algorithms and personalization are tailored toward presenting this kind
of information, and the more that information correlates with greater
sources of revenue for the broker, the more easily it is characterized as
a recommendation.
Still, this is not to suggest that any particular gamification practice
is a recommendation. This is an area of securities law in which
“principles-based” approaches predominate—those approaches
allergic to providing bright-line answers to the application of law.321
The devil is in the details.322 So securities regulators will have to grapple
with the “recommendation” concept, as well as the role of existing and
new doctrines in addressing the plausible harms from gamification
features. But as this paper shows, they do not write on a blank slate.
Existing sales practices rules give regulators other options beyond
quantitative suitability. Gamification reflects a behavioral variant of
“churning,” an old and familiar problem in securities law.323 Brokers
with discretionary control over customer accounts had incentives to

information is presented to encourage engagement with the particular client. Other algorithms
tailor information to the cross section of the broker’s clients, as in a list of securities in which there
is the highest volume of buy and sell orders from the broker’s customers. See, e.g., Studdard, supra
note 22, at 19–20 (discussing Robinhood’s personalized push notifications). Machine learning, AB
testing, and related efforts to fine-tune recommendation algorithms have become increasingly
integral parts of consumer-facing applications as companies try to wring out greater surplus from
their consumer contacts. See House Gamification Hearing III, supra note 14, at 90 (statement of
Gary Gensler, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (explaining how “game-like features,” “behavioral
prompts,” and “predictive data analytics . . . are implemented across many different technologies,
from streaming platforms to fitness trackers”); Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66
DUKE L.J. 1267, 1272 (2017) (observing that just as firms can “profit from consumer
misperceptions” through shrouded and nonsalient attributes, “digital intermediaries can do the
same through their search engines and web interfaces”).
321. See, e.g., Langvardt & Tierney, supra note 14, at 727 (discussing the SEC’s reliance on
“[e]x post adjudication of principles-based rules” in this area, as well as the resulting “criticisms
that the SEC is engaging in ‘regulation by enforcement’”) (citing James J. Park, The Competing
Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 634–41 (2007)); see also supra note 316 and
accompanying text. See generally Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and PrinciplesBased Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2008) (arguing for principles-based, outcomeoriented securities regulation over the traditional rules-based approach).
322. It doesn’t matter that a broker tells its customers that it is not making recommendations.
See, e.g., William H. Murphy & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 90,759, 2020 WL 7496228, at *10
(Dec. 21, 2020); Suitability Rule and Online Communications, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,697, 20,700 (Apr.
24, 2001); FINRA MANUAL, supra note 68, § 2111 (noting in Rule 2111.02, a pre-Reg BI
articulation of the suitability rule, that disclaimers of responsibility for suitability are prohibited).
Securities law doesn’t recognize this kind of “ceci n’est pas un pipe” defense. Cf. RENÉ
MAGRITTE, The Treachery of Images (painting) (1929).
323. See Langvardt & Tierney, supra note 14, at 737–39.
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trade excessively to increase compensation.324 In prohibiting that
practice, as in requiring quantitative suitability, securities law already
reflects a particular normative policy about retail investors and brokerdealers. It discourages broker-dealers from eliciting overconsumption
of expected-negative net-present-value transactions by those who do
not know better and are discouraged from learning better.
Churning and the Reg BI duty of quantitative suitability are
prospective legacy devices for regulating these potential problems
from gamification. These doctrines might be sufficient—on their own
or in connection with other doctrines—to handle the problem of
behavioral churning. But they also involve tradeoffs between reactive
principles-based enforcement and proactive rulemaking, with sobering
implications for the effectiveness of regulatory policy in this area.325
Recent regulatory reforms have sharpened the toolkit under Reg
BI in ways that naturally lend themselves to framing the harm as selfdirected churning. But the main wrinkle is that Reg BI is triggered in
the event of a “recommendation” to a retail customer, heightening the
stakes of that legal categorization. It does not “apply to self-directed or
otherwise
unsolicited
transactions,”
absent
a
related
326
recommendation.
SEC Investor Advocate Rick Fleming has
highlighted that some DEPs, possibly including some gamification

324. Churning is “a conflict of interest in which a broker or dealer seeks to maximize his or
her remuneration in disregard of the interests of the customer.” 8 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN
& TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 475 (5th ed., 2015); see id. at 471–72 (noting that
churning “may violate” a wide range of laws and regulations); see, e.g., Mihara v. Dean Witter &
Co., 619 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). Traditionally the churning theory applied where the client
had given the broker discretion over trades in an account, but also where the “customer routinely
accepts the broker-dealer’s recommendations, typically because the customer is naive,
unsophisticated, or inexperienced.” 8 LOSS ET AL., supra, at 475–76. FINRA codified churning
doctrine in its quantitative suitability requirement under its Rule 2111, then proposed to eliminate
the control element. See Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change to FINRA’s Suitability, NonCash Compensation and Capital Acquisition Broker (CAB) Rules in Response to Regulation
Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 88422, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,974, 16,975 (Mar. 25, 2020). In
Reg BI, the SEC codified the broker’s duty of care not to make quantitatively unsuitable
recommendations and applied this duty regardless of whether the broker has actual or de facto
control over the account. Reg BI Adopting Release, supra note 246, at 33,327.
325. See generally Ford, supra note 321 (discussing tradeoffs between principles-based and
more prescriptive approaches to governance).
326. See Reg BI Adopting Release, supra note 246, at 33,334–35.
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features, “may blur the line between solicited and unsolicited
transactions.”327
That highlights three potential gaps in Reg BI the SEC could fix.
First, if brokers elicit order flow subtly through gamification, the
broker’s duties “should not turn on whether the customer technically
initiates the trades after” experiencing the gamification feature.328 The
SEC should make clear what kinds of gamification and other digital
engagement practices fall within the category of “recommendation,”
triggering Reg BI quantitative suitability duties.
Second, some practices might not be easily characterized as
recommendations. In any case, industry practices are likely to evolve
in any event to avoid falling in that doctrinal category. We might
therefore expect the doctrinal concept of a recommendation to prove
insufficient to implement the social welfare case for regulating
gamification. If that is so, the SEC should consider addressing
gamification by reopening two important aspects of the deal struck in
Reg BI that have proved not up to the task: stopping short of
harmonizing the standards of conduct for broker-dealers and
registered investment advisers, and limiting the broker’s duties to
situations involving “recommendations.”
Finally, to the extent that the SEC has an ambition to add new
regulatory categories, it might even define DEPs as a middle-ground
category that do not rise to the level of recommendations. Where
recommendations are involved, Reg BI imposes on brokers extensive
duties relating to care, disclosure, compliance, and conflicts of
interest.329 It may not be appropriate to trigger all these duties with
respect to every kind of gamification feature or DEP. One solution
would be to apply a subset of these duties, like quantitative suitability
and the conflict-of-interest obligation, to app design features that are
customer communications but can’t easily be categorized as
“recommendations.”330

327. Rick Fleming, Inv. Advoc., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at SEC Speaks: Investor
Protection in the Age of Gamification: Game Over for Regulation Best Interest? (Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/fleming-sec-speaks-101321 [https://perma.cc/3CKA-8UQF].
328. Id.
329. See generally Reg BI Adopting Release, supra note 246 (explaining new standards that
“enhance[] the broker-dealer standard of conduct beyond existing suitability obligations, and
align[] the standard of conduct with retail customers’ reasonable expectations”).
330. See also supra notes 302–304 (describing related supervisory and compliance duties).
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5. Fiduciary duty theories. There is a more fundamental aspect of
the deal struck in Reg BI that the SEC might reopen: the quality and
nature of the broker-client relationship. Ordinary arms-length
commercial or sales relationships in most industries, under most states’
laws, do not give rise to special duties to customers.331 This reflects the
intuition that commercial strategies meant to activate or alter
consumers’ behavioral or cognitive processes, and elicit behavior that
generates private profit, might be the proper subject of unfair trade or
other bodies of regulation—but not the heightened duties of
fiduciaries.332
Securities law has long grappled with whether brokers are more
like mere salespeople, who do not owe fiduciary duties to their
customers, or more like investment advisers, who have more of a
confidential advisory role with their clients.333 The distinctions between
the kinds of financial advisory relationships are often blurry.334 Brokers
do much of what registered investment advisers do. Yet they are
exempted from the fiduciary duties that apply to RIAs because there
is an exemption for brokerage advice that is solely incidental to
brokerage business—an exemption that has been thoroughly
interpreted away so as to render it toothless.335 At common law,
brokers were not fiduciaries, except when that status sprang from some
aspect of the relationship suggesting that the client needed the
additional protection of the law.336 The Dodd-Frank Act built from that

331. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs.,
LLC, 592 F. Supp. 2d 608, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that “no fiduciary duties arise where
parties deal at arm’s length in conventional business transactions”).
332. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (observing, in the classic case on
fiduciary duty, that “[m]any forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties”).
333. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Advisors as Fiduciaries, 72 FLA. L. REV. 953, 1021 (2020);
Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be Fiduciaries,
87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 726–36 (2012) (describing the history of regulatory contestation over
broker-dealer fiduciary status between deregulation in 1975 up to a few years before adoption of
Reg BI); Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty and Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary
Duty Make a Material Difference, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 105, 108–16 (2014).
334. See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers,
55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 704 (2010) (noting the law of fiduciary duty in this context “has vexed courts
and commentators for decades”).
335. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C);
Commission Interpretation Regarding the Solely Incidental Prong of the Broker-Dealer
Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Adviser, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,681, 33,685 (July 12, 2019).
336. See, e.g., Patsos v. First Albany Corp., 741 N.E.2d. 841, 851 (Mass. 2001).
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common-law baseline, directing the SEC to examine whether to
harmonize the duties that brokers and RIAs owe to their customers.337
Reg BI came out of that statutory mandate. It was the product of
long negotiations over whether to harmonize those duties or subject
brokers to a lighter duty.338 One objection is that Reg BI did not go far
enough, implying regulators might address this unfinished business.339
Reg BI was adopted by an SEC dominated by Republican appointees,
and the shift to an SEC dominated by Democratic appointees may
bring fresh scrutiny to whether Reg BI should be extended in this or
other regards.340
But fiduciary duty theories may have some traction in addressing
gamification even if the SEC does not continue to harmonize the
broker-dealer and RIA standards of conduct. In a concurrent
enforcement system, absent preemption, states can respond to federal
rules or enforcement efforts thought to be inadequate.341 Several states
have considered adopting broker fiduciary rules after Reg BI.
Massachusetts, for instance, has state regulations applicable to brokers
registered to do business there.342 In 2020, its state securities regulator
amended those regulations to impose a fiduciary standard building on
337. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 913(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010).
338. See, e.g., James A. Fanto, Techniques of Regulatory Implementation: The Case of Reg BI
and Form CRS, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (Arthur B. Laby ed.,
forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 9–11) (on file with author).
339. In October 2021, the director of the SEC’s Office of the Investor Advocate told an
industry conference that DEPs “blur the line” between brokerage and investment advice, and
that if the SEC “fails to brighten the distinction between advisers and brokers, it will make little
sense to regulate the two with such distinct regulatory models.” Fleming, supra note 327.
340. See MORGAN LEWIS, 2020 YEAR IN REVIEW AND A LOOK FORWARD: SELECT SEC
AND FINRA DEVELOPMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT CASES 11 (2021); cf. Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC
Can Handle Digital ‘Nudges’ with Regulation Best Interest: SIFMA, INV. NEWS (Dec. 7, 2021),
https://www.investmentnews.com/sec-can-handle-digital-nudges-with-regulation-best-interest-sif
ma-214906 [https://perma.cc/6ZP9-X8FQ] (discussing a major Wall Street trade organization’s
comment letter, which argues against scrutinizing Reg BI).
341. See, e.g., James Fallows Tierney, Summary Dismissals, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1841, 1860–61
(2010) (noting that in a federal system, “it should be unsurprising” to see states experimenting by
adopting rules that “are welfare maximizing” relative to more permissive federal-law standards).
For discussion of the costs and benefits of states’ role in this kind of regime, see Amanda M. Rose,
State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities
Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1351–59 (2013).
342. See 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.201–.202 (2020) (requiring and providing procedures for
licensing and registration); cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 110A, § 201(a) (2002) (“It is unlawful for
any person to transact business in this commonwealth as a broker-dealer . . . unless he is registered
under this chapter.”).
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the common law rule.343 And in December 2020, it brought an
enforcement proceeding alleging that Robinhood’s gamification
violated those regulations.344 Robinhood challenged the regulations,
arguing federal preemption and that the state agency could not change
state common law.345 In adopting these rules, Massachusetts securities
regulators effectively dared the state Supreme Judicial Court to
approve an extension of state fiduciary law beyond both what the
common law and the SEC had recognized applies to brokers.346 Though
the Massachusetts superior court concluded that the securities division
couldn’t do that, the agency has appealed that ruling—so the state
fiduciary-law story is not over yet.347
The main implication for us is that fiduciary theories are a
plausible, if risky, regulatory response to gamification. The traditional
common-law bases for assigning fiduciary status to a broker typically
involved firms that were trying to earn rents in nonsalient ways by
manipulating people’s trading—in accounts that are discretionary,
owned by people who lack capacity to manage their affairs, or owned
by those who blindly accept recommendations without further
thought.348 These theories offer a readymade basis, rich with common
law support, for going after broker-dealers that target children and
other investors who should not be taking brokers’ advice about risky

343. See generally Adopting Release, Amendments to Standard of Conduct Applicable to
Broker-Dealers and Agents, 1412 Mass. Reg. 61, 62 (Mass. Sec. Div. Feb. 21,, 2020) (explaining
that the regulation would apply a fiduciary conduct standard to broker-dealers and agents “when
they make recommendations or provide advice with respect to securities”).
344. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
345. See Robinhood Compl., supra note 227, at 20, 24.
346. See Dean Seal, Robinhood Fight Will Test Mass. Securities Chief’s Authority, LAW360
(May 7, 2021, 3:49 PM), https://www.law360.com/securities/articles/1378416 [https://perma.cc/
5R4N-GL3W]. For the argument that federal law neither expressly nor implicitly preempts these
regulations, see Maria E. Vaz Ferreira, Note, Staying True to NSMIA: A Roadmap for Successful
State Fiduciary Rules After Reg BI, 94 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 557, 579–83 (2020).
347. See Robinhood Fin., LLC v. Galvin, No. 2184CV00884, 2022 WL 1720131, at *14–15
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2022), appeal filed (Sept. 6, 2022); see also Lauren Berg, Robinhood
Gets Judge To Strike Down Mass. Investment Rule, LAW360 (Mar. 30, 2022, 11:28 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1479359/robinhood-gets-judge-to-strike-down-massinvestment-rule [https://perma.cc/2ZQ6-GCUD] (situating the Robinhood enforcement action
within the state securities regulator’s broader efforts to promote a robust state investor-protection
regime); Chris Villani, Campbell Wins Mass. AG Primary, Galvin Survives Challenge, LAW360
(Sept. 6, 2022, 10:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1527748/campbell-wins-mass-agprimary-galvin-survives-challenge [https://perma.cc/L7EC-A858] (noting that incumbent Bill
Galvin was reelected in a contested primary for his “eighth term” as “the state’s longest serving
Secretary of the Commonwealth, overseeing the state’s . . . enforcement of securities” laws).
348. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
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speculative asset markets. But we also shouldn’t overstate their
promise, especially at the state level. Even the viable fiduciary claims
remain state law, limiting their scope until the SEC completes the
unfinished work of Dodd-Frank in harmonizing the broker-dealer and
investment adviser standards of conduct.
C. Securities Law’s Role in Picking the Investment Game’s Winners
Gamification, and calls to regulate it, highlight a tension at the
core of securities markets. Investing is an essential way of growing
wealth in a capitalist economy, and securities law expresses a
normative commitment toward protecting investors. Securities
regulation was historically concerned about compensation in the form
of commissions, as well as the kinds of conflicts of interest this would
generate. The emergence of a business model that gives rise to
nonsalient compensation, and equally important but less apparent
conflicts of interests, raises tensions about what securities law is trying
to accomplish in its investor-protection goals.
These tensions are likewise reflected in techno-pessimist concerns
that investment games, left unchecked, will lead retail investors to
become increasingly skeptical toward finance and toward markets
themselves.349 That investment games will generate this skepticism is in
some sense inevitable. Across many types of asset markets today,
prices simply do not reflect anything like fundamental value, if that can
even be ascertained.350 From the perspective of traditional finance’s
concern for intrinsic or fundamental value, market prices are often
inaccurate.351 Yet securities law encourages an arms race in developing
349. See supra notes 236–245 and accompanying text.
350. What is the intrinsic value of Dogecoin? See Martin C. W. Walker, Impossible Finance
— the Zero Coupon Perpetual Bond, MEDIUM (Feb. 21, 2019), https://martincwwalker.medi
um.com/impossible-finance-the-perpetual-zero-coupon-bond-eaf4460d80ef [https://perma.cc/ZE
7Z-RP44] (drawing on bond valuation theory to zero in on the value of assets like cryptocurrencies that
pay no coupon in perpetuity); see also, e.g., Savva Shanaev, Satish Sharma, Arina Shuraeva &
Binam Ghimire, The Marginal Cost of Mining, Metcalfe’s Law, and Cryptocurrency Value
Formation: Causal Inferences from the Instrumental Variable Approach 2, 11–26 (June 7, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3432431 [https://perma.cc/9SY3-ARS7] (reporting
evidence from causal inference methods that transaction data is inconsistent with “widely
considered important” factors for valuation of proof-of-work cryptocurrencies).
351. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 253, at 988–96 (discussing causes of market-price
inaccuracies, and consequences for markets); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 481, 483–84
(2003) (noting reasons why “a significant divergence between security prices and fundamental
value can develop,” and citing evidence of “sustained mispricings and inefficiencies in capital
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physical infrastructure and trading algorithms that can earn very small
profits, many times a day, to “correct” mispricings or promote price
discovery across distance in continuous time.352 One recent working
paper estimates that this imposes a modest tax on trading and increases
the social costs of liquidity.353 The goal is ensuring that market prices
are infinitesimally precise—in the form of constantly updated limit
order books deep with liquidity and transparency across geographically
dispersed execution venues in continuous time.
Viewed at a high enough level of generality, the technologies that
enable liquidity, price discovery, and price transparency are central to
constructing and stabilizing financial markets. These technologies give
financial actors the ability to communicate, process, calculate,
speculate, and do other things with vast reams of financial data.
Innovation has long served the production of these goods, back to even
before the days of the ticker tape.354 And retail investors have long used
these innovative technologies in engaging with markets. As Alex Preda
describes contemporaneous accounts of watching the stock market in
the broker’s office around 1907, one’s “ability to watch and be in
touch” with markets and pricing information “all the time was a key
condition of playing the [investing] game.”355 In this sense, retail stock
trading has had a gameful-play element since its earliest days—one that
has always been interwoven with technological advances in price
transparency.
Technology is thus central to the maintenance of securities
markets: in how traders interact with posted bids and spreads, trades
cross in matching engines, and proprietary trading algorithms shave
markets”). See generally SHILLER, supra note 203 (offering a theory of behavioral finance and
bubbles in asset markets).
352. See Andrew G. Haldane, The Race to Zero, in THE GLOBAL MACRO ECONOMY AND
FINANCE 245, 261–62 (Franklin Allen, Masahiko Aoki, Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki,
Roger Gordon & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2012) (“If the way to make money is to make markets,
and the way to market markets is to make haste, the result is likely to be a race – an arms race to
zero latency . . . . Arms races rarely have a winner.”). See McNamara, supra note 274, at 73–75.
353. See generally Matteo Aquilina, Eric Budish & Peter O’Neill, Quantifying the HighFrequency Trading “Arms Race,” 137 Q.J. ECON. 493 (2022) (estimating the tax at 17 percent).
354. Alex Preda, Socio-Technical Agency in Financial Markets: The Case of the Stock Ticker,
36 SOC. STUD. SCI. 753, 760–61 (2006). See generally Devin Kennedy, The Machine in the Market:
Computers and the Infrastructure of Price at the New York Stock Exchange, 1965–1975, 47 SOC.
STUD. SCI. 888 (2017) (discussing the history and use of market data technology to disseminate
information about securities).
355. ALEX PREDA, FRAMING FINANCE: THE BOUNDARIES OF MARKETS AND MODERN
CAPITALISM 133 (2009) [hereinafter PREDA, FRAMING FINANCE].
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miniscule profits by arbitraging stale prices. Given this, however, it’s
puzzling that securities regulation has formally kept technology at
arm’s length as a regulatory object. In a semantic analysis of SEC
commissioner speeches from 1935 to 2010, Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra
argues that regulators have increasingly framed technology as a kind
of exogenous, “inscrutable force[] that act[s] upon markets with
seemingly little possibility of control.”356 The result is to naturalize
expectations among the regulated community, and among regulators
themselves, about law’s role in constituting and constraining market
forces.
So how should securities law prioritize technology’s role in
producing information about markets that is valuable for a select few
participants? Noting securities law’s somewhat ambivalent stance
toward new technology, legal scholar Eric C. Chaffee offers one
approach in the context of virtual investments.357 Like former SEC
Commissioner Roisman, he has encouraged clarity and a light
regulatory touch to encourage technological innovation.358 There is
some merit to the light-regulatory-touch approach, especially when
there is an uncertain forward path of technological innovation in the
kinds of projects that will attract capital investment. In my view, the
social welfare case for intervention is stronger, however, where
evidence suggests innovative technologies use behaviorally
exploitative methods to produce order flow—generating significant
harms to capital markets’ allocative functions and to retail investors
themselves.
Whichever way securities law decides to intervene here, it is
certain to shape trading technology’s development. As Frank Pasquale
has observed, contrary to the view “that the technology of finance is
independent of legal rules, such rules are in fact a prime driver of
technological developments in finance.”359 Market structure and the

356. Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra, Where Are the Market Devices? Exploring the Links Among
Regulation, Markets, and Technology at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 1935–2010, 49
THEORY & SOC’Y 245, 271 (2020).
357. See Eric C. Chaffee, Securities Regulation in Virtual Space, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1387, 1454–56 (2017); cf. Pardo-Guerra, supra note 356, at 246 (studying “the relative neglect of
technology as an object of [securities] regulation”).
358. See Chaffee, supra note 357, at 1454–56; Seal, supra note 60.
359. Frank Pasquale, Law’s Acceleration of Finance: Redefining the Problem of HighFrequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2015).
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activity of market participants are largely inseparable from the legal
rules that construct those markets.360
Technology like gamification pits the interests of retail investors
against those of sophisticated financial intermediaries. Securities law
has pushed arrangements that encourage informationally noisy
engagement with capital markets that makes it valuable for dealers to
try to do information arbitrage and promote price transparency. That
arms race is socially costly, as it diverts investment from the real
economy into efforts to shave miniscule rents from improvements in
intermediation, liquidity, and price transparency.361 These are
important services to provide in a continuous-time geographically
dispersed market. But that kind of market structure is not necessary,
making investments in arbitraging seem like significant diversions of
attention and capital toward unproductive ends. An ambitious
legislative response would be to address these market structure
features that have encouraged gamification practices to emerge.362
Recall that market fragmentation and continuous-time nationally best
pricing have created undesirable opportunities for the arbitrage that
makes gamification profitable. Reform might address those structural
issues instead of the app design that inexorably flows from it—
addressing the disease directly, not just treating the symptoms.363

360. Recent scholarship on law and political economy, for instance, has underscored law’s
(and legal scholarship’s) market-structuring role in “determining who is subject to market
ordering and on what terms and who is exempted in favor of other kinds of protection or
provision.” Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 226, at 1833 (noting that “law is . . . perennially
involved in creating and enforcing the terms of economic ordering” through the institutional
design of markets).
361. See supra notes 352–353 and accompanying text.
362. As John Coffee suggested in an op-ed, a “major redesign of market structure” would
“face the most organized resistance.” Coffee, supra note 176. For examples of the SEC floating
reforms like a ban on PFOF and the resistance that has followed, see Katherine Doherty & Lydia
Beyoud, Wall Street Gets Ready To Rumble over Stock-Trading Rules, BLOOMBERG (June 23,
2022, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-23/robinhood-hood-stocktrading-could-lead-to-new-sec-rules [https://perma.cc/C4YD-PGP6]; Katherine Doherty, Former
SEC Chair Clayton Defends Payment for Order Flow Model, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 3, 2022, 11:22
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/former-sec-chair-clayton-defends-paymentfor-order-flow-model [https://perma.cc/UU34-CZPY].
363. Some regulators, scholars, and consumer advocates have called for Congress to prohibit
the practice of payment for order flow, on the notion that this will address distributional concerns
about gamification. See, e.g., Benjamin Bain & Robert Schmidt, Gensler Swims Against Tide in
Payment-for-Order-Flow Fight, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2021, 4:35 PM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2021-08-31/gensler-swims-against-tide-floating-payment-for-order-flowban [https://perma.cc/GS7Q-NG36]. But standing alone a ban on PFOF would appear not to

TIERNEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

INVESTMENT GAMES

10/16/2022 11:36 AM

443

Financial scholars have suggested that a solution to this arms race is to
switch from continuous-time pricing to periodic batch auctions.364
This kind of technocratic solution still would not get at the
underlying incentive structure that produces gamification, however.
Today the regulation of modern stock markets largely promotes the
sectoral interests of sophisticated financial intermediaries in the guise
of producing two quasi-public goods: liquidity and price discovery.365
The political economy of capital markets regulation has, since the
beginning, found ways of making order flow more legible to promote
the production of those goods.366 Self-regulated groups of market
participants have evolved to claim these goods as private property,
seeking to protect them as sources of private wealth and profit.367 These
goods are profitable for their producers.368 Technological innovation
enables lower costs of acquiring information, which begets an incentive
for greater innovation. But as economist Roxana Mihet has suggested,
if rational uninformed investors have an incentive to exit informationrich markets, “financial technology reduc[tion of] barriers to access . . .

address other first- and third-party harms from investment gaming, even if it might make the
business model less profitable.
364. See, e.g., Budish et al., supra note 112, at 1594–1608; cf. Yi-Tsung Lee, Roberto Riccó &
Kai Wang, Frequent Batch Auctions vs. Continuous Trading: Evidence from Taiwan 3 (Feb. 25,
2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3733682 [https://perma.cc/GZD54BG6] (studying Taiwan Stock Exchange’s switch from frequent batch auctions to continuous
trading, and noting that “[w]hile frequent batch auctions can potentially increase liquidity
provision and reduce the severity of crashes, they can also reduce pre-trade transparency and the
number of strategies implementable by investors”).
365. See MATTLI, supra note 104, at 5–6.
366. See PREDA, FRAMING FINANCE, supra note 355, at 241–43 (suggesting that “the
observational mode of the microscope, allowing the continuous observation of price flows in real
time, is the dominant mode of global financial markets,” and situating this within a larger project
tracing the development of this mode over time). See generally David C. Donald, Information,
and the Regulation of Inefficient Markets, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION (Emilios Avgouleas & David C. Donald eds., 2019) (describing the role of
information production in market design).
367. See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH
AND INEQUALITY 208 (2019) (“The key to understanding the basis of power and the resulting
distribution of wealth lies . . . in the process of bestowing legal protection on select assets and to
do so as a matter of private, not public, choice.”).
368. See generally, e.g., Charles M. Jones, Understanding the Market for U.S. Equity Market
Data (Aug. 31, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/
cjones/papers/2018.08.31%20US%20Equity%20Market%20Data%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.c
c/AAR9-7NT9] (analyzing the market conditions of and uses for equity market data).
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deter[s] financial market participation.”369 Innovative technology that
enables information production may cause exit by investors who will
forgo earning equity risk premiums. If so, it “may be worsening
financial income inequality.”370
How to regulate gamified investing is thus but the most recent
battle over the design of legal rules that distribute surplus not from
market exchange, but from the production of markets as goods
themselves. Taken together, this illustrates securities law’s orientation
toward elevating the interests of financial exchanges and
intermediaries above other capital markets participants. In doing so, it
risks overlooking an alternative conception of markets in which price
discovery and liquidity are but means to ends: components of markets
that are oriented toward the public interest and are valuable primarily
insofar as they are effective at producing and encouraging human
flourishing.
Let’s wrap up by situating investment games within this sketchy
effort to offer a political economy of retail investment regulation.
Retail traders don’t beat the market by trading actively. We shouldn’t
expect brokers, wholesalers, and other market intermediaries to ignore
incentives to encourage retail investors to trade excessively in service
of price discovery and liquidity. The uncompensated labor of retail
investors in generating noisy, volatile order flow is an input to the
production of those two goods. So from intermediaries’ perspective,
gamified investing may be an integral part of generating data for their
profit.371
But securities law doesn’t have to sit idly by, either. And it should
not succumb to the notion that we should promote noisy trading by
retail investors in service of infinitesimally precise but wildly inaccurate
prices. The consequences of doing so are to drive misallocation of
capital, divert investment and attention from the real economy to the
financial economy, and potentially endanger ordinary people’s
financial security and achievement of their long-term goals. We might
even welcome the skepticism that gamification casts toward the social
functions of stock markets. If “meme stocks” and investment games
reveal these disjointed problems with asset pricing and capital

369. Roxana Mihet, Who Benefits from Innovations in Financial Technology? 3 (Jan. 9, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://news.unil.ch/document/1578925328797.D1578925328891
[https://perma.cc/WP65-4XGP].
370. Id.
371. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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allocation, that would be a welcome antidote to our understanding of
what capital markets in late capitalism are even for.
*

*

*

To summarize Part III, there are several plausible social welfare
justifications for regulating gamified investing and related digital
engagement practices. Encouraging retail investors to churn their own
accounts for noisy reasons, and potentially to excess, is likely to
degrade market quality and the processes by which financial markets
allocate capital to projects that will grow the real economy. It may also
harm investors directly, preventing them from achieving their financial
goals.
Regulators concerned about gamification’s consequences have a
menu of potential interventions to choose from. These interventions
run the range from modest (disclosure) to ambitious (market structure
reform). The most politically achievable and plausibly effective
interventions likely involve a combination of modest tweaks to existing
sales practices rules and the adoption of compliance-like monitoring
duties—either standalone or as part of extending fiduciary duties to
brokers. Yet merely technocratic tweaks like these do not address a
normative problem underlying gamified investing: that it sees retail
investors not as participants in the economic project of encouraging
widespread human flourishing, but as sacrifices to the production of
price discovery and liquidity in the market.
CONCLUSION
Gamified brokerage apps make trading more fun. That will always
be a problem for regulators who must face the headwinds for being
spoilsports. There are plausible social welfare reasons, however, for
regulators to prohibit or limit gamification and other digital
engagement practices. As always, regulators should be cautious to
tailor interventions consistent with empirical evidence. But in doing so,
securities law should be attuned to cross-sectional differences in retail
investors’ trading motives. Those differences may align with objections
to gamification in investing apps in the first place but are often
overlooked.
Securities law has a number of doctrinal interventions for
addressing the associated principal-agent, surplus allocation, and
externality concerns. Most promising are those that try to get at
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whether trading is quantitatively suitable, or those that harmonize the
standards of conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers.
Regulators should also consider the problems that give rise to gamified
investing, making it profitable to stock a pond with noisy order flow
from retail investors. But a bold and modern securities law would not
stop at small fixes; it would step in to address the market structure
problem too.

